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ABSTRACT	  
 
This study analyses the mediation and mediatisation of the Cole Inquiry, formally 
known as the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-
Food Programme, which investigated whether breaches of United Nations’ trade 
sanctions by Australia’s monopoly wheat exporter, AWB Limited, broke any 
Australian law. This thesis explores how a political “framing war” over responsibility 
for the scandal impacted on media coverage of the Cole Inquiry. 
Using news-framing theory and qualitative methods this thesis investigates how the 
Inquiry was reported, how legal and political communicators influenced news 
reportage and in turn how the media influenced the presentation of the Inquiry 
process. The study draws on expert interviews, news-framing and transcript 
analyses, and a case study to document and analyse interactions between the 
media, lawyers, and others with a stake in shaping public perceptions of the Cole 
Inquiry.  
The study finds that media representations of the Inquiry were not just accurate 
accounts of legal process, but a co-production involving legal performers, strategic 
communications professionals, politicians and journalists. The research illustrates 
that journalists’ professional practices respond to legal process and are shaped by 
legal communications. It indicates that lawyers appearing at the Inquiry can be seen 
as performing for the media and reacting to media coverage. It extends research on 
the role of court information officers as a “bridge” between lawyers and journalists, 
indicating how such internal strategic communications professionals might also 
function as frame sponsors. A case study concludes that externally sponsored 
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source material from politicians and political strategists had a marked impact on 
news journalists’ framing of the Cole Inquiry. 
In analysing the extent of the Cole Inquiry’s mediatisation, this research develops a 
more nuanced understanding of the differences between legal and media 
interpretations of public hearings than has previously emerged from journalism and 
media studies of political scandals. It presents a complex account of the ways in 
which legal and political frame sponsors can influence the way journalists shape the 
“truth” of legal process for the public. 
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ACRONYMS	  AND	  TERMS	  
 
ABC – Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Australia’s national public service 
broadcaster. 
Alia – Alia for Transportation and General Trade: Jordan-based trucking company 
that received fees from AWB and paid them to Iraqi government entities. 
AusAID – Australian Agency for International Development. 
AWB – AWB Limited: monopoly Australian wheat trader formed from the 1999 
privatisation of the national Australian Wheat Board.  
AWBI – AWB International Limited: subsidiary of AWB that conducted international 
grains trade.  
Counsel Assisting – Counsel Assisting the Inquiry: barrister appointed by the 
Inquiry to conduct the investigation and present evidence at hearings.   
Cole Inquiry – Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-
for-Food Programme: named after its Commissioner Terence R. H. Cole (coll. the 
Oil-for-Food Inquiry). 
DFAT – Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
IGB – Iraqi Grains Board. 
OFFP – Oil-for-Food Programme: UN program for supply of humanitarian goods 
funded from sales of Iraqi oil. 
Ronly – a British shipping company used, at one point, to pay fees to Iraq. 
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Single Desk – The system under the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 that meant AWB 
(International) Limited was exclusive marketer for all bulk exports of Australian 
wheat. 
UN – United Nations. 
Volcker report/inquiry – the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food programme, named after its Chair, Paul Volcker. 
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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
 
 
On the afternoon of 27 November 2006, scores of journalists across the Canberra 
press gallery offices at Australia’s Parliament House hastily ripped plain brown paper 
wrapping from freshly delivered packages containing the five-volume report of the 
Cole Inquiry – officially, the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to 
the UN Oil-for-Food Programme, presided over by Commissioner, the Honourable 
Terence R. H. Cole AO, RFD, QC (Cole, 2006). For many journalists, including me, 
this was the culmination of about six months of intensive reporting on public hearings 
into what had been widely reported as the “Wheat for Weapons” scandal.1 The Cole 
Inquiry had been the biggest story in Sydney for much of the year and had 
dominated national newspapers as well as radio and television news bulletins. Now 
the final report was being tabled in the Australian Parliament. 
The media reporting had explored both commercial and political responsibility for the 
scandal. The slogan “Wheat for Weapons” neatly encapsulated the idea that AWB 
Limited, Australia’s monopoly wheat exporter, had paid millions of dollars in secret 
commissions to the Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein, in breach of UN trade 
sanctions and in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq by a military coalition that 
included Australia.2 In many reports, a “boy’s own adventure” photo of Trevor 
Flugge, the former chairman of AWB, naked from waist up and playing with a pistol 
in post-war-ravaged Iraq, implied breaches of ethical responsibility. AWB’s activities 
resulted in “the largest case of corruption in Australia’s corporate history” (Coghlan & 
                                                
1 See Chapter 4 pp. 95–8 for details on the scope of reporting that used this slogan. 
2 AWB Limited was a private company and Australia’s monopoly wheat exporter. Its precursor, the Australian 
Wheat Board, was a government entity privatised so recently (1999) that it was often still mistakenly called the 
Australian Wheat Board. The first contract containing “kickbacks” was negotiated when it was still the Board. 
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Dunlop, 2006, p. 82), but there was also close media scrutiny of what the Howard 
government knew about the extent of this illegality. Journalists pursued political 
culpability and critiqued the inquiry’s failure to explore the government’s role, to the 
point that Commissioner Cole called the then Prime Minister to give evidence. 
Using framing analysis and other qualitative methods, this thesis will examine how 
journalists interpreted the inquiry hearings for the Australian public, and what shaped 
their representations of this investigation into a highly politicised scandal.  It analyses 
how their work was influenced by, and influenced, the conduct of Inquiry lawyers as 
well as other communications professionals involved in the event. It also examines 
how the dominant media frames reflected a political battle between the Howard 
government and its opposition over the purpose and significance of the inquiry. In 
these senses the study investigates how justice was mediated and mediatised, via a 
case study of this Inquiry, which was constituted under the Royal Commissions Act 
1902. 
The Cole Inquiry was set up to investigate a scandal with apparent implications for 
the federal government’s reputation in trade and international relations. Between 
1990 and 2003 Saddam Hussein’s government was under UN economic sanctions, 
ostensibly supported by the Australian government, which aimed to prevent the 
regime getting cash to purchase weapons, including those with the potential for 
mass destruction. To mitigate the human cost of the sanctions, the UN Oil-for-Food 
programme (OFFP) held Iraq’s oil sales revenue and released funds for 
humanitarian purchases such as food and medicines. AWB Limited was the single 
largest corrupter of the OFFP, paying Iraqi government entities quasi-bribes or 
kickbacks amounting to $A294 million over five years to secure Australian wheat 
sales (Volcker, Goldstone & Pieth, 2005). 
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During the inquiry a number of senior news journalists sought material that would 
confirm political allegations that the government was implicated in the scandal – 
particularly the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer – by having 
knowledge of the sanction breaches. Yet the report of the Cole Inquiry into these 
matters found that the government was not involved – neither the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) nor government ministers knew about the illicit 
payments. It did, however, find the Wheat Export Authority did not perform its 
function of monitoring AWB International Limited (AWBI) in relation to the Iraq wheat 
sales, and criticised DFAT. 
When the then Attorney-General, Phillip Ruddock, tabled the inquiry report in the 
federal parliament he claimed: 
No other country has undertaken such an open and far-reaching 
inquiry …. As Commissioner Cole states in the Prologue to the 
Report: “AWB has cast a shadow over Australia’s reputation in 
international trade. That shadow has been removed by Australia’s 
intolerance of inappropriate conduct in trade, demonstrated by 
shining the bright light of this independent public inquiry on AWB’s 
conduct.” (Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 
record of proceedings, November 27, 2006a, p. 43) 
As this speech was being broadcast in the Canberra press gallery, a few groans 
could be heard over the tapping of keyboards. Journalists had not been given 
embargo time to examine the report before Ruddock’s speech, and now they had to 
race to deliver reports, reaction and analysis. “The government is off the hook” was 
the consensus established as reporters rapidly searched the tomes for a clear 
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summary of findings and recommendations. They called out as they found what they 
sought, often with page references: “Downer is exonerated,” “ten AWB 
prosecutions,” and “he [Cole] has had a go at DFAT.” 
Around the country the government’s apparent exoneration led news coverage of 
Cole’s final report, as did the recommendation for criminal prosecutions. Newspaper 
features with analysis followed but, within days, the across-the-board media 
coverage of the scandal evaporated because, despite earlier media critiques, an 
independent and powerful Inquiry had made its findings (McConnell, Gauja, Botterill, 
& Courtenay, 2008; Prasser, 2006). 
THE PROBLEM 
Terence Cole’s finding that the Howard government did not know about the payment 
of kickbacks was often reported as the inquiry absolving government of culpability in 
this affair. Yet on the face of it, Cole’s conclusion appeared to be at odds with the 
widely reported evidence presented in the hearings about reports and tip-offs to 
government ministers or departmental staff. At the time, this evidence excited much 
media attention, and was used by the federal opposition to bolster arguments for 
ministers and the Prime Minister to directly explain their roles.  
Since the inquiry, the lack of any political or legal consequence for the Howard 
government has been the subject of debate in parliament, media commentary, and 
academic examination in a variety of disciplines. It has spawned a theatre production 
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and a book3 and commentators and academics have asked why there was no long-
running public outrage about the inquiry outcome. 
This thesis makes no attempt to re-try those issues. It does aim to examine the 
construction and framing of inquiry media coverage, to shed light on the apparent 
disjuncture between news reports of the hearings and the legal and political 
conclusion. 
The Cole Inquiry and its report stuck closely to carefully crafted and narrow terms of 
reference, which were to look at whether Australian companies had broken the law 
through paying kickbacks in export contracts under the UN’s OFFP (Nethercote, 
2007). Nethercote says the inquiry brief was interpreted as a matter of law, rather 
than viewed in a broader policy and regulatory context. While DFAT officials were 
criticised for failing to act on warnings, the governmental failure to ensure Australian 
trade complied with the OFFP was not scrutinised (Farrall & Rubenstein, 2009, p. 
186). Cole did, however, recommend law reform around the oversight of UN trade 
sanctions and the powers of the regulator, the Wheat Export Authority, that were 
enacted in 2007–8. 
However, members of the public who did not delve directly into the evidence, which 
was lengthy, manifold, and technically complex, may have been left with an 
inaccurate impression from news reports that the inquiry was charged with delving 
into the political and governance contexts. I will not be examining the audience 
reception of Inquiry news, but rather how and why news stories conveyed such an 
impression, work that could provide a basis for further research on audience studies 
of legal reporting. 
                                                
3 The play was Deeply Offensive and Utterly Untrue (Version 1.0, 2007). The book was Caroline Overington’s 
Kickback: Inside the Australian Wheat Board Scandal (Overington, 2007). 
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This thesis is grounded in the well-researched communication and media studies 
theory of mediatisation, “in which media have become increasingly influential in and 
deeply integrated into different spheres of society” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 
244), to the point that the media frames politics and political discourse for the public 
and thus shapes political process (see Hjarvard, 2008). A feature of mediatisation is 
that: “political institutions, organizations and actors more or less reactively or 
proactively adapt to the media and their own needs to communicate through the 
media” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 244). This work will argue that public inquiries, 
which are politically constituted legal processes, can be similarly mediatised. 
The title of this thesis, Mediating justice, refers to the media’s reporting and 
interpretation of the inquiry to the public. However, this quasi-judicial process, 
headed by a former judge, was exposed to an extraordinary level of media scrutiny 
and in a highly charged political context, prior to the 2007 federal election.4 
Therefore, it is critical to analyse whether the presence of journalists might have 
impacted on Inquiry-related communications processes so that, in effect, those 
public proceedings became focused on, or at least involved in, shaping the media’s 
framing of the legal proceedings. 
THE RESEARCH FOCUS 
This thesis does not pursue a research question, but rather, two hypotheses. The 
first is that the news coverage of the Cole Inquiry was influenced by, and in turn 
influenced, legal “performance” in what many regarded as a politically expedient 
                                                
4 The Australian Law Reform Commission says a federal Royal Commission exercises powers usually exercised 
by courts, but does not decide or determine, so the powers and functions are not judicial (Australian Law reform 
Commission, p.1288, 2008). 
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event (Prasser, 2006, pp. 79-80). Second, it proposes that the coverage was shaped 
by the conflict in national political discourse, and by politicians and strategic 
communications professionals with a stake in determining the outcome of that 
conflict. 
These propositions developed from my interest in addressing a basic question about 
the construction of court and Inquiry reporting: what is the difference between a 
transcript and a news report? The obvious answer is a great deal, in length, style of 
language, narrative structure and purpose, and partly because, as Australian judges 
acknowledge, the media approaches courts looking for newsworthy stories rather 
than just the legal facts of a matter (French, 2005; Gleeson, 2007). As the next 
chapter will acknowledge, many excellent journalism studies have outlined the 
practice-based nature of this interpretative process. However, my research explores 
the range of interrelated mediatised practices and the professional relationships that 
inform a journalist’s interpretative framework. 
AIMS 
This work analyses why there are differences between the Cole Inquiry’s accounts of 
its purpose, process and outcomes, and news journalists’ reporting of these to the 
public. It has three aims: 
1) to investigate how news reports of the inquiry were mediated by journalists in their 
professional practices and their interactions with strategic communicators and other 
stakeholders in the political debate 
2) to explore how journalists and lawyers participated in the mediatisation of Inquiry 
hearings 
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3) to analyse how the mediatisation of legal process contributed to the journalistic 
framing of the inquiry. 
Much journalism research assumes the media can report the “reality” of a legal 
process, and that journalists get it right or wrong for various technical reasons. Legal 
reporting is often considered, for want of a better word, unmanipulated, because 
journalists receive the raw data – evidence – and must report it faithfully, according 
to the reporting privilege rules that protect the operation of an independent legal 
system. Instead, this work argues that the reporting, or mediation, of a public Inquiry 
in a highly complex, politicised and media-saturated environment must be seen as a 
co-constructed process, involving at least journalists, lawyers and those professional 
communicators with whom they exchange information during the period of coverage. 
The Cole Inquiry, for example, employed its own information and communications 
officer, and the hearings involved the constant presence of other media 
professionals who offered interpretations of evidence on behalf of their political or 
corporate employers. I aim to demonstrate how journalists’ interactions with those 
strategic communicators affected the reporting and framing of the inquiry’s activities. 
I will also explore how lawyers’ “performances” may have impacted on news reports, 
and, in turn, how reporting may have influenced legal “performance’’, if not process. 
From observation, interviews and close comparison of transcripts and news stories, I 
will show that legal professionals at times played to the news media and that 
journalists interpreted lawyers’ actions as a “performance” within the overarching 
political debate around the event. Thus the presentation of evidence by lawyers, their 
rhetorical strategies, their authority to direct media attention, and their relative legal 
importance, became elements in shaping the news reporting and hence the 
development of the scandal, even though it did not as obviously influence the 
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proceedings or the inquiry findings. If we also factor in the media’s interest in 
entertaining legal “performance” to an understanding the way the inquiry was 
represented, this allows a more nuanced and accurate analysis of what is often seen 
as the chasm between news and the legal processes reporters are witnessing. 
Finally McConnell et al, (2008) suggest the role played by official inquiries in helping 
frame political contests over meaning should be factored into any analysis of the 
blame management of the Iraq wheat scandal. In relation to the Cole Inquiry, this 
work will examine whether it was the media that helped create public expectations 
that government culpability was being closely examined, or the legal “performance” 
of the Cole Inquiry and its political framing that fulfilled this role. Using news source 
and transcript analyses, together with interviews, this thesis will argue mediatised 
legal “performances” and campaigning by various political and corporate actors were 
significant contributors to that framing contest. 
In these three ways this study aims to provide insights into the media’s construction 
of the Cole Inquiry that add to the body of knowledge on the AWB oil-for-food 
scandal and move well beyond the focus on the partisan political claims made about 
its role, purpose and outcomes. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The issues raised by the AWB scandal are significant for any democracy that views 
itself as a fair player on the international political stage, given that they involved 
international sanctions, humanitarian aid, and compliance with international anti-
bribery law. In domestic terms the issues were just as large, and included corporate 
governance, government oversight of international trade obligations, and the alleged 
misuse of legal professional privilege by AWB to deny the Cole Inquiry access to 
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incriminating documents (Haller, 2009). These are the reasons journalists “mined” 
the Cole Inquiry hearings, documents and sources for information that would 
address the proper or improper conduct of those activities. 
It is critical, then, to understand why records of a legal investigation and news 
reports of that process might draw different conclusions about its role in the carriage 
of justice. This research will show how reporting practices such as newsworthiness 
and photojournalism contribute to narrative “framing” of legal process that can be at 
odds with the actual enactment of legal process and its outcomes. 
Journalism studies, which have been preoccupied with the influence of political and 
commercial spin on news production and distribution, also need to look at more 
subtle institutionalised forms of influence, particularly where these operate in legal 
arenas. In terms of the Cole Inquiry this work considers the potential impact of those 
communications professionals who were constantly present at the hearings and 
attempted to explain the evidence on behalf of various competing parties. 
The government’s role in appointing the head of an Inquiry and setting its terms of 
reference clearly demonstrates political influence (Prasser, 2006; Tiffen, 1999). 
Beyond acknowledging that influence, Australian legal and journalism studies largely 
assume the independence of the legal process from the media. This thesis will 
contribute to academic knowledge of the mediatisation of inquiry and royal 
commission reporting, as it delves into the less-studied relationship between news 
media coverage and legal “performance”. This is a little-explored area, particularly in 
the communications field where conflict between the language and aims of the legal 
world and those of the media gain the lion’s share of attention. 
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It is important to analyse the impact of legal “performance” on what gets reported as 
news, because many judges and legal academics largely dismiss this field of 
influence. The term “performance”, through its association with theatricality, has long 
had a pejorative meaning in the legal profession (Leader, 2008), which portrays itself 
as acting with probity and revering procedural fairness (Daniel, 1998). However, its 
significance to effective court conduct is well recognised in performance studies 
(Auslander, 1999, 2008; Rogers, 2008). The impact of legal “performance” in a 
mediatised environment has also been analysed in theatre and performance studies 
(Leader, 2008; Lubin, 2008). 
To a more modest degree this research will extend on scandal studies by closely 
examining the factors influencing the generation of news media content from the 
hearings phase of the inquiry, which was a central part of “the unfolding dynamics” of 
the AWB scandal. This will flesh out how news coverage contributed to the Howard 
government’s weathering of the scandal, where it “successfully negotiated a blame 
minefield” (McConnell et al., 2008, p. 613). 
BACKGROUND 
Media reports of the extensive corruption of the OFFP first emerged in the Iraqi 
newspaper al-Madain in 2004, and this triggered an investigation headed by former 
US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (McMahon, 2006). AWB’s extensive 
dealings in Iraq were strongly pursued in early 2005 by journalist Caroline 
Overington, who won a Walkley Award for her reporting for The Australian. However, 
John Howard’s Coalition government only set up the Cole Inquiry in late 2005, after 
the Volcker report confirmed the extent of AWB’s corruption of the UN humanitarian 
scheme (Volcker, Goldstone, & Pieth, 2005), and the UN requested domestic action.  
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The then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kevin Rudd, had been 
pursuing the issue, and his claims were reported, but it took these local legal 
proceedings to move the focus of almost all of the Australian media onto the AWB 
story, taking it from a slow burn to what political scientist Rod Tiffen calls a “self-
sustaining” scandal (Tiffen,1999, p. 45), involving the wheat trading company, its 
subsidiaries and the Howard government. The federal opposition, particularly Rudd, 
continued to push claims of government culpability in and outside the parliament, 
and MPs used the Cole Inquiry hearings to pursue that agenda.5 
The government’s political response was first to blame the UN, then later the wheat 
exporter and “ministers used both political language and the authority of the Cole 
Inquiry to steer blame towards the AWB Limited and the UN” (McConnell et al., 
2008, p. 601). Responsibility for overseeing compliance with UN sanctions lay with 
the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer, and trade matters lay with the 
Trade Minister, Mark Vaile. Both entered the witness box to face questions. 
International media joined the coverage when Australia’s Prime Minister, John 
Howard, was also called to give evidence and senior members of the Canberra 
press gallery crowded around the regular reporters’ reserved seating, creating what 
is colloquially known as a “media circus”. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Throughout this thesis I will use framing theory to understand how journalists 
interpreted the complex, politically contentious legal proceedings they covered. This 
body of theory has been used for more than 40 years to study aspects of media 
                                                
5The Howard government lost power in 2007 to the Labor Party, led by Kevin Rudd. Even though Rudd had 
strongly prosecuted the government’s responsibility for the scandal in 2006, he did not continue to pursue it as an 
election issue, or when he became leader of the Labor Party and later Prime Minister. 
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representation and is particularly useful in analysing the production and editorial 
processes that constrain reporting, as well as identifying the overarching macro-
framing of stories, which creates the audience’s context for understanding events. 
Framing theory is interested in the contextual settings that influence journalists’ 
editorial decisions and the nature of their source relations. During politicised events 
such as inquiries, administrators and their opponents seek frames to define the issue 
or win the discursive struggle (Reese & Lewis, 2009); and the “frame-building 
process takes place in a continuous interaction between journalists and elites” (de 
Vreese, 2005, p. 52) who often act as sources for news stories. 
Stephen Reese (2011) says frames are “organising principles, shared and persistent 
over time working symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). 
With Seth Lewis he identifies one such powerful organising principle, the Bush 
Administration’s “War on Terror” as a macro-level cultural construction that was 
ultimately reified and naturalised by the media (Reese & Lewis, 2009). This has 
some parallel in the Australian media’s adoption of the “Wheat for Weapons” slogan, 
which originated with the federal opposition as part of Kevin Rudd’s campaign to win 
leadership of his party and an upcoming election. While the Coalition government 
promoted the Cole Inquiry as a legitimate and fair investigation into corporate 
wrongdoing, a position its Inquiry staff upheld, its Labor Party opponents sought to 
implicate the executive in the scandal. I argue that the debate over the legitimacy of 
the inquiry terms of reference, as to whether government culpability was being 
scrutinised, became one of the competing frames played out in the media coverage. 
Journalists reported the inquiry hearings in this highly charged political context, daily 
negotiating a discursive struggle or “framing war” over the meaning of the process. 
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As an observer-participant I was present on most hearing days, reporting for radio 
often on an hourly basis. When I had a good lead, which was most of the time, I filed. 
When able, I participated in behind-the-scenes media discussions and assessments 
of the inquiry’s progress, and the “performance” of the witnesses, the Commissioner 
and the lawyers. Often journalists and the lawyers appeared to be participants in a 
game of highlighting the most politically salacious and dramatic, even theatrical, 
elements of the inquiry, appealing to the political “framing war” over the legitimacy of 
legal process. This thesis tests the validity of that perception. 
By examining how journalists did their work at the inquiry, conducting interviews with 
those journalists, analysing the news stories that reinterpreted what was said in 
hearings and comparing these accounts with legal transcripts, I have been able to 
tease out the factors that influenced reporting of this public investigation. Interviews 
with legal participants have also enabled me to interrogate the performative aspects 
of legal practice and to establish, from the other side of the Bar, whether Inquiry 
lawyers think the news media or other communications actors influenced their side of 
proceedings. 
THE CHAPTERS 
This thesis contains seven chapters, including a literature survey, methodology, 
three original research chapters, and my findings in conclusion. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the literature on the role and reporting of inquiries, noting the 
absence of journalism and media studies research on the Cole Inquiry, and the need 
for research on the media’s role in reporting highly politicised legal events. In 
particular, I locate the lack of research on the relationships between journalists and 
legal professionals, then turn to studies and analyses of the mediatisation of law. I 
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explore the argument that this mediatisation involves a complementary move, the 
theatricalisation of legal practice in court – and concerns among Australia’s top 
judges (including Wayne Martin, James Spigelman, Paul de Jersey, Robert French 
and Michael Kirby) about the media’s impact on the administration of justice and 
public perception of the law. 
I then survey the uses of framing theory and Herbert Gans’s concept of frame-
building as a way of analysing the way that interactions between journalists, legal 
practitioners, strategic communications professionals and politicians influence the 
news reports and their representations of the Cole Inquiry. 
Chapter 3 outlines the qualitative methodology used in examining the reporting and 
conduct of the Cole Inquiry through expert interviews, frame analysis of news stories 
and transcript comparisons with media reports. The chapter also outlines the shape 
of a case study, which enables me to demonstrate how this approach can be used to 
analyse the mediatisation and framing of an exemplary day’s hearings. 
The frame-building of scandal stories will be discussed in Chapter 4 which 
concentrates on how news journalists reported on the inquiry based on the particular 
production demands and constraints of their platforms as well as the political context. 
This chapter examines how reporters sourced information, filtered evidence and 
constructed the frames for their news reports. It also reveals how strategic 
communications professionals attempted to influence that process. 
The chapter then provides a framing analysis of ABC Radio news stories on the Cole 
Inquiry and the context for understanding the “framing war” over the scandal as 
conducted not just in political debate, but in and around the hearings. This analysis 
suggests the legal sources, on which most news was based, helped to convey the 
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dominant, and government preferred, pair of media frames – those of AWB Limited’s 
culpability being revealed by an open and fair Inquiry. 
Chapter 5 further explores how the mediatisation of the legal process reinforced 
those frames. I first examine how legal practitioners performed for the inquiry, 
reinforcing its authority and that of its governmental sponsors. I then discuss whether 
lawyers saw themselves as independent legal agents or as playing to the news 
media, armed with the knowledge of what journalists’ reporting priorities would be, 
effectively becoming participants in the mediatised coverage of the AWB scandal. 
This chapter finally considers whether media coverage might have influenced the 
legal process. It outlines the direct interactions between media and lawyers at the 
Cole Inquiry, inside and outside the hearings. I present evidence from expert 
interviews with legal practitioners and journalists, and analyse largely unreported 
events in the hearings, including that following the appearance of Prime Minister 
John Howard, to illustrate one way that the “framing war” was conducted – via a 
legal “performance” tailor-made for news reportage. 
Chapters 5 and 6 build on the work of McConnell et al. (2008), whose research 
suggests that analysis of the Cole Inquiry news coverage can help us to understand 
the government’s “successful” blame management of the AWB scandal. 
Chapter 6 presents a case study of the inquiry’s mediatisation and illustrates the 
“framing war” to determine public perceptions of who was responsible for the AWB 
Limited breaches. It focuses on the day that a senior AWB manager, Michael 
Watson, and the former chairman of the AWB, Trevor Flugge, appeared in the 
witness box and examines why Flugge was the biggest story that day, although he 
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spent less than two hours in the witness box, far less time than Watson, and 
revealed far less about corporate culpability. 
Chapter 6 analyses the impact of Fairfax Media’s publication of a photograph of 
Flugge, taken in a hotel in Iraq, in which he is playfully pointing a pistol at the 
camera. This picture became an iconic representation of the AWB scandal. I argue 
that it was also a pivotal point for the “framing war” being conducted by political and 
professional frame sponsors, and had a significant impact on the media reporting of 
the hearings on that day. 
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATIONS 
In part this study came about after reflecting on the value of the months of my radio 
reporting from the inquiry; thinking about the unusual amount of outside pressure put 
on my interpretation of the story; seeing so many legal and political questions raised 
and not answered; and later, hearing public concerns raised about the findings. 
Covering legal inquiries is a privilege. Journalists get to hear people give evidence 
under oath, relatively free of spin, and see forensic examination designed to get to 
the unvarnished facts of matters. My interaction with, and observation of, other 
journalists covering the Cole Inquiry gave me valuable insights into the ways we (the 
news media) told the story to the public. It also informed my view of how other 
communications practitioners performed to gain our attention and influence the focus 
and substance of our stories. I hope it may prove valuable to make these 
observations more than anecdotal, and to explore systematically the mediatisation of 
this central event in Australia’s political history. 
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That I was present as a radio reporter for a public service broadcaster enhances my 
value as an observer-participant researcher. My hourly deadlines meant I had 
virtually no opportunity to “collude” with other journalists before filing stories and the 
ABC’s strict editorial guidelines ensured I would attend to both the legal detail as well 
as the balance and fairness of the representation. I sometimes participated in 
journalists’ discussions about the hearings and occasional meetings in lunch breaks 
with various members of the media contingent. Consequently I am in a strong 
position to examine closely, through scholarly interviews, attitudes to the inquiry held 
by individual journalists. 
My stories were not always fundamentally different from those of my colleagues, 
which points to the importance of studying the norms of professional practice. 
Indeed, the similarity of angles chosen across much of the media might lead an 
outside researcher to assume some pack mentality or form of collaboration was at 
work. However, as Phillip Schlesinger (1978) says in an early study of the ideological 
constraints of broadcast news, reporting “is the outcome of standardised production 
routines” (p. 106) and “the conventional wisdom of professionalism” (p.134) – 
meaning that a journalist’s professional agreement with colleagues on what is most 
important and interesting demonstrates “that he [sic] knows how to tell his story” (p. 
134). 
I did not have direct contact with all Inquiry stakeholders, so my observations are 
based on a mix of journalistic notes from the time, recall of events, and interview 
data. My observations of strategic communications professionals, particularly the 
inquiry’s media liaison officer, were obtained through regular direct professional 
interaction, but my scholarly interviews have shed new light on their work both from 
their point of view and that of others who interacted with them. While I observed the 
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legal practitioners over the time of the inquiry, I had no previous interaction with 
those who agreed to be interviewed for this thesis. Again, my knowledge of the 
hearings proved to be invaluable in drilling down into lawyers’ views on particular 
events, media reporting and their interpretations of the behaviour of various “actors” 
at the inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the current body of academic work on the AWB scandal explores why there 
were no major implications from the Cole Inquiry for those involved in the 
governance of Australia’s wheat trade and international humanitarian policy. This 
study investigates how the scandal was presented to the public via the media’s 
reporting of legal process, and how it was shaped by mediatised interactions 
between the inquiry stakeholders.  Importantly, the research indicates that despite 
the rules of legal reporting, news of the inquiry was influenced by a broader political 
“framing war” that was underway outside the hearing room. 
This research can contribute to understanding of the way in which news about 
controversial legal inquiries is reported and framed, and illuminate the role that such 
quasi-judicial events might play in the ultimate resolution of scandals of corruption or 
governance. 
The next chapter critically investigates the existing literature on Inquiry reporting, on 
journalism studies of the law and legal views of media reporting. It will also reference 
the literature on legal “performance” and the contemporary mediatisation of legal 
process, to explore the impact on news production. Finally, it will outline the 
application of framing theory to an examination of the mediatised legal event. 
  
 31 
CHAPTER	  2:	  MEDIATISING	  AN	  INQUIRY	  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1970s Australia’s Chief Justice, Gerard Brennan, argued that the courts 
operated independently of the media, unlike the executive and legislature, which had 
a symbiotic relationship with the fourth estate. Courts dispensed justice, he said, 
while the media reported on and critically analysed judicial work in “disparate but 
interlocking functions, which if properly performed by both institutions should 
produce public confidence in the maintenance of the rule of law by the courts” 
(Brennan, 1997). 
Within journalism studies, that functional separation has been generally accepted. 
Research has focused more on the obscurity of legal language and process, legal 
restrictions on reporting and the potential conflict between the aims of courts and the 
media, addressed through the prism of the legal and ethical obligations of journalists 
(Pearson, 2007; Schultz, 1998) than on any symbiosis between the media and 
courts. This chapter will argue, however, that the literature indicates news media 
plays an important role in representing the judicial process to the public, leading to 
the “performance” of legal practitioners being “mediatised,” or adapted to the 
expectations of audiences, affecting aspects of legal presentation (although not 
necessarily process). 
This dynamic is most obvious in royal commissions and inquiries. The raison d’être 
of such legal proceedings is not to pass judgment but to be seen to be publicly 
inquiring into events, with a view to identifying causes of corruption and 
maladministration and identifying ways to improve governance (Prasser, 2006). 
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However, “the use of royal commissions is as much concerned by their symbolic 
value as with their actual utility” (Prasser,1994, p. 5) so they can provide a valuable 
service or be politically expedient and play a role in managing political blame, 
(McConnell et al., 2008). Indeed, their connection with political controversy is 
recognised by Australia’s High Court, which has not released a judge to serve on a 
royal commission since 1918, despite a number of federal government requests 
(Wheeler, 2013). As publicity is a key function of such inquiries, this chapter argues 
that we also need to closely examine the role of media communications 
professionals on staff (media liaison officers) in the mediatisation of such events. 
This chapter will review three major types of literature – academic studies; feature-
length journalism; and public speeches by senior judicial figures – in order to analyse 
the debates around the media’s reporting of inquiries, and legal process more 
generally. It will first look at how inquiries or commissions, have been studied, and 
why they can be considered political events that generate significant public meaning. 
It will then analyse how media, legal, and political scholars have examined the 
interrelationship between the news media and the law. It will question the dominant 
paradigm – understanding reinterpretation of legal language into news media – as an 
adequate way of understanding media reports. It will then suggest a structural 
framework for understanding such reporting and look at the areas where more 
research is needed, and point to the way I have undertaken my research. 
INQUIRIES, POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 
While much of the relevant scholarly work on legal reporting is centred on media and 
cultural studies, the bulk of studies on inquiries and their attendant political scandals 
comes from political science and legal studies. The disciplines of government and 
  
 33 
political science, often incorporating scandal studies, focus on the uses and conduct 
of highly publicised inquiries, and make some interesting findings about the wide 
differences between an Inquiry’s levels of effectiveness and the role the media plays 
in that. 
Political studies indicate inquiries are not just important legal proceedings, but also 
important political events. The most comprehensive study of Australia’s ad hoc (that 
is, discrete, temporary) inquiries by public policy academic and government adviser 
Scott Prasser suggests why the bulk of studies of royal commissions and inquiries 
come from the politics, public policy and legal disciplines. Commissions and inquiries 
are, he says, tools of public administration and drivers of public policy. They are, he 
adds, unique institutions of Australian government, and despite the risk from their 
“publicness” and the potential for “unexpected and embarrassing results,” they are 
“one of the few remaining institutions in our political system largely held in high 
esteem” (Prasser, 2006, p. 5) that can investigate highly contentious issues of 
corruption and maladministration: 
Public inquiries have become an “institution of last resort,” appointed 
to investigate not only scandals, but also many other aspects of 
public administration and public policy because they are perceived to 
have greater independence than other advisory bodies. (Prasser, 
2006, p. 252) 
McConnell et al. (2008) also note that inquiries play a symbolic role through the 
appearance of  “experts and learned individuals” to construct a reasoned account of 
what went wrong and who or what is to blame; an educative role in recommending 
how society can avoid similar failures in future, and a realpolitik role when a 
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particular Inquiry format assists “in the protection and maintenance of key 
officerholders” (p. 605). 
For political scientist and scandal scholar Rod Tiffen (1999) media attention is critical 
to the public communication of inquiry purpose and proceedings, and the 
construction of a scandal. He found that a number of inquiries “achieved their final 
effectiveness as much in process as in outcome” and “utilised publicity as a 
deliberate strategy in prosecuting their cause” (p. 106). For example, he says the 
highly successful Wood Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police 
Service, which was established in 1994, was notable for its strategic use of 
indemnities, for its last-minute statements and provocative use of video surveillance 
“useful as much for their dramatic as their evidentiary effect” (p.106). That legal 
event even had arrests in the court foyer, which publicly exposed its power and 
ultimately the extent of police corruption. 
Tiffen also notes that in turn royal commissions play a crucial role in “giving oxygen” 
to the media, so that they take contentious issues from a “slow burn” controversy to 
an ongoing scandal as: “A scandal only becomes self-sustaining when it lends itself 
to routine rather than extraordinary reporting” (1999, p. 45). For these reasons news 
journalism has important functions in communicating and amplifying the meaning of 
the scandals that are being investigated 
Journalists “mediate,” or interpret and re-present these legal processes for the 
public. As Shoemaker and Reese say in Mediating the Message (1996), when the 
scope or scale of that media attention affects the way in which institutions such as 
courts communicate, research refers to that adaptation as mediatisation. Such raw 
news suppliers can dictate media routines, but “in some cases media and sources 
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have adapted to each other's requirements, making it hard to determine which came 
first” (p. 112). Legal scholar Kathryn Leader (2008) suggests that the “relative 
autonomy of the legal field is eroding in the face of a mediatised world” (p. 151), a 
case gaining credence in recent law literature (Joyce, 2010; Innes & Australia’s Right 
to Know Coalition, 2008).  
The term “mediatisation”, initially coined by historians to describe the process 
whereby heads of conquered states retained sovereign powers through which they 
mediated the will of the conquerors (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014), was relaunched by 
Swedish media researcher Kent Asp in 1986 to refer to the way politics was 
“influenced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media” (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 
106). 
A broader approach to mediatisation sees the transformation of many social 
institutions by media influence and uses the term as a more universal concept 
relating to the growing impacts of media forms and practices on social institutions as 
a driver of social change (Couldry, 2012; Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Hjarvard, 2013). My 
usage in this work is limited to examining the impact of media processes on the 
conduct of Inquiry hearings, which is Swedish media scholar Jesper Strömbäck’s 
third phase of mediatisation, that of social actors adapting to media logic. As I outline 
in Chapter 5, his description of mediatised political actors is also apt as a 
theorisation of media’s contribution to legal “performance”: “[politicians] are 
attempting to influence the media through adaptation, while simultaneously 
protecting their own integrity and the demarcation between the mediated and the 
non-mediated realities” (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 239). 
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As I will relate in more detail shortly, there is some concern in legal studies and law 
practice about the impact of mediatisation on legal process and lawyers’ 
“performance” in courts. This study is unique in considering the scope of 
mediatisation in the Cole Inquiry, in analysing the mediating practices that shaped its 
news coverage and any impacts of that coverage on the conduct of the inquiry. 
There is little research that considers the media’s role in interpreting or representing 
legal process during the Cole Inquiry. Nethercote (2007) notes the AWB 
investigation is primarily studied as a scandal of government, corporate governance 
or law, and the focus has depended, rather unsurprisingly, on the discipline of the 
writer. Governance consultant Stephen Bartos (2006) and public policy scholar Linda 
Botterill (2007) examined the critical problems with the government oversight and 
corporate governance of AWB. Like Bartos, Jurgen Kurtz (2006), an expert in 
international jurisprudence, drew on news reports when he critiqued the legal basis 
of defences used by AWB and the Howard government that were raised in “the 
media discussion” (p. 1).6 Other legal studies have been concerned with the inquiry’s 
implications for law, say, in the national and international intersection of bribery laws 
and sanctions regimes (Farrall & Rubenstein, 2009) or legal professional privilege 
(Haller, 2009). In the main, these types of studies do not directly examine how the 
news media interacted with the legal process, or how journalists produced reports on 
the hearings to the public, as I intend to do. 
Bartos is one exception, arguing that journalists covering the Cole Inquiry did not 
understand the failure of regulatory systems and corporate governance in Australia’s 
agripolitics, and so failed to report what he argued was the key evidence. He is 
critical, too, of the media’s politicisation of the event: “A disappointing aspect of the 
                                                
6 Kurtz’s work is interesting for its account of legal debates about the validity of the UN sanctions. 
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media coverage of the Cole Inquiry has been the futile search for direct evidence of 
ministerial culpability, the so-called smoking gun” (Bartos, 2006, p. 13). 
However, his critique comes from a professional concern with the technical detail of 
policy and government. He does not consider journalists’ role in mediating the many 
political meanings of the inquiry, or the mediatisation of the process and its impact 
on Australian law or politics. 
The latter is better suggested by McConnell et al., whose study of policy fiascos 
argues the Cole Inquiry provided tools to help the Howard government to steer 
blame away from itself successfully: 
Indeed, ministers were able to portray the outcome of Cole as a 
victory for democracy, accountability and transparency because the 
government had established an independent Inquiry and allowed 
itself to be subject to rigorous scrutiny and acted in response to its 
findings. (McConnell et al., 2008, p. 614) 
They note that fiascos such as the AWB scandal spark debates “over their meaning 
in terms of how ‘bad’ they are, who or what caused them to happen, what prompted 
the actions of those involved and who is to blame” (2008, p. 602). Commissions such 
as the Cole Inquiry are sites where those debates are fought out and are key to the 
development of the scandal, particularly where the government and the opposition’s 
public presentation of the issue moves according to evidence emerging from the 
inquiry. This study accepts the proposal from McConnell et al. that inquiries help 
“frame contests over meaning” (2008, p. 602) and extends their work by focusing on 
how Inquiry news reports conveyed those political frames to the public. 
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This thesis argues that the news media performed the function of mediating these 
“frame contests” over the political interpretation of evidence from the hearings, 
filtering and re-framing the purpose and focus of the inquiry for their target 
audiences. Primarily they interpreted legal presentations within those frames. 
However, my analysis includes the little studied role of the media professionals 
working behind the scenes of legal proceedings, some of whom were trying to “reify” 
particular contested frames as uncontested, to “naturalise” them as taken-for-
granted, common-sense notions. 
This search for the deeper political meaning of inquiries is well established in media 
and cultural studies, and again points to the mediating importance of news reports in 
conveying the significance of legal process. Graeme Turner (1993) looked at how 
anti-colonial rhetoric became the dominant meaning of the Maralinga Royal 
Commission, which obscured, he argued, the responsibilities of national 
governments for the effects of nuclear testing. Noel Sanders (1993) probed the 
“silent theatre” of fears accompanying reporting “that exceeded the official 
discourses” of the coronial inquest into the death of Azaria Chamberlain (p.185). In 
both studies the reported comments of presiding Inquiry heads were often cited as 
representations of the inquiries. Turner says the “performance” of Commissioner Jim 
McClelland with his “pommy bashing” was critical to defining a nationalist media 
discourse, within an Inquiry that was reported as a “political thriller.” Turner does not 
record exactly how the dramatic statements of Commissioner McClelland were 
reported in news media, but he is pointing to the attractiveness of that senior 
lawyer’s legal presentation in influencing the media’s construction of the meaning of 
the political exercise. In an argument similar to that of Bartos (2006), Turner said the 
central policy concerns of the inquiry were ignored by the media: “Issues such as 
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who would pay, who should pay, what needed to be done and who would do it were 
all left to the report itself, and thus would always risk being ignored [by the media]” 
(Turner, 1993, p. 186). 
Both Tiffen (1999) and Prasser (2006) indicate that the forensic direction and 
resolution of inquiries depends on the presiding judicial officer’s interpretation of her 
or his purpose, tasks and findings. I further argue that Commissioner Terence Cole’s 
interpretation of his role, as publicly presented in hearings, projected the central 
frame of conducting a fair, independent Inquiry, a frame that was contested by both 
the opposition and some reporters as the event wore on. 
Inquiries, then, are political tools that can play symbolic, educational and pragmatic 
roles, and which rely on the media to project their public purpose, although the 
media does not always do that to the satisfaction of some observers. My research 
fills a gap in analysing the mediatisation of a major Australian inquiry, and the 
mediating practices of the news journalists covering it, by investigating news 
journalists’ approach to reporting legal process and “performance” for the Australian 
public. It also considers reporters’ interactions with strategic communicators during 
the hearings to understanding how these realpolitik communicative actions 
influenced their stories. 
Before examining the influence of the performed legal process on news reporting, or 
the converse, it is first important to discuss the relationships between journalism and 
legal reporting. 
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JOURNALISM AND THE LAW 
There is a large body of journalism studies literature centred on law and court 
reporting, but for the purposes of this thesis I have chosen to look at relevant work 
within the Australian context. In Australian journalism studies relating to the law, 
analyses of conflict between the media and the law have been central. Journalists 
choose what to report based on “news values,” which rate legal events in terms of 
interest factors that will appeal to audiences, such as novelty and impact. What is 
newsworthy, however, does not always correspond with what is important from a 
legal perspective. 
Much of the journalism textbook writing around court reporting is instructional, telling 
novice reporters about their legal obligations to report fairly and accurately (White, 
1991, 1996; Conley & Lamble, 2006). In the authoritative Journalists Guide to Media 
Law, now in its fifth edition, journalism scholar Mark Pearson has drawn on his legal 
background to address what was originally a noticeable gap in the market – a 
practical guide to Australian law written from a media producer’s viewpoint. In his 
book he neatly summarises the conflicting aspirations and duties of the two estates: 
“Courts offer drama, conflict and voyeurism, which help news ratings, but the ethical 
reporter balances that against a duty to present newsworthy stories of consequence 
as accurately as possible, within the legal restrictions” (Pearson, 2007, p. 128). 
Prasser notes that “royal commissions are not in any sense judicial inquiries” (2006, 
p. 24) but these restrictions also constrain how Inquiry news can be expressed. 
Rhonda Breit (1999) says the 1964 and 1998 High Court judgments on defamation 
defences for royal commission media reporters set particularly high expectations of 
veracity in news reporting of complex events: 
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The report need not be verbatim but to be privileged it must 
accurately express what took place. Errors may occur; but if they are 
such as not substantially to alter the impression that the reader 
would have received had he been present at the trial, the [absolute 
privilege] protection is not lost. (Breit,1999, p. 49) 
However, some journalism studies point out that there are cultural and logistical 
barriers to journalists’ effective interpretation of legal process. Julianne Schultz 
(1998), for example, indicates obscure legal language is a problem for, or a blockage 
to, reporters trying to translate proceedings, as are legal restrictions on open court 
reporting including lack of timely access to information. This study demonstrates how 
these hurdles impacted the mediation of the Cole Inquiry. It will suggest that 
reporters’ interpretative problems were amplified by the additional complexity of 
understanding the wheat trade and the operation of UN sanctions. 
I also intend to explore how journalists gained knowledge of specialist subjects such 
as law and trade, by examining the role played by the strategic communications 
professional on the inquiry staff, who provided journalists with tendered documents, 
and other media communications professionals hired by the parties before the 
inquiry such as AWB. 
Jane Johnston (2005) noted that the “communicative interlock” between courts and 
the media had been inadequately researched from the media’s point of view. Her 
doctoral thesis is a qualitative exploration of how journalists bring the work of courts 
into the Habermasian public sphere, through an evolving system of information 
dissemination that now includes court media officers or public information officers. In 
many cases these officers were appointed as a result of judicial/academic debate 
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about open justice over the previous two decades. Their role, apart from facilitating 
access to documentation, involves helping journalists to interpret legal process and 
“bridging the gap between the judiciary and the media” (p. 100). Johnston’s work 
indicates that the influence these professionals can have on media reporting of legal 
proceedings should be studied in more detail. 
This study is also fundamentally alert to the impact of journalists’ information filtering 
practices on what details are reported from legal proceedings (see Entman, 1993; 
Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). An awareness of how coverage is 
determined by news values, impact or relevance, timeliness, proximity, prominence, 
conflict, currency and, sometimes, the unusual or novel (White, 1991,1996) 
suggests, for example, why Maralinga Inquiry reporters did not consistently report 
the important legal and political issues that Graeme Turner (1993, p.186) notes were 
left “to the [inquiry’s final] report.”  My research shows how such reporting practices 
contribute to the narrative of legal process, which can be at odds with the intent of 
the conduct of legal process and its ultimate outcome. 
Journalist practitioner studies in either sociological (Koch, 1990; Schlesinger, 1978) 
or discourse studies fields (Bell, 1998) often critique the limitations of such 
journalistic routines for translating events into media stories. All three scholars argue 
that the narrative structures of journalism may distort the “reality” of the events they 
report. Bell usefully summarises how radio journalists, for example, are narrative-
tellers whose stories reflect the creative demands of their medium and their 
profession: “A [radio] news story’s structure is never chronological, and is a marriage 
of journalistic values, practices and technology” (Bell, 1998, p.101). 
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Schlesinger (1978) describes one distorting effect as the “professional fetish” of 
immediacy that creates “an inherent tendency for the news to be framed in a 
discontinuous and ahistorical way and this implies a truncation of ‘context’ and 
therefore a reduction of meaningfulness” ( p.105). 
American journalism and medical researcher Tom Koch (1990) argues the very form 
of news reports can create falsehoods because of the lack of context within legal 
stories, although some of Koch’s case studies of coronial inquests suggest 
journalists should use background information that may breach Australian rules of 
contempt. However, this thesis argues that Cole Inquiry reporters did try to provide 
context, which then complicated their role as impartial observers of daily legal 
hearings. It concurs with Tiffen (1999) who notes that journalists exercise more 
leeway with legal rules in covering political inquiries than they would in criminal trials. 
This thesis argues that Cole Inquiry journalists referred to previously heard evidence 
to make sense of the day’s happenings and were willing to add external source 
material into stories to contextualise the internal evidence being presented. 
This study is interested in news mediation, the impact of journalistic practices and 
routines on how the Cole Inquiry was reported. However, it will present a rich picture 
of how journalists build stories about legal process rather than simply dissecting the 
failures of reporting for portraying complex events. 
Another major concern is to examine whether the media’s considerable presence at 
the Cole Inquiry impacted on the conduct of any aspect of the proceedings and, if so, 
how. In order to examine how the inquiry might have been mediatised, I turn to the 
literature on open court reporting and media influence. 
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COURTS, JOURNALISM AND MEDIA INFLUENCE 
Australian judges have for several decades been a part of a valuable debate within 
journalism and legal studies (and with media organisations) over the conduct of 
“open justice” and support for the news media’s access to legal process. Over the 
past few decades, Australian judges have addressed university journalism and law 
schools, as well as the Australian Press Council, on the subject of television and 
radio access to courts. They have also tried to reduce the “practical obscurity” 
(Bergman, 2009) created for journalists by lack of access to court documents or 
lawyers’ use of arcane legal language moving, for example, to improve evidence 
availability (Martin, 2007, 2009; see Keyzer, 2002). However, the judiciary has mixed 
feelings about the possible results of media influence on legal process. 
Most see media reporting of the justice system as essential, subscribing to a 
utilitarian view harking back to the 18th century philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. 
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spirit to exertion and the surest 
of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge, while trying, under trial” (Bentham, 
1843, in Spigelman, 2005, p. 3). 
However, this view is tempered with concern about how reporting might affect the 
administration of justice and public perception of the law. Analysing judicial 
perspectives on journalism can take us a little more deeply into what aspects of legal 
proceedings get to the public’s eye. 
Chief Justice Robert French opposed television access to courts on the basis of the 
prejudicial effect it might have on proceedings, but he also speaks of ways the media 
is already having an influence on judicial presentation. He says judgment summaries 
are now produced “in journalistically reproducible language.” Judges also use 
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summaries or “key words” for the media, his personal preference being for 
introductions “that can be read relatively painlessly by a journalist” (French, 2006, 
pp. 11–12). French and former Chief Justice Brennan both argue the difficulty of 
legal language for media demonstrates the need for journalists to acquire better legal 
knowledge (Brennan, 1997; French, 2005). 
There is also judicial concern about journalists’ selective reporting of legal process. 
Chief Justice French (2005) likened electronic media coverage of courts to mining, 
correctly but pejoratively noting that news and current affairs reports use only a tiny 
fraction of what is said in court: “creating a verbal tailings dump, with a licence to 
treat” (p. 1). Yet in a speech about public confidence in courts, former Chief Justice 
Murray Gleeson noted with resignation that: “The nature of news affects what is 
published about courts ... The things that sustain confidence in an institution are not 
likely to be newsworthy. Things that shake confidence are more likely to be 
newsworthy” (Gleeson, 2007, p. 13). 
The Chief Justice of Western Australia, Wayne Martin, similarly accepts that 
journalists work within the confines of industrial practice:  
Issues like newsworthiness and the limitations of space (in the 
printed media) and time (in the electronic media) place natural 
limitations upon the amount of information that can be conveyed to 
the public (Martin, 2009, p. 7). 
The fact that senior judicial figures understand news values and recognise the 
limitations of news production suggests they have a keen awareness of the law’s 
mediation. Indeed, in the tightly controlled filming of the European Court of Justice, 
Mason (2000) found that judges were the most aware of cameras in the hearing 
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room. Daniel Stepniak has extensively studied claims about the potential impact of 
television news cameras in courts (2006, 2008) and says judges now accept that it is 
not the role of media to explain courts, but to critique the system or find “a yarn” in it 
(Stepniak, 2011, personal notes, February 12, Open Justice: Facilitating Media 
Access, panel at The Courts and the Media in the Digital Era; Symposium, Bond 
University, Ronina, Australia). 
The internet is now expanding access to royal commissions and inquiries, with 
entire hearings now broadcast using unobtrusive cameras. The 2009 Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission was live-streamed, as were the 2014 Royal 
Commissions into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and into Trade 
Union Governance and Corruption. Nevertheless judicial concern that television 
news cameras will have an impact on legal hearings through mediatisation still 
limits broadcast news media access to courts in Australia. Stepniak’s studies 
(2006, 2008) of television cameras in court found they would have limited impact on 
court process, but should be optional where it was necessary to, for example, 
protect privacy, limit distraction and maintain the dignity of proceedings. 
Justice Martin says the media’s influence on all estates, including the judiciary, 
cannot be dismissed: “It is, I think, a mistake to underestimate the power of the 
media in shaping public opinion, or to ignore the effect that that opinion is likely to 
have on all three branches of government – the parliamentary, executive and 
judicial” (Martin, 2007, p. 5). 
Certainly it is well established in media history and government that the news media 
influences the conduct of politics, for example, in the case of Rupert Murdoch (see 
McKnight, 2013; Tiffen, 2014). It also affects the way politicians present ideas and 
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arguments. In journalist Margaret Simon’s (1999) account of the Canberra Press 
Gallery her “God” figure (a very senior reporter) maintained that “The media 
influence how the game is played – we don’t influence policy” (p. 68). 
It is not clear why the media would not have the same effect on major legal inquiries, 
with political ramifications. If, as political scientist Murray Edelman (1988) has 
suggested, politicians put on spectacle or theatre for the media, then this possibility 
also needs to be tested against the conduct of senior lawyers in highly political 
inquiries. 
PERFORMING LEGAL PROCESS 
The idea that legal proceedings are, in part, a performance is not especially new, but 
the notion that this presentation might be shaped to appeal to media frames has had 
little attention, as Kathryn Leader (2008) argues. In her historical tracing of law as 
theatre in British/Australian justice systems, she draws on the work of Michel 
Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that performance is not an embellishment of 
the trial process but a source of its authority, which constructs a gap between lay-
people and the law. Leader also notes that while the act of “performing” has a 
pejorative meaning in the legal profession, which strives to present truth, media and 
drama training have now become a part of legal education. 
Bourdieu (1998) argues that the presence of television leads to the mediatisation of 
specialist fields and says the goals of journalism lead to an inevitable 
theatricalisation of any particular material they produce. Leader takes that theoretical 
perspective into her analysis of modern Australian courts: 
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Keeping trial courts away from mediatised influence is a lost battle ... 
The somewhat precious approach that agents within the juridical 
field take to preserve internal autonomy overlooks the extensive 
cross-fertilisation [with media skills development] that has already 
taken place. (Leader, 2008, p. 183) 
The notion of mediatisation is a useful one suggesting that people’s expectations of 
communication are formed in essence by their experience of media representation. 
Leader (2008) argues a jury often gains its understanding of courts and expectations 
of good advocacy through television drama and “this has diminished the autonomy of 
agents in the legal field to set their own standards of behaviour” (p.151). 
Journalism scholars Rhonda Breit and Jane Johnston, in their account of legal 
reporting, make it clear that while courts and news media have different purposes, 
there are certainly lawyers who seek media attention: 
Because the purpose of the court case is separate from the news 
story, it can be argued that news values in this environment are 
independent of the “created” court event. This is not to say that the 
courts represent a “pure” news environment, which runs entirely 
without the potential for underlying news agendas. Obviously, there 
are those who are interested in gaining the media spotlight in this 
environment as with any other (Johnston & Breit, 2009, p. 147). 
So lawyers’ delivery or “performance” of law in a mediatised environment should be 
examined to help understand the influence of media reporting on legal proceedings. 
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There are various long-form journalism accounts of inquiries that are suggestive. 
Caroline Overington (2007) describes legal “performance” in her book on the Cole 
Inquiry, but rather than providing analysis of those acts, the book combines evidence 
with interviews and dramatisations to create an accessible narrative of the AWB 
scandal. Other journalist-writers such as Margaret Simons (2003) on the Hindmarsh 
Island Royal Commission and Chloe Hooper (2010) on the Cameron Doomagee 
inquests suggest stronger connections between media reporting and legal process. 
They go behind the scenes to examine the personal, political and sometimes legal 
manoeuvring that went on around coverage of the hearings. Simons is particularly 
attuned to the drama of the hearings: “If the story of Hindmarsh Island is grand 
opera, then the royal commission was the crescendo” (p. 342). She also reports 
instances in which media stories influenced who was called to give evidence and 
argued decisions about the legal process were being made for political as much as 
cultural sensitivities. However, like the cultural studies mentioned earlier, these 
books are broadly contextual, written mainly from the point of view of the Aboriginal 
participants who they say were ill-served by the inquiries, or even victims of the legal 
process and the media.7 
The notion of mediatised legal “performance” that is shaped by lawyers’ 
predetermined expectations of what media will attend to and report can add to our 
understanding of how a legal process becomes a news story. This study explores 
the operation of a “co-production” of meaning, between lawyers and journalists in the 
first instance, that could help to explain the apparent disconnect between news 
reports of the Cole Inquiry and its less dramatic legal conclusions. I observed and 
detail instances where Cole Inquiry lawyers directly reacted to media reporting, but 
                                                
7 It must be noted that some key participants refused to be interviewed for both books. 
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my main focus will be on how journalists translated legal presentations into 
contested political frames within their news narratives – a more subtle feedback loop. 
‘THEORETICAL DISAMBIGUATION’ OF FRAMING THEORY 
Framing theory provides a useful conceptual approach for analysing the way in 
which news journalists interpreted the legal process within the Cole Inquiry, and how 
they selected evidence or incorporated external sources into their reports to convey 
that interpretation. Framing can describe the way journalists contextualised ongoing 
hearings for the audience, as it involves presenting information in a way to imply a 
certain meaning. If analysed with due reference to the professional demands of 
journalism practice, framing offers a conceptualisation of how potentially politicised 
“facts” may have been fairly and accurately selected and conveyed by the media as 
the truth of the process. 
Sociologist Thomas König (2005), in reviewing developments since Erving 
Goffman’s 1974 classic framing methodology, defines frames as “basic cognitive 
structures that guide the perception and representation of reality” (p. 2). On the 
whole, König says representative frames are not consciously manufactured but are 
unconsciously adopted in the course of communicative processes: “On a very banal 
level, frames structure which parts of reality become noticed” (ibid). However, he 
argues that the range of framing approaches used across academic disciplines since 
Goffman merely gives a nod to the original concept, and requires some “theoretical 
disambiguation” (ibid). In political communication theory, sociologist Todd Gitlin 
(1980) proposed that “Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation 
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” 
(cited in König, p. 3) and so they structure those parts of reality that are noticed. 
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Gitlin is widely cited in communication studies of media framing. However, “such 
general descriptions give no clear guidelines for identifying how frames were created 
and how to measure them” (Matthes, 2009, p. 350). Jörg Matthes’s (2009) 
comprehensive examination of framing studies in communication journals between 
1990 and 2005 found that in the vast majority of studies “citing a definition does not 
necessarily mean that it is used as a direct guide for operationalization” and so what 
a frame was, how it was constructed and employed often remained unclear (p.354). 
König (2005) says the analytical trouble starts when it comes to identifying and 
measuring frames, which are as often tacit, as they are overt. He suggests this is 
one reason that understanding the selection of frames as a more deliberate process 
has come to dominate media studies. 
Robert Entman’s work was key to that move in thinking, when he argued for more 
discipline in framing analysis in both communications and media studies. He 
specified what frames do: “... [to] frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). 
Framing, then, for Entman, offers “a way to describe the power of a communicating 
text” (1993, p, 51). Put more concretely: “We can define framing as the process of 
culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights 
connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (2007,  p.164). This 
definition of Entman’s is a most influential one and underpins current framing 
studies. It is the one I use in this study. 
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There is, however, the small problem of identifying what the facts of “reality” are in 
order to understand how some elements assume a certain salience. Scholars using 
the empirical approach to framing analysis look for significant textual or visual 
framing devices in journalism that are commonly used, clearly distinguished and 
recognisable by other researchers, and that are different from the “core facts” of a 
story (see de Vreese, 2005). Researchers often look to identify frames “by exploring 
images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors and messages” (Matthes, 2009, p. 349). 
Tankard, Hendrickson, Sliberman, Bliss and Ghanem (1991) have further described 
a (limiting) media frame as: “The central organizing idea for news content that 
supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, 
emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (cited in Reese, 2011, p.10). 
There is no “correct” a priori frame for an event or issue, but the selection of a frame 
is a “significant decision on the part of a journalist” (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 67). That is 
why this study adopts de Vreese’s (2005) argument that there are internal 
(organisational and professional) and external (political, economic and social) factors 
that influence the construction of frames (p. 52). It investigates how the initial political 
or social framing of the Cole Inquiry is a central part of the journalistic frame-building 
within hearings. 
As journalism scholar Stephen Reese (2007) has noted, the social constructivists 
(for example, Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) regard frames as “relatively benign 
resources, conceptual tools or a stock of frames embedded in society” while “the 
critical perspective has regarded frames as controlling, hegemonic, and tied to larger 
elite structures” (p.149). This study will take an interest in how power is used to 
shape, or direct attention to, particular frames and framing devices. 
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The power focus may have led some to equate framing with bias, but König says 
framing is not a limiting effect on understanding. Reese, too, is not comfortable with 
media framing being taken to mean intentionality on the part of the framer, as this 
would make it too closely related to the type of agenda-setting that political 
strategists use: 
News stories must select certain aspects of reality and emphasize 
them, but Entman’s definition begs the question of how they are 
organized ‘‘in such a way as to promote’’ their effects. It is precisely 
the way that certain attributes come to be associated with particular 
issues that should concern framing analysis. (Reese, 2007, p. 152) 
Reese (2007) says frames define some ideas as in or out, and snag related ideas in 
an active process of social interaction: “Frames are organizing principles that are 
socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully 
structure the social world” (p. 150). He is critical of framing being used as a hook on 
which to hang content analysis, because counting and sorting of content may neglect 
the dynamic organising ability of frames. In this study the way certain textual and 
visual devices become associated with certain political issues is important. I do use a 
content analysis of news stories and their sources, not as an end in itself but to 
confirm that identified frames were used to portray the meaning, role and purpose of 
the inquiry, and to provide a background to my examination of the dynamics of their 
generation. 
As Reese (2006) suggests, frames have persistent historic and political significance 
in “their ability to project knowledge ahead as they guide the structure of incoming 
experience” (p. 150). In Framing the War on Terror, Stephen Reese and Seth Lewis 
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(2009) described how the “War on Terror” frame was elevated to “a macro-level 
cultural structure” (p. 778) that comes closer to ideology, through media’s 
internalising and reproduction of it – “from transmission, to reification and to 
naturalization” – even though the concept started out as a functional political frame 
that was used to support the invasion of Iraq. 
An issue-specific or functional frame is used to influence public debate where there 
are clearly competing perspectives on an issue, and a desired or actionable policy 
outcome. These frames and their associated political positions are often “well known 
to journalists who become mindful of the ‘spin’ various labels give” (Reese, 2007, 
p152). This study finds that the “Wheat for Weapons” expression became a similar 
functional frame for the Labor opposition in its political campaigning, in that its 
political object was to create opprobrium for the Howard government and public 
expectation of some punishment in the lead-up to a federal election – and also in 
that journalists often kept this spin in mind when using it in their reports. 
I will define a series of four such functional frames: presenting the Cole Inquiry as a 
“fair and open inquiry” or an “unfair and restricted inquiry”, and indicating who was to 
blame for the scandal, the “AWB culpable” or “government culpable” frames. These 
conceptual frames that the media conveyed in its reports were all part of the 
overarching parliamentary and public debates about the inquiry’s value and 
implications. McConnell et al. (2008) identified a fifth frame – “UN culpable” – which 
the federal government and AWB executives advanced at the start of the Cole 
Inquiry, but which did not gain long-term traction in the media. As I will outline, these 
identified frames were usually located in frame combinations or “packages” (Van 
Gorp, 2007): the “AWB culpable/fair and open Inquiry” frame package and the 
“government culpable/unfair and restricted” frame package, which both pointed to 
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different policy possibilities. The “Wheat for Weapons” frame package will be 
discussed as the more politicised version of the latter package. 
As de Vreese (2005) suggests, these issue-specific, or functional frames are 
pertinent to particular topics, but correctly says most political or social issues can not 
be reduced to two characterisations or policy outcomes, and that is clearly the case 
with the frames I have outlined. “Frames are part of political arguments, journalistic 
norms, and social movements’ discourse. They are alternative ways of defining 
issues, endogenous to the political and social world” (p. 53). 
In the literature, frames that transcend thematic limitations are generic frames, which 
some define in ways that correspond, perhaps unsurprisingly, to news values or 
journalistic conventions. For example, Semetko and Valkenburg, (2000) identified 
five news frames: “conflict”, “human interest”, “attribution of responsibility”, “morality” 
and “economic consequences” – and this list sounds much like news values in 
journalism texts. Similarly, Tankard et al. (1991) have listed 11 framing mechanisms 
or focal points, most of which are journalistic storytelling techniques such as 
headlines, source selection, or photo captions (cited in Reese 2007, p. 51). 
Empirically attractive as news content analysis may be, Reese (2007) suggests the 
cultural texture and connection to broader influences is lost to such data reduction. 
This is why content analysis is only one of the qualitative methods used for this 
research, which also draws on the rich data provided by interviews and a case study. 
Journalists’ approaches to the building of news frames are based on a combination 
of inferred social meaning and media routines, as Van Gorp suggests: 
Framing refers, on the one hand, to the typical manner in that 
journalists shape news content within a familiar frame of reference 
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and according to some latent structure of meaning and, on the other 
hand, to the audience who adopts these frames and sees the world 
in a similar way as the journalists do. (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 61) 
As journalism scholar Herbert Gans notes, journalists also use framing as “a 
necessary tool to reduce the complexity of an issue, given the constraints of their 
respective media, related to news holes and airtime” (cited in Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2009, p. 12). Basic journalistic values in combination with specific news 
routines impact on the production of frames, as can the actions of frame sponsors 
such as spin doctors (see Stockwell, 2007). 
“Frame sponsors are concerned with directing the perception and the frame 
selection of journalists as they report on an event” (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 68). Such 
sponsors are often members of the communicative elites – politicians, corporate and 
political advisers and other strategic communications professionals. The “continuous 
interaction between journalists and elites” to determine how public issues are 
portrayed is part of the “frame contest” (Reese & Lewis, 2009) which this thesis calls 
a “framing war”. 
It seems that issue-specific frames are built on “macro” socio-political frames, shared 
understandings of how society is (or should be) structured and governed. For 
example, Herbert Gans has described the domestic news operating in a macro-
frame of altruistic democracy: 
Indicating how [American] democracy should perform by frequent 
attention to deviations from an unstated ideal evident in stories on 
corruption, conflict, protest and bureaucratic malfunctioning. News 
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implies that politics should follow a course based on the public 
interest and public service. (Gans, 1979, p. 43) 
Thus both political sides of the debate about how the AWB scandal could be handled 
would place themselves within that generic frame of altruistic democracy. Frames 
are a central part of culture and are used in various institutionalised ways, for 
example, when “media workers apply and magnify them in media content and 
present them to their audiences” (Van Gorp, 2007, p 62). 
The processes by which journalists create frames or interpretive packages to give 
meaning to an issue are called “frame-building”, as outlined by de Vreese (2005) and 
Shoemaker & Reese (1996). Frame-building analysis looks at factors that shape 
journalism production processes, such as the news-values technique. Chapters 4 
and 5 will explore these mediating processes. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
also consider the operation of frame-setting, which is in any case more reception-
study focused, in its search for impacts of news reporting on the public. 
There is at least one strong alternative to a framing analysis of legal reporting from 
the legal-media studies field. Breit and Johnston (2010) proposed that a narratology 
of court reporting could provide a holistic framework to analyse how court stories are 
reproduced as news stories: “as acts of production and interpretation within specific 
contexts that frame sense-making” (p. 49). This methodology explores how legal and 
media narratives are used to make sense of the legal process, and analyses 
discourses of law and media to examine the interpretative context. However, their 
proposal (which was not pursued in any depth in their own work) does not take in the 
extra-judicial context, the potential influence of media communications professionals 
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and political commentary.8 Nor does it consider the presentation or “performances” 
of legal professionals and any impact they may have on media reports. This 
approach is an attempt to grapple with the problem of how a court transcript 
becomes a media report but, I argue, it is too narrow to incorporate any contextual 
analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter indicates that the media and news reporting are central to the public 
communication of Inquiry hearings and to the effective operation of their 
investigative, educative and political roles. However, news coverage of inquiries also 
helps to build and frame the politics of scandal, and in this respect it must be 
regarded as more than a vehicle for accurately and fairly reflecting those legal 
proceedings. 
In recent years, legal and journalism studies research has begun to problematise 
how the law is mediated, how media coverage influences lawyers’ conduct, and how 
mediatised legal “performance” then affects the presentation and interpretation of 
legal process. This thesis will examine these questions with regard to the Cole 
Inquiry, addressing a gap in the literature that political scientists have identified 
concerning the media’s role in the AWB scandal. 
This thesis also extends current work in journalism, political, and legal studies that 
probes the media’s influence on law reporting. It will, for example, query the effect of 
substantial media attention on the “performance” of legal inquiries and the strategic 
communication of legal and political processes. The concept of mediatisation 
                                                
8  They have noted elsewhere “the news agenda is increasingly being set by public relations and media relations 
professionals” (see 2009, p. 147). 
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explicates the interaction between the institutions of the law, media, and democratic 
politics and allows this thesis to propose the inquiry news coverage as a co-
production of meaning for public consumption and political blame management. 
This chapter has suggested the concept of media framing can be used to understand 
the political contests over meaning surrounding the Cole Inquiry, which then 
impacted on the interpretation and mediation of legal process. It argues for the use 
of critical empirical research to study how lawyers and politicians framed, and 
journalists reframed, the inquiry’s purpose and process. 
The next chapter outlines the methodology of this study. It explains how expert 
interviews, frame-building analysis and a case study will be used to test my two 
hypotheses: first, that journalists and lawyers influenced each other’s output, and 
second, that the political debate surrounding the scandal had an impact on both the 
“performance” of the legal process in the hearings and on reporting from the inquiry. 
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CHAPTER	  3:	  METHODOLOGY	  	  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I outline the methodology used to investigate the news reporting and 
framing of the Cole Inquiry and its mediatisation. The research design, which draws 
on critical media-framing studies, sets out the way in which expert interviews, frame-
building and story-framing analyses can be used to understand the professional 
practices of meaning production that occurred in and around the hearings. A case 
study of the inquiry reporting demonstrates application of these approaches to 
analysis of the Cole Inquiry’s mediatisation. This framework will support my 
argument that the reporting of the inquiry was a discursive co-production involving 
the news media, the legal participants, strategic communicators and other frame 
sponsors. 
In this study I look at the reporting of the public hearings of the Cole Inquiry from its 
opening on 12 December 2005 until its closure on 29 September 2006. Events that 
led up to the scandal and followed hearings are documented in a timeline in 
Appendix 1 (p. 202).  
The analytical methods I have chosen are informed by my expert role as a radio 
news reporter at the Cole Inquiry for the ABC. The initial and central method of data 
collection was interviewing observer participants, journalists, lawyers and strategic 
communications practitioners. This was used to establish the institutional context for 
news coverage and to investigate reporters’ varied practices and processes of 
frame-building. Framing analysis of radio news was then used to identify whether the 
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“angles” or “lines” of reporting journalists and lawyers raised in their interviews could 
be identified in news stories, and the sources of stories in those frames identified. 
This analysis also involved close examination of hearing transcripts to verify what 
evidence had formed the source for the stories. Finally, a case study of a day’s 
hearing coverage closely investigates the frame-building process. 
INTERVIEWS 
The analysis in this thesis is partly based on 10 in-depth 45–60-minute semi-
structured expert interviews conducted in 2012 with individuals who worked at the 
Cole Inquiry. Five of these interviews are with news journalists who covered the 
Cole Inquiry, two with communications professionals, and four with barristers who 
appeared before the inquiry. 
Interviews are the most common of qualitative research methods used to “find out 
about people’s experiences in context and the meanings these hold” (Holloway & 
Jefferson, 2008, p. 298). In this work I have used “expert” interviews (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2002) because I am concerned with understanding the nature of 
professional practices and require insight into lawyers’ conduct at the Cole Inquiry.  
While the literature on this interview genre suggests that experts can exploit their 
specialist knowledge and any class or social power imbalances to avoid an 
interviewer’s probing questions (Meuser & Nagle, 1991), I am confident that in the 
case of the journalists and communications personnel, my senior role and expertise 
in royal commission and inquiry reporting, as well as my knowledge of reporting at 
the Cole Inquiry, enabled me to overcome this problem. In relation to the lawyer 
interviews, as a senior legal reporter with the ABC, I have become what is 
colloquially known as a “bush lawyer”, with broad lay knowledge of legal process. My 
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role as an observer at the Cole Inquiry allowed me to question barristers’ recall of 
events and to probe their explanations of process. 
In selecting the journalist interviewees I approached those who worked in news 
reporting, rather than longer-form features or commentaries, which often focus on 
theatrical aspects of the proceedings and events or people surrounding the scandal 
of the wheat exports. I interviewed news journalists from radio, television, and 
metropolitan and rural newspapers who regularly attended the inquiry.9 Of those   
journalists who responded, all but one agreed to be named for the purposes of this 
study: Marian Wilkinson, then from The Sydney Morning Herald, a Fairfax Media 
broadsheet; Caroline Overington, then from The Australian, a News Corporation 
broadsheet; Lucy Knight, then from The Land, a national rural newspaper,10 who 
also did live radio reports for commercial radio 2UE’s rural news. (She reported as 
Lucy Skuthorp, her maiden name in 2006); John Hill then from Channel 10 
(commercial television); and “Journalist A”, a broadcast reporter who did not want to 
be named. 
Two interviews were conducted with media professionals who were paid to service 
or influence the media during hearings. They were the media liaison officer for the 
Cole Inquiry, Rick Willis, and James Bond, a trade adviser to Kevin Rudd, the then 
Opposition Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
Although I was acquainted with many of the journalists and strategic communications 
people at the inquiry, I sent formal requests to all interviewees, as per University of 
Sydney ethics committee approval no. 13544, granted 2 May 2011. 
                                                
9 There are no online reporters, as the ABC then used radio copy online, and most newspaper websites used 
AAP (agency) reports for breaking news online; Twitter and Facebook reporting had not come into vogue in 
2006. 
10 The Land was independent in 2006, but is now owned by Fairfax Rural Media. 
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Four interviews were conducted with barristers who represented a range of clients 
who appeared before the inquiry. These barristers are senior legal figures who have 
acted in other highly publicised legal inquiries and court cases. They are generally 
figures to whom it is not easy to gain access. I was unable to interview any of the 
barristers who appeared on behalf of the Cole Inquiry. My email or phone requests 
to speak with the Commissioner, Terence Cole, and Counsels Assisting the Inquiry, 
John Agius and Miles Condon, received no response. A number of other barristers I 
approached chose to give reasons for not participating, most citing legal restrictions 
such as lack of client permission or the existence of ongoing legal action. 
The barrister interviewees all wished to remain anonymous, and for the purposes of 
distinguishing their comments I have given them the pseudonyms “Barry”, “Carrie”, 
“Darry” and “Garry”. This anonymity leads to some limitations, as any responses that 
would tend to identify the participant cannot be used. Where necessary, a quote 
from an interview is used without a pseudonym to further protect the participant’s 
identity. Some of those who were interviewed for this thesis were highly critical of the 
conduct of the inquiry on behalf of their clients. One felt that it coloured his 
observations, another suggested that some of his opinions might be defamatory. 
This further restricted the valid use of some material. 
The interview questions approved by the University of Sydney ethics committee, 
included a combination of open, closed and Likert scale questions (see Appendices 
3, 4 and 5) to gather both rich discursive data and comparable quantitative ratings 
that indicated the interviewee’s depth of feeling about specific topics. While all 
interviewees were asked about the “performance” of lawyers and the impact of 
media presence on those “performances” and the legal proceedings, some questions 
were tailored to the three different professions. 
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Journalist interviewees were asked to explain how they selected and constructed 
news stories, how they interacted with the legal professionals and how their 
professional practice impacted on their representation of the evidence (see 
questions at Appendix 3). Domestic news journalists were chosen for interview 
rather than feature writers, or political or foreign correspondents, because they work 
to a tightly defined, factual format, which makes historic claims to accurate, 
objective, balanced and fair reporting of reality (Maras, 2013). Most reporters 
interviewed were senior journalists – that is, “A-grade” journalists – with more than 
15 years’ experience. This means that they have internalised ideas of being 
“professional”, a notoriously slippery concept in journalism given the lack of barriers 
to practice (Spence, Alexandra, Quinn, & Dunn, 2011), and so can speak as experts 
on the functions, goals, and ethical standards expected of them. 
The questions to barristers and journalists included up to five Likert-type items 
(Bertram, 2006), scaled from one to 10. These questions were designed to gauge 
the perceived extent of lawyers’ media awareness, and their understanding of how 
the large media presence affected the conduct of the Cole Inquiry legal process, 
including the Commissioner’s conduct, and that of other legal practitioners. The 
barristers were asked about their awareness of the media and their views on its 
impact on the inquiry process or the professional “performance” of lawyers, including 
themselves. 
This attempt at gathering quantitative data had limited success in creating a useful 
scale, as participants were often resistant to nominating a rating. One lawyer rated 
his awareness of the media at the Cole Inquiry as 20 out of 10. Others gave 
qualified or nuanced answers even when they did use a one-to-10 scale. Many 
journalist interviewees also resisted scaling. 
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The interviews were transcribed, and were then de-identified in accordance with the 
interviewees’ instructions. I then examined the interviewee’s accounts of their own 
roles before examining their perspectives on the “performances” of the legal players 
and those they saw as frame sponsors. Within their accounts I looked for evidence of 
frame-building practices and processes, as outlined in Chapter 4. 
Here the interview transcripts are viewed from a constructivist perspective; that is, 
“they are considered for the ways that they construct aspects of reality in 
collaboration with the interviewer” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002, p. 127). 
My experience as a radio news reporter for the ABC at the Cole Inquiry grounds the 
interview analysis. My own recollections of events allowed me to challenge some 
interview accounts, or to raise an incident to test whether that accorded with the 
interviewee’s explanation of a particular concept. Where necessary, I checked the 
accuracy of recollections against transcripts of the Cole Inquiry, which are available 
online. 
The journalist interviews form the primary basis of my understanding of how the 
media engaged in frame-building and, together with interviews with two media 
communications professionals, inform Chapter 4, which examines influences on 
reporting from the Cole Inquiry’s hearings. Journalists’ accounts of how they 
regarded and were influenced by lawyers are critical to the analysis in Chapter 5, 
and they are contrasted with, and contextualised by, interviews with Inquiry lawyers. 
These interviews with journalists, lawyers and media professionals often referred to 
the “line”, “message” or “angle” being pursued by journalists or promoted by frame 
sponsors. From this information I identified a series of potential frames for inquiry 
news reports; then, in radio news stories, I quantified their occurrence. 
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FRAMING ANALYSES 
News-framing analysis also provides “a useful methodology for identifying the 
dominant and contested frames inherent in media texts” (McCallum, 2007, p. 3). 
The initial assumption underpinning institutional reporting of the Cole Inquiry was 
that it was a legitimate legal and political event that required the attention of the 
mainstream media. In the previous chapter I noted that Gans (1979) argues: “News 
implies that politics should follow a course based on the public interest and public 
service” (p. 43). Building on the work of Shoemaker and Reese in examining framing 
as a macro-level socio-cultural construct (1996) I identified the media’s macro – or 
societal – frame for the Cole Inquiry as that of a process conducted for reasons of 
what Gans called “altruistic democracy” (ibid). 
In analysing how that process was mediated, I first examined the journalists’ 
interview transcripts to understand their frame-building practices – the logistic and 
editorial demands of their medium and the professional imperatives that drove their 
decision-making. I also looked for accounts of their professional interactions with 
Inquiry staff and political frame sponsors or editorial managers that might have 
influenced their selection or representation of events in reports.  
I then examined journalists’ accounts of the angles they took on events and issues, 
and the lines of inquiry they pursued in news gathering. Using Entman’s (1993) 
approach to identifying what frames do, I located a series of functional frames from 
those accounts: “fair and open inquiry,” “AWB culpable,” “government culpable” and 
“unfair and restricted inquiry. These generally appeared in the two primary frame 
packages identified above: “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry and the “government 
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culpable/unfair and restricted Inquiry” or the “Wheat for Weapons” package. These 
are detailed in Chapter 4. 
A frame analysis of 252 radio news stories, broadcast on ABC Radio news from 16 
January 2006 to 15 November 2006, establishes the consistency with which those 
functional frames were used. Just over 87 per cent of these stories were mine.  
While this biases the sample, in reporting I acted reactively according to the norms 
of journalism practice, and this research enables a reflexive examination of the 
influence of those norms on representation of the legal process. I also identified that 
particular frame sponsors were the dominant source for, and thus a primary 
influence on, these stories. 
To conduct this frame analysis I analysed the text of the news stories to determine 
their “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip 
of events” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). I looked first for evidence of the 
macro-frame – an overall consensus about the legitimacy of the legal investigation 
for the purposes of altruistic democracy. This was presented via the use of language 
such as: “breached” or “broke” (sanctions regulations or laws), “illicit”, “illegal”, 
“truth”, “blind eye” or “deceiving”. I only identified two stories falling outside this 
overall frame, which were about some technical legal argument in the hearings. This 
level of consistency at the macro-level is not surprising, given the broad support for 
democratic process in Australia, and the subject matter of the inquiry, along with the 
fact that journalists can be found in contempt if they dispute the integrity of inquiry 
proceedings. 
I chose radio news to interrogate because these stories are short and tend to be 
based on a single dominant frame, whereas researchers might expect to find 
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multiple frames in longer reports. Radio news also often breaks information that is 
later reported on television and in long-form print journalism, and so was an 
influential media form in terms of everyday public communication of Inquiry events. 
As radio news stories are generally under one minute in duration, and three-to-four 
one-sentence paragraphs, the central idea or frame was usually indicated by the 
lead and second paragraph of the story. In most cases, the first paragraph (par) is 
read by the newsreader, directing listeners’ attention, and the second is either by the 
newsreader, or voiced by the inquiry journalist. Thus these two pars can be argued 
to provide a strong indication of the story frame. Where the second par contained 
newsreader-delivered background information, such as what the inquiry was 
investigating (which often reinforced the macro-frame of legitimacy), I would move to 
analyse the third paragraph or story body. 
Using this two-step process I quantified the appearance of the four separate 
functional frames and the two frame packages that interviewees had discussed, and 
located which were dominant in reports of the inquiry process. The first, which I call 
the “fair and open inquiry” frame and which was also identified by McConnell et al. 
(2008, p. 612), supported “the government’s symbolic portrayal of Cole as impartial, 
apolitical and rigorous.” This was indicated in stories reporting the inquiry as 
“uncovering,” “discovering” or “revealing” evidence of wrongdoing, and included 
statements about the inquiry’s independence, integrity or fairness. 
The second frame, which was indicated by phrases containing AWB with words such 
as: “knew,” “had knowledge,” “admitted” or “denied”, when referring to illegality or 
immorality, was the “AWB culpable” frame. This existed in almost all news stories, 
and again supported the government’s political aim of focusing attention on the 
inquiry terms of reference, which was the investigation of the company. The “AWB 
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culpable/fair and open inquiry” frame package was evident in stories that 
acknowledged the inquiry’s legislative brief and its pursuit of corporate wrongdoing, 
I also found stories that questioned the focus of the inquiry or its terms of reference, 
and/or highlighted its part in a political scandal that had international implications. 
The iconic phrase “Wheat for Weapons” also describes this “government 
culpable/unfair and restricted Inquiry” frame package. This was the slogan used by 
the opposition to suggest corruption or impropriety by the Coalition government 
working in concert with AWB and setting up a narrowly defined Inquiry process. 
Textual identifiers for the “Wheat for Weapons” frame package include phrases used 
in connection with the Australian government’s awareness of breaches: it “knew,” 
“was informed,” “warned,” “approved,” “discussed/met with” AWB. This frame 
suggests government culpability in sanctions breaches. Any complaints about the 
inquiry process identified the “unfair inquiry” frame. 
The ABC Radio news stories did not use the “Wheat for Weapons” expression and 
generally did not use sources from outside the inquiry hearings (discussion on the 
overall news bulletin structure that might include such stories is included in Chapter 
6). For this reason I undertook an examination of the source material that provided 
the story angle or main perspective. It was designed to test the hypothesis that the 
legal “performance” had an impact on reporting, if not framing. 
In Chapter 5 I identify where lawyers’ quotes, statements or questions, rather than a 
direct report on evidence was the lead or angle (see Table 1, p. 95). Those stories I 
describe as being lawyer-directed, a term I discuss in that chapter and they are 
identified by the use of expressions such as: “denied,” “admitted” or “could not 
recall/remember” and also by direct report of quotes by the Commissioner or 
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lawyers. These stories fell largely into the dominant frames from the two opposing 
political frame packages – the “government” side in what I term the political “framing 
war” over the inquiry’s role and purpose. 
My examination of whether Cole Inquiry news reports were lawyer-directed or 
evidence-driven gives some insight into the power the media accorded legal 
practitioners as sources, and informs my conclusion about the existence of a co-
production of meaning between Inquiry stakeholders. 
TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS 
While researching this thesis I consulted Inquiry transcripts to verify, explain or 
illustrate interviewees’ interpretations in the context of the hearings. They are also 
checked against media reports to illustrate the use of sources or the incidence of 
newsworthy legal “performances”. 
Transcripts and exhibits are available on a website hosted by the Attorney-General’s 
department (http://www.oilforfoodInquiry.gov.au). Often they were consulted to verify 
or clarify an interviewee’s partial memory of a statement or incident in the hearings, 
or to check the context of a statement to which an interviewee had ascribed 
meaning. Generally I found the interviewees’ memories were reasonably accurate, 
but sometimes the context of a comment suggested a legal process meaning that 
had not been raised by the interviewee. I was fortunate in having attended most of 
the hearings, which meant that I had kept notes and stories and was able to locate 
much of the relevant documentary material quickly. 
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CASE STUDY – THE FLUGGE PHOTOGRAPH 
My hypotheses both suggest that frame-building is a co-production involving the 
media and lawyers, as well as strategic communicators and other frame sponsors. I 
test this in Chapter 6 with a case study of news reporting of day 29 at the inquiry. 
Media framing “does not happen in a political vacuum; it is shaped by the frames 
sponsored by multiple social actors” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 216) and Chapter 
6 explores the material or sources journalists drew on to construct their news reports 
about the inquiry and its origins to see how any sponsoring of ideas, opinions, 
documents and evidence affected the framing of the evidence. 
I chose to investigate one day of high media coverage – and this was not the day of 
the appearance of the Prime Minister (due to the potential for sample bias as it was 
an unusual circumstance in which the witness directly provided outside commentary 
after giving evidence). I examined the genesis of newswire, radio, print and television 
stories from Monday 27 February 2006, six weeks into the inquiry, in hearing 
transcripts, exhibit lists and my contemporaneous notes. That date was a hearing 
day that had attracted journalists from all media outlets, including all the 
interviewees. They had come for the first appearance of Trevor Flugge, who was the 
Chairman of AWB during the period of the OFFP contracts that were under 
investigation. A damaging photograph of him, taken in Iraq, had been leaked some 
weeks before he gave evidence, and this image emerged as an important factor in 
the case-study analysis. Media coverage of this day also provided me with a range 
of news reports to demonstrate the different ways in which journalists reframed the 
legal process.  
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I accessed and analysed reports of the day from the AAP wire service, ABC Radio 
news and current affairs, ABC Television news and current affairs, and three 
newspapers, The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Advertiser in 
South Australia. I looked for the way they framed the inquiry, what evidence they 
reported on and what sources they used. Excerpts are used to demonstrate the 
framing of evidence from the hearings. 
This process established that on this day, journalists drew on outside sources from 
frame sponsors in Canberra, whose comments were included in reports. This led me 
to examine parliamentary Hansard, media releases and media conference 
broadcasts, in order to locate several political statements that were made on 27 
February 2006 that had an impact on news media framing of the day’s evidence. 
In establishing the significance of the Flugge photograph, I drew on the journalist and 
barrister interviews conducted for this study. In reconstructing how journalists 
covered and framed the inquiry that day, I again compared transcripts and media 
reports and drew on documents, including strategic communications materials. 
CONCLUSION 
By triangulating three methods of data collection – interviews, framing analysis and 
transcript analysis – and interpreting the results with participant knowledge of the 
inquiry, I have developed an innovative and effective means of interrogating the 
construction of meaning in news media reports of the 2006 Inquiry into Certain 
Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. 
I then applied these methods to a case study of one day’s coverage of the inquiry to 
examine how this approach can be used to demonstrate that the news was co-
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produced within the “framing war” that took place over the political purpose of the 
inquiry. 
This methodology enabled me to provide a rich description and analysis of the 
different factors that shaped journalistic framing of the Cole Inquiry, which attends to 
the complex interactions between institutional structures (journalism, the law and 
politics) and journalistic agency. It also examines structural factors such as the 
inquiry environment and legal process, the professional and organisational 
requirements of news reporting, and the inquiry terms of reference. It then considers 
the interdependent and contested relationship between journalists, legal workers, 
and media communications professionals that shaped a “framing war” over the 
purpose and findings of the inquiry. 
The next chapter sets the scene for this approach by analysing the mediation of the 
inquiry. It explores how news reporters gathered, filtered and interpreted information 
about this lengthy, complex event, with whom they interacted during the course of 
their work, and how the political “framing war” over the inquiry’s meaning shaped 
these encounters and their eventual coverage. 
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CHAPTER	  4:	  	  WILL	  EVERYONE	  SHUT	  UP	  SO	  
I	  CAN	  LISTEN?	  
 
If we fell into the trap as lawyers of trying to rely on a [news] report 
as a fair and accurate report of a day’s proceedings – well it is an 
impossible exercise for the media and you know as a barrister, if 
ever you read any case report, that it’s only going to cover a 
smidgin. (Barrister ‘Carrie’, interview, 2012) 
In the previous chapter I outlined how framing could be used to understand reporting 
from the Cole Inquiry, and argued that the process of frame-building involves a co-
production involving legal players, frame sponsors and the media. This chapter 
examines news journalists’ professional strategies for reporting the Cole Inquiry. It 
investigates the ways that they build story frames to meet the requirements of their 
various media types and publication outlets, shaping the “truth” of the legal process 
for the public. It gives a journalism practice context for the next chapter, which will 
examine the role of legal personnel in framing the media coverage of this inquiry. 
As Barrister ‘Carrie’s quote above suggests, news stories about the Cole Inquiry 
could not simply convey the facts of the legal proceedings. This chapter draws on 
interviews with journalists who covered the Cole Inquiry, and a framing analysis of 
ABC Radio news stories, to analyse journalists’ mediation of Inquiry events. It 
outlines the external influences on how journalists gather, filter and interpret legal 
information and begins to indicate why the news media’s coverage and framing of an 
Inquiry cannot be understood by simply reading a transcript of the day’s evidence 
and looking for the summary in news reports. 
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This account suggests that while evidence may have formed the central part of 
inquiry news stories, other factors, including the logistics of hearings and information 
supply, professional production considerations, and journalists’ interactions with 
political and media communications professionals players, affected what was 
reported. The chapter title suggests the professional frustration I felt when my focus 
on hearings was interrupted by new external sources of information, especially those 
originating from political frame sponsors. 
This chapter has eight sections: Covering the inquiry examines the logistics of the 
inquiry. Filtering the evidence outlines the time, space and media-specific production 
restrictions on reporting. Building story frames outlines the storytelling techniques 
that directed journalists’ focus on the event, determining the story choice and the 
angle, or framing of information from evidence. Legal constraints examines the 
extent of the impact of Australian legal reporting law on journalists. In The dominant 
frames and The framing war I examine the conduct of the overarching political 
contest to influence journalists’ interpretation of the Cole Inquiry. The framing of the 
Cole Inquiry then assesses the frames evidenced in ABC Radio news report from the 
inquiry. Finally, Professional reframers discusses journalists’ interactions with a 
range of strategic communicators, political and corporate stakeholders who sought to 
influence their reporting.  
COVERING THE INQUIRY 
The Cole Inquiry was a demanding process for news journalists to cover in two 
respects: the lack of reporting facilities and the weight of the information the hearings 
generated. 
  
 76 
It was held in a small hearing room built in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
offices in Market Street in Sydney’s CBD. Half the room was taken up with desks for 
about 20 barristers who had computers with real-time transcripts and access to 
exhibits. There were also desks without computers for about 20 journalists, and a 
few internet access ports. Members of interest groups dominated the remaining 
public seating, which accommodated about 40 people.11 
This Inquiry did not have the “gold plated” reporting facilities of  the long-running HIH 
Inquiry (2001–03), such as a separate media room for filing stories, ethernet ports, 
and reporter access to the rolling transcripts to check note-taking accuracy – 
facilities that were designed to enhance the fairness and accuracy of media 
reporting (Martin, 2007, p. 6). The Cole Inquiry did, however, make the ground-
breaking move of releasing transcripts publicly on the internet soon after delivery. 
The Inquiry media liaison officer, Rick Willis, says this was designed to enhance the 
clarity of media reporting. “The decision was made simply because of the, at times, 
extremely complicated nature of the evidence being led and the need to provide 
journalists covering the Commission with the best possible scope for accuracy” 
(Rick Willis, interview, 2012). 
Unfortunately, due to the limited internet access, most journalists could only check 
online transcripts after they left the hearing room. No recording, other than the 
inquiry opening, and some of the Commissioner’s later statements, was allowed. 
Most reporters relied initially on handwritten notes. A large screen showed exhibits 
about which witnesses were being questioned, forcing journalists to attempt to note 
                                                
11 When the then Prime Minister, John Howard, and other ministers entered the witness stand, proceedings were 
broadcast into an adjacent hearing room to accommodate extra journalists and members of the public. 
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verbal evidence and copy documents at the same time. Mostly they had to wait for 
hand delivery of paper exhibits, when they were tendered, to get full details. 
The Cole Inquiry took evidence from 10am to 1pm and 2pm to 4pm on most days, 
although some hearing days were longer. The Inquiry began with AWB handing over 
almost 80 folios of documents, but many more large batches were released over the 
following six months. Documents were also subpoenaed from 16 government 
departments and from the UN. 
As each new witness entered the stand, a large batch of documents would be 
tendered. When the then Managing Director of AWB, Andrew Lindberg, first 
appeared on 17 January 2006, 15 documents were tendered. One was the 526-
page report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the UN Oil-for-Food 
Programme – the Volcker report. There were also two of Lindberg’s 10-page 
statements, AWB’s answers to questions posed by the Volcker Inquiry, a folio of 70 
internal AWB documents, which had Lindberg’s writing on them, and AWB’s 10-
page code of conduct. As well, Lindberg was questioned about Iraqi wheat trade 
tender documents and contracts and a trip report from AWB managers, documents 
which were all made public on that day. Parts of Lindberg’s statement and 
supplementary statement to the Cole Inquiry were also flashed up on the screen and 
later tendered into evidence. This was not unusual. Several reporters carried a 
folder of exhibits that they expected to recur in cross-examination, for quick 
reference. These folders swelled and requiring culling as the inquiry went on. 
Thus the mathematics of the inquiry’s information generation dictated that one day’s 
hearings could never be fully translated into news reports. The hearings produced at 
least five hours of verbal evidence daily, along with the hundreds of pages of written 
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evidence needed to make sense of it. The sheer scale and scope of the evidence 
tendered required journalists to make a series of filtering decisions about what 
stories would be covered. This contributed to their frame-building. 
FILTERING THE EVIDENCE 
Inquiry journalists filtered the evidence to achieve basic professional standards of 
brevity, clarity, and to avoid complexity. All journalists indicated they performed a 
public service role in reporting legal proceedings, but recognised that this was 
constrained by their capacity to deliver legible reports within their production 
constraints: 
It’s critical to democracy to have a clear picture of events, as clear as 
can be expressed in a 10-paragraph news story, or one-and-a-half 
minute TV news story or a thirty-second radio report. (John Hill, 
interview, 2012) 
The whole reason I was there was to try and explain to the Australian 
public why something had taken place. Why we had given the most 
evil man of the 20th century $A300 million. (“Journalist A”, interview, 
2012) 
Reporters had to filter the evidence for brevity, according to the demands of their 
publication and medium. “You have to make a filtering call about what the best story 
will be for my readership for the following week and not every shred of evidence is 
going to make it into a 75-centimetre story” (Lucy Knight, interview, 2012). 
The Cole Inquiry was an investigation that revolved around the provision of 
documentary evidence. Journalists who filed numerous times a day (AAP and radio) 
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had to filter according to what was available. A piece of verbal evidence might not 
be reported at all until documents that explained its meaning properly became 
available. “In a way it’s like going to see a performance without the guiding notes 
and the subtitles and things like that – you needed to know the context and for some 
reason it is not clear why they withheld documents until they finished questioning 
someone” (“Journalist A”, interview, 2012).  
The logistics of getting access to those documents, and having time to understand 
the material also forced journalists to make filtering decisions. “Emails from 
protagonists are flashed onto a screen, and the Counsel Assisting Cole, John Agius, 
usually takes them as his basis for cross-examination. But journalists covering the 
Commission rarely have the documents themselves” (Simper, 2006). 
Lack of document access has been noted as a problem for effective, accurate 
reporting (Martin, 2007; Innes & Australia’s Right to Know Coalition, 2008). In this 
instance, a lack of immediate access restricted journalists’ capacity to understand 
proceedings fully, and so those documents that were made available first, dictated 
the range of possible frames for reporting. 
Reporters also filtered the inquiry evidence because of the informational complexity 
of the proceedings, including the specialist language used to describe the business 
dealings and the legal process. While three or four rural reporters at the hearings 
had a speciality in agribusiness, urban reporters found those issues more difficult to 
follow. Commercial television reporter John Hill was among the majority, who said in 
interview that the inquiry was one of the most complex that he’d covered because it 
dealt with subject matter that was “esoteric, quite foreign to me. I had no idea how 
grain trading worked.”  
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In the newspaper column quoted on the previous page, written on his arrival at the 
Cole Inquiry a month into proceedings, The Australian newspaper columnist Errol 
Simper, a veteran of public inquiries, wrote that the complex content and logistics of 
getting documents made the hearings initially bewildering. In particular he argued the 
news story was not evident, “the headline didn’t come gift wrapped”: “You must ... 
develop an ear for evidence that is often dense with specialist jargon. You must 
frequently sit through hours of testimony to get three paragraphs of reportable 
material (Simper, 2006). 
The Sydney Morning Herald’s Marian Wilkinson indicated that being able to follow 
the detail of evidence was an important aspect of her professional role at the inquiry: 
“I think there was a great competitiveness in the reporting at the time to make sure 
you were really on top of the story” (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
Finally, the intricacies of a long, politically contentious legal process arguably 
demanded reporters filter evidence to produce coherent, linear narratives. Evidence 
could be repetitive, because the same or similar material covering many years of 
contracts (such as the 70 company memos on which Lindberg wrote) had to be put 
to different witnesses to test any breach of the law. Many AWB executives were in 
the stand for several days responding to such material and many were recalled as 
new material became available to the inquiry. One barrister interviewed for this 
thesis (“Darry”) also said that evidence was given in a confusing direction, with no 
chronology. The result was, as “Journalist A” indicated, that reporters would choose 
a simple frame, and a more simple rather than a more complex narrative structure: 
“For me, because it was such a rapid turnaround, it was about summing up quickly 
an event or a turning point, a series of questions or someone’s [a witness] attitude” 
(“Journalist A”, interview, 2012). 
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However, the role of journalists extends beyond delivering information with accuracy 
and clarity. They must also produce compelling stories for audiences. Even the 
Australian journalists’ union’s Code of Ethics says in part that their aim is to disclose, 
record, question, and “entertain” (Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 1999). 
Journalists also reframed the legal process through the application of a series of 
story-building techniques, including news values and story angles, to frame or make 
sense of the evidence within their specific story genres. The next section looks at 
how these techniques influence the discursive aspects of news framing. 
BUILDING STORY FRAMES 
Journalists commonly use “news judgement”, based on a range of story-
development techniques, to whittle down the available story material they have 
access to and to select what will be represented as news. These practices help them 
produce “narrative” frames and discursive frames, which are agreed topics and 
perspectives chosen to convey the news. 
In deciding whether a story is worth covering in the first place, for example, 
journalists and editors consider its measures of “news value” or social significance. 
These help them judge whether a story is of interest to a defined audience. News 
values are variously defined, but commonly include impact or relevance, timeliness, 
proximity, prominence, conflict, currency and the unusual or novel (Brighton & Foy, 
2007; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; White, 1991, 1996). Thus when a veteran journalist 
such as Errol Simper says a complex legal discussion does not deliver “gift 
wrapped” headlines, he is talking about the need to look for the particular news 
value of the occasion. As UK journalism scholar Philip Schlesinger (1978) suggests, 
this helps journalists produce news quickly to a format “When it comes to thinking 
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about the kind of news most relevant to ‘the audience’ newsmen [sic] exercise their 
news judgment” (pp.116). US communications scholars Pamela Shoemaker and 
Stephen Reese (1996) say these agreed-on evaluations of stories “predict what an 
audience will find appealing and important; and in practice they direct gate keepers 
[journalists] to make consistent story selections” (p. 106).  
What Schlesinger calls the “professional fetish” of immediacy drives news reporting. 
Editorial decisions about the timeliness and political relevance of the Cole Inquiry 
meant scores of journalists were sent to the inquiry, although some did not always 
report unless there was news value for their publication. Johnston and Breit (2010) 
note that criminal proceedings often have news value as they provide conflict and 
scandal, allowing the media to judge the value of evidence by a focus on aspects of 
individuals’ prominence and on the exceptional or novel. Several Australian judges 
also believe media interpretation of the value of legal information is not always 
parallel to legal purpose (French, 2005; Gleeson, 2007). Shoemaker and Reese 
(1996) concur, saying “the adversarial format of the legal system fits the news 
model, although it may give a distorted view of the case” (p. 122). 
News value is also specific to the outlet and representational demands of the 
medium. Television reporter John Hill needed the day’s hearing to embody certain 
news value in order to justify his report getting a run on his station’s nightly news: 
It had to have politics in it, it had to have the smell of corruption, it 
had to have a new element we had not heard of before; because of 
course, there been had been an awful lot of conjecture go on for 
some time about the nature of this [scandal] ... and there was finally 
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an inquiry. [So] it had to have something really sexy to get a run. 
(John Hill, interview, 2012) 
Although Hill was paid to attend, he did not always report. Other commercial 
television reporters attended the inquiry on an intermittent basis. Hill said complex 
legal detail did not make interesting television. “The overriding issue for me was the 
chronic lack of pictures … The players, we had no pictures of the players in Iraq and 
that was important and the comings and goings from Market Street were pretty dull” 
(John Hill, interview, 2012). 
News reporters also presented the available evidence from discrete perspectives or 
“angles” that were particular to their outlet – that is, they chose focusing ideas or 
questions for story development that clearly differentiated their stories from their 
competitors’ and gave them additional news value. Newspaper reporters had double 
requirements, getting a “new” story while also being influenced by and competing 
with the electronic media, which often published/broadcast before them, during the 
day. They were searching hard for a novel perspective. Caroline Overington had 
extensively reported on the AWB scandal in the lead-up to the Cole Inquiry. This 
meant that a substantial part of the evidence lacked news value for her paper: “The 
fact that they were going to find that AWB had been paying kickbacks to Saddam 
Hussein’s regime was done and dusted before the first day. The nagging question 
was what does the government know?” (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012). 
Story angles would change as new evidence emerged. Often legal documentation 
that became available later in the day allowed newspaper or long-form reporters to 
compete for different angles, based on information that may have been buried in 
documents, and that electronic media might not be able to read in time for deadlines. 
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The Sydney Morning Herald’s Marian Wilkinson says she paid particular attention to 
these documents later in the day to ensure that her own assessment of the 
evidence, rather than just the lawyers’ arguments, informed her stories. 
Different audiences dictated different news values and angles. The wheat export 
monopoly debate was significant to Australia’s rural constituency. Thus the AWB 
executives appearing in the early part of the inquiry met the “prominence” news 
value for the rural media, even though they were not household names for the 
majority of journalists at the inquiry. For the rural media, the angle of any story 
started from what the evidence meant for farmers: 
That would drive my interpretation of the transcripts. Initially the 
behaviour or misbehaviour of the AWB executives and the Chairman 
Trevor Flugge in particular, who is well known not just for his role in 
the wheat industry but also in the wool industry and had been 
running some agricultural programs in Iraq just before the scandal 
broke. There was intense interest in these people who were on 
massive salaries and what they were doing and whether it was 
above board or in their [farmers’] interests. (Lucy Knight, interview, 
2012). 
Interviews indicate the focus of the metropolitan mainstream media was the broader 
context of governance and international politics – how the government managed 
sanctions on, and considered an invasion of, Iraq while still exporting wheat to it: “It 
was an amazing story with global ramifications with roots into a war in Iraq, into 
Saddam Hussein, into the Foreign Affairs Department, into the top echelons of 
government” (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
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However, news reports were still driven by the daily feast of information arising from 
evidence. “A lot of daily coverage was literally the amazing revelation of the day, or 
often, several revelations a day, the bags of cash, the incredible meetings, the 
trucking company – or who the trucking company was run by.” (Marian Wilkinson, 
interview, 2012) 
As mentioned earlier, competition also drove reporters to check and follow up on 
story angles they might have missed. In the “circular circulation” of journalism 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 23) electronic media coverage influences newspaper reporters, 
and the papers in turn influence the electronic media. Anecdotally, an AAP journalist 
who provided wire and radio-desk copy during the inquiry day told me she would be 
quizzed by editors if ABC radio had reported anything she had not mentioned. 
Thus, aside from filtering and on-the-spot news judgement, competition influenced 
what evidence journalists reported on. The need to find distinctive angles contributed 
significantly to the discursive frames they chose for the presentation of news 
knowledge. These frames were often at odds with the institutional interests and 
perspectives of the legal and political fraternities. 
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
So far I have indicated that journalists built the frames of their stories around the 
inquiry evidence that was available, comprehensible and fitted with the news values, 
production requirements and audiences of their particular media outlet. However, the 
first consideration in legal reporting is which laws apply to the reporting of courts and 
inquiries. Interviews indicated that Cole Inquiry journalists informed themselves 
about the nature and aim of the legal proceedings and used different techniques to 
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come to grips with the specialist information under examination. They were also 
aware of their legal responsibilities, and that played a crucial role: 
I do think you were very conscious of two things, one: that was your 
basic duties as a reporter that you needed to cover the day’s events, 
number two: frankly, your legal privilege, i.e. your defence from 
defamation necessitated the fact that you had to do balanced reports 
as far as one could in a short space, of the day’s events. (Marian 
Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
However, while the legal requirements of reporting ostensibly restricted what 
journalists could report from the inquiry, scandal scholar Rod Tiffen (1999) says 
legal rules have often been loosely interpreted (p. 107), if not challenged to their 
limits, in such political inquiries over recent decades. Caroline Overington said 
journalists were less restricted by legal sanctions at the Cole Inquiry than they had 
expected, and constantly stepped outside the conventional frames for legal 
reporting: 
It was one of those, it was kinda [sic], wild west inquiries where ... 
because all the competition between the journalists was so intense 
there was a real capacity for catastrophe; that you would run things 
that you weren’t technically allowed to run, and witnesses would be 
interviewed and approached when they shouldn’t be, and all this 
kind of thing was going on. (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012) 
This does happen with mundane court cases (Johnston & Breit, 2010, p. 11), but 
journalists who draw on, or report about, material that is incidental to a legal Inquiry 
or even sourced from outside can find themselves at odds with the rules of legal 
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reporting, such as the requirement that you only report what was said in that day’s 
evidence (Pearson, 2007). Yet in the Cole Inquiry, journalists put stories into a 
context, included references to previous evidence, and even implied or reached 
conclusions that witnesses had made admissions of culpability (see media reports: 
Vincent, 2006d; Wilkinson, 2006).  
Sometimes reports were published based on journalists’ notes taken from a 
document mistakenly flashed up on the public viewing screen while a witness was 
being questioned about it. One such example is media reporting about the advice 
given by a US public relations guru, Peter Sandman, to AWB, which was published 
while the document was confidential and had not been tendered into evidence (see 
AAP, 2006). That story was one of at least two examples of breaches of 
suppression orders on documents. Commission media liaison officer Rick Willis 
confirmed the inquiry took no action over that publication, nor one other instance of 
publication of restricted documents. Further, Commissioner Terence Cole warned 
barristers not to make complaints about media coverage, as he was unlikely to 
respond (Cole, 2006, p. 176). 
The journalists’ coverage of the inquiry did not always parallel the aspects of the 
hearing that had most significant legal evidentiary value. Indeed, what a journalist 
calls an admission may not be a legally constituted admission to an illegal action, 
quite apart from the fact that the inquiry was a quasi-judicial process. It is no surprise 
then that Cole Inquiry Barrister “Garry” said that what he recalled of a hearing was 
not what he read about in the next day’s paper:  
For Counsel, any newspaper report of proceedings often seems to 
be of different proceedings in a different court. There were a lot of 
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distractions, that were potentially interesting for stories but they were 
not the real legal issues. (Barrister “Garry”, interview, 2012). 
Recent research indicates that journalists and lawyers use different discursive 
approaches to representing the key aspects of legal proceedings (Johnston & Breit, 
2010; Leader, 2008); and thus come into conflict about what constitutes accurate 
and fair court reporting. Journalists are often criticised – sometimes unfairly – for 
failing to produce accurate court reports (Johnston & Breit, 2010). 
However, the Australian High Court does not agree with Barrister “Carrie”, quoted in 
the chapter introduction (p. 74), that it is impossible to be fair and accurate in 
covering legal inquiries. The Court’s judgment quoted above (p. 41) was concerned 
with misrepresentation of facts that might damage a reputation, rather than how 
comprehensive a media report of the day’s events was. Indeed, it accepts that what 
should be conveyed is the “impression of an ordinary person” (Breit, 1999, p. 49). 
Certainly the need of journalists to communicate with the general public in lay 
language can over-simplify complex legal processes. “Journalist A”, who was 
selecting quick summaries or turning points, suggested that those who really wanted 
to follow legal or agribusiness detail could read the publicly available transcript: “By 
having contemporaneous transcripts, members of the public would make up their 
own minds if they wanted to go to the primary evidence. They could either go to the 
inquiry themselves, or they can read the transcripts themselves” (“Journalist A”, 
interview, 2012). 
The legal restrictions on reporting undoubtedly reinforced journalists’ professional 
ethic of accuracy in reporting but, as Johnston and Breit (2010) argue, filtering the 
evidence to fit into media narratives can represent a distorted picture of the legal 
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process. A witness’s agreement with a lawyer’s proposition, for example, “admitting 
full knowledge of payments to the Iraqi regime” is nothing like pleading guilty to a 
crime. Journalists drawing evidence together for a report focusing on contacts 
between AWB and government officials, for example, might have been relevant to 
the political discourse about the scandal, but potentially at odds with the intent of the 
investigation. So it is important to see what frames journalists brought to Inquiry. 
THE DOMINANT FRAMES 
The introduction to the Cole Inquiry terms of reference defined its role narrowly as: 
... an Inquiry into certain matters relating to the decisions or actions 
of Australian companies mentioned in the Final Report (Manipulation 
of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime) of the 
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Programme ... might have constituted a breach of any law of the 
Commonwealth, a State or Territory. (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2005)   
These terms of reference did not include examining whether there was any 
criminality by government officials (Cole, 2006, p. 164). Thus the inquiry primarily 
framed its purpose as an investigation into AWB’s culpability. It did, however, 
examine how the government monitored UN sanctions and whether they were 
breached. So, as a number of journalist interviewees put it, the Cole Inquiry was “the 
biggest show in town” because it touched on issues of government accountability, 
international affairs and trade, and corporate malfeasance, in that order of priority. 
Business corruption is at the bottom because as Rod Tiffen (1999) says, it only 
becomes a general public scandal when it is a political issue, “because of the 
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institutional and policy inadequacies that permitted it, or because it has been abetted 
or protected by political connections” (p. 23). 
The Cole Inquiry was being reported because it was a political scandal that had the 
potential to expose government culpability in the breaching of UN sanctions on Iraq. 
Marian Wilkinson from The Sydney Morning Herald said the inquiry was looking for 
the responsibility for the scandal within AWB itself, but this was not what she was 
pursuing. She wanted to investigate: “Number one, what did the government know 
about the scandal, so we were looking for evidence that said that. Number two, how 
far inside, how far up inside the AWB did the scandal go, and how the cover-up, if 
there was one, was enacted” (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
She is describing another frame for the inquiry – “government culpable” – which 
sometimes drew on sources external to the inquiry hearings. Wilkinson and 
Overington said their reporting was driven by information they were getting from 
their own investigations in Australia and overseas from the UN, Iraq and competitor 
wheat traders.  
Rural reporters also looked beyond the evidential terms of reference for angles of 
interest to agricultural producers. While the inquiry did not examine the politically 
contentious monopoly marketing system, known as the Single Desk, which was run 
by AWB (Cole, 2006, p. 492), Lucy Knight saw that as a hugely significant issue. “I 
said, ‘clear the calendar, I’m here for a while’. It was obvious it would have major 
implications for the [wheat] Single Desk marketing system” (Lucy Knight, interview, 
2012). 
Journalists filing several times a day usually saw themselves as taking a more craft 
approach to the news selection. “Journalist A” described it as: “Play[ing] a pretty 
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straight bat”: “… simply throwing them titbits that I thought most interesting ... this is 
the context, this is what happened, this is why it happened. The more entertaining 
the better but it doesn’t for our purposes colour how we reported it” (“Journalist A”, 
interview, 2012). 
While such rapid-form regular reports might at times be closer to an interpretive 
summary of the day’s evidence, we – the inquiry journalists – agreed that political or 
government information from the evidence was the best selection for a lead. This is 
because we were operating in what Gans calls the “altruistic democracy” macro-
frame – mining the inquiry to perform our public-service role – to examine the 
government apparatus for “deviations from expected performance of officials” 
(Gans, 1979, p. 43). In this, our frames and reporting priorities sometimes appeared 
to be at odds with those of the inquiry.  
There was often a contest between the institutionally sanctioned perspectives of the 
inquiry’s progress, and what the journalists saw as significant in terms of the public 
interest. This is, I argue, a result of the “framing war” over the way the inquiry was 
represented. 
THE FRAMING WAR 
The news media’s pursuit of government culpability was one side of the overarching 
political “framing war” between the federal government and opposition that was 
conducted during the inquiry, and which also reframed the formal legal process.  
Critics of the inquiry did not see it as an open and fair process (see media report, 
Kruger, 2006) and journalists interviewed for this study were highly conscious of the 
argument that the Cole Inquiry was failing to examine the government’s involvement 
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in either sanctioning illegality or turning a blind eye to immorality. The great 
“unanswered question”, about whether the federal government had known about the 
breaches of UN sanctions by AWB, was first and foremost a media critique of the 
inquiry itself. Overington says that was because its terms of reference did not 
specify an investigation into the government’s role: “I think the media also made it 
very clear that it should be. Question, Walsh: So we will extract that evidence? 
Overington: Completely, if we cannot get that from the inquiry we will go looking for 
it elsewhere” (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012). 
Four of the six reporters interviewed for this study thought that the inquiry’s terms of 
reference should have included the government’s role in sanction circumventions. 
This contested frame of news inquiry was also legitimately grounded in journalists’ 
fourth estate, watchdog role:  
“That was a case made by academics in opinion pages, it was a 
case made by journalists, it was a case made by Kevin Rudd, the 
[Opposition] Foreign Affairs spokesman over and over again that this 
was not an Inquiry into the government” (Caroline Overington, 
Interview, 2012). 
Marian Wilkinson said her view that the terms of reference were “bloody narrow, and 
deliberately so” coloured her approach to her reporting: 
I think that where it did affect me was things like reporting of 
Flugge’s [former chairman of AWB] meetings with the government, 
reporting the interactions between government officials and UN 
officials or officials from the Oil-for-Food Inquiry. I think I cast a much 
more sceptical eye over that, than the questioning of Agius [Counsel 
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Assisting the Inquiry] … I think it affected me to the extent that I was 
trying to do a lot of second-guessing on Agius. (Marian Wilkinson, 
interview, 2012) 
Nonetheless, reporters conveyed the unfolding of evidence from the Cole Inquiry as 
they were professionally and legally bound to do. Because of these constraints, and 
the inquiry’s focus, reporting tended to support the government’s official frame – 
steering blame away from itself and towards AWB through an open and rigorous 
Inquiry. This “fair and open inquiry” frame reflects the dynamic of institutional power 
that McConnell et al. (2008) outline, where:  
Formal Inquiry processes may of course be subject to scrutiny from 
the media, NGOs, bloggers and others, but such a constitutional or 
quasi constitutional processes of scrutiny can bring strong authority 
to debates, and make it difficult for critics to undermine. (McConnell 
et al., p. 611) 
The framing analysis conducted for this study supports this proposition, suggesting 
the “AWB culpable” and “fair and open inquiry” frames dominated news reporting of 
the Cole Inquiry. 
THE FRAMING OF THE COLE INQUIRY 
Using the approach described in the previous chapter, I found that the majority of 
ABC Radio news stories, 151 of the 252 stories examined, presented a frame 
package of an open and fair inquiry uncovering AWB’s misbehaviour. The stories 
were mostly filed from the inquiry by me (87.4 per cent), but I had no particular 
memory of individual stories, and the finding was somewhat of a surprise, given that 
  
 94 
my strongest memories were of the “best leads” – that of government culpability. 
Almost all of the 20 stories filed by other reporters were in the “AWB culpable/open 
and fair inquiry frame” as they covered the opening address and the first appearance 
of AWB’s managing director. Overall, the Commissioner and inquiry lawyers are the 
sources for the majority of stories in this frame package (87 of 151). Only nine of 
these stories concurrently suggested the government was culpable. Some of these 
were previews, for example, reporting that a government minister was about to give 
evidence, or when AWB witnesses said they’d had some form of government 
approval (see media report, Grimm, 2006a). 
Table 1 below shows most stories were in one of the two frame packages. The two 
in “other” were reports on some legal argument not in any of the frames. 
The “government culpable/unfair and restricted inquiry” frame was illustrated in 101 
stories. It is notable that the sources for these stories are instead overwhelmingly 
from evidence or documents. That is suggestive of the trawling for evidence about 
government wrongdoing, discussed above. On the other side, the Commissioner and 
inquiry lawyers are the dominant source for the “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry” 
frame, which was also the government’s frame. Some of the factors involved in this 
finding are further examined on the next chapter on legal “performance.” 
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Table 1. Framing and sources 
FRAME 
PACKAGE 
SOURCE  
(Lawyer or 
Commissioner 
quote) 
SOURCE  
(Lawyer 
question)  
SOURCE  
(Verbal 
evidence or 
documents) 
TOTAL 
AWB culpable/ 
fair and open 
Inquiry  
46 32 60 138 
Govt +AWB 
culpable/fair 
and open 
Inquiry 
9  4 13  
Tot = 151 
Govt culpable 
or “Wheat for 
Weapons” 
9 4 83 96 
Govt +AWB 
culpable 
1   1 
Unfair and 
restricted 
Inquiry 
 2  2 
Other   2  2  
Tot = 101 
All     252 
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As indicated in Chapter 3, the federal opposition often expressed the government 
culpable frame as the “Wheat for Weapons” scandal.  I found the term was not used 
in the above ABC Radio news stories filed from the inquiry. The opposition used the 
expression to direct interpretation of the scandal as one of a government putting the 
wheat trade before international action against Saddam Hussein. Anecdotally it 
appears that the opposition’s Kevin Rudd invented the moniker “Wheat for Weapons” 
(Julie Macken, former journalist at the Australian Financial Review personal 
communication, 2012) and he first used it in late 2005 (Nethercote, 2007). Rudd’s 
trade adviser James Bond was also “pretty sure it came from Kevin”: 
I don’t remember the specific time when he came up with it but we 
did used to spend time sitting around, throwing around phrases to 
come up with – you know, a pithy way of expressing it that would get 
picked up by the media. (James Bond, interview, 2012) 
At the time of the inquiry, many journalists only used the phrase if it was a direct 
quote, because it was the opposition’s alternative to the government’s frame. A 
ProQuest search of Australian and New Zealand newspapers and ABC transcripts 
found 598 uses of the expression “Wheat for Weapons” between 15 January and 29 
September 2006 – the time of the Cole Inquiry’s public hearings. Well over half of 
these stories included references to the federal opposition, variously identifying it as 
a quote, putting it in inverted commas, using the expression “so-called,” “dubbed as” 
or “what the opposition calls” [the Wheat for Weapons scandal]. However, it was also 
used as an unattributed descriptor in the News Limited Sydney paper The Daily 
Telegraph. That database does not allow the identification of its use in television 
scripts or as a visual banner. However, political blogger Theo Clark wrote at the time 
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that Channel Ten often used the expression as a convenient banner, so he asked 
Kevin Rudd about it:  
Does someone in the ALP know more than they are letting on at 
present? Was the Australian Wheat Board [sic] actually trading 
‘Wheat for Weapons’ – the government will be up the creek when 
that comes out! Though I can’t help but wonder, why exactly does 
the Wheat Board need weapons? (Clark, 2006) 
The Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesman’s reply justified the usage of the term by 
quoting several US authorities that reported the Iraqi regime used hard currency it 
had obtained to buy weapons. Media outlets may have used similar justifications for 
describing the scandal as “Wheat for Weapons” without attribution. “As the AWB was 
the single largest contributor to Saddam Hussein's slush fund (by a country mile) I 
believe it is accurate to describe it as a Wheat for Weapons scandal” (Rudd, in Clark, 
2006). 
Like the more powerful organising principle the “War on Terror”, which the US media 
internalised between 2001 and 2006 (Reese & Lewis, 2009), “Wheat for Weapons” 
was dramatic and easily summarised the scandal, which made it attractive, 
particularly for television as what Reese and Lewis call an “on-screen organizing 
device.” The phrase is used to this day by some media to describe the scandal (see 
media report by Bettles, 2014), but its use is still contested, and its unattributed use 
is still criticised by bloggers (see Henderson, 2009). 
Such devices, and the provision of handy interpretations of complex material, from 
political media communications professionals, complete with the offer of “talent” in 
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the form of television and radio interviews with Kevin Rudd, could add enough value 
to a “boring” story to get a run in some media.  
One of the most interesting findings of this study is that the relationships between 
journalists and the paid professionals trying to influence them did have an impact on 
reporting of evidence from hearings. James Bond, who worked for Kevin Rudd, says 
he had a clear brief to cast any story in the “Wheat for Weapons” frame. Others 
pushed their company line, or aimed to maintain the reputation of a fair and open 
Inquiry, reinforcing Cole’s authority.  
PROFESSIONAL REFRAMERS 
As indicated earlier, timely provision of documents to journalists reduces the 
practical obscurity of legal process created by a lack of access to evidence, and 
enables the media to better communicate what is happening in proceedings (Martin, 
2007). This is one reason for the hiring of court information officers. A court 
information officer will make material available once in evidence and explain legal 
procedure (but generally not evidence) to the media (Johnston, 2005). 
However, the Cole Inquiry media liaison officer, Rick Willis, said he did explain 
evidence to the media. In particular, he says he briefed journalists who came in and 
out of the inquiry on an irregular basis (commercial radio and television came only on 
“big days”) to bring them up to date. Other journalists he assisted on request; his 
only other approaches were to correct “blatant inaccuracies ... I would talk it over 
with the Commissioner or Counsel Assisting, and then I’d approach the journalist 
and talk to them about what I felt was the error of their ways” (Rick Willis, interview, 
2012). He said he would behave differently if he were doing the same job for a court, 
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but he was hired to assist the process of interaction, “because it was always going to 
be a highly politically charged royal commission”: 
A Commission of Inquiry is slightly different to a criminal court case 
in that there is a lot more interaction between the legal process and 
the media process. There is a lot more interaction than there is in the 
normal process of a court hearing. (Rick Willis, interview, 2012) 
Willis says he was employed to ensure the inquiry was not brought into disrepute, 
and that was his focus. Given that one contested political frame for media reporting 
stories was about the legitimacy of the commission itself, it may be that Willis must 
be seen as a player influencing media framing. 
In any case, his control over document delivery had an impact on reporting. The 
sheer number of documents put into evidence on the Cole Inquiry made the job of 
document delivery a challenging one. It meant that Willis also made filtering 
decisions. If there was a large number of documents he would select those he 
judged to be of most interest to the media to print hard copies, ready to distribute, 
and he would get the rest to journalists later. Morning consultations guided him in 
those decisions: “I had briefings every morning with Counsel Assisting. I knew 
where they were going, and what they were trying to achieve on any given day” 
(Rick Willis, interview, 2012). 
It is noteworthy that Willis was viewed with some wariness by the regular journalists. 
Overington thought Willis may have been a partisan player who decided which gaps 
in journalists’ knowledge would be filled:    
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In this particular case it seems to me that we were given documents 
that the inquiry wanted us to highlight. So if there was a particular 
contract that showed that AWB had been dealing with Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, we would be handed a copy of that and not of 
everything else; that would seem to me – that was the one that they 
wanted in the paper, that was the one that they wanted extracted, 
that was the one that they wanted to show off on that particular day 
and that is clearly part of a marketing strategy to show you that the 
inquiry is uncovering information. (Caroline Overington, interview, 
2012) 
“Journalist A” wasn’t sure that the opacity of some evidence was due to anything 
other than the legal process, but he called Willis a “smooth operator. Sometimes 
they were very helpful and other times it’s really ... you do feel like you’re being 
used” (“Journalist A”, interview, 2012). 
Willis often faced groups of five or more journalists, all requesting a different 
document. He usually managed to deliver material quickly or ensure that it went 
online during the day. However, for some outlets, delays mean the difference 
between filing on the material or not. He took short cuts, which pleased the media 
but not some of the legal profession. A number of barristers and AWB’s corporate 
relations manager complained, at times vociferously, about Willis’s highly unusual 
practice of handing out embargoed copies of documents that were not yet tendered 
and accepted as public evidence. 
It was never suggested that it was outside the legal scope; I think 
that they just felt that the headlines weren’t going to help their cause. 
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… I would have been aware that those documents would have been 
tabled, they were on the agenda to be tabled, and in those instances 
it would have helped the reporters in understanding the context. 
(Rick Willis, interview, 2012) 
Willis described himself as “in Terence Cole’s fan club” but distinguished himself 
from the other media communications professionals by saying that he did not have 
an agenda to cast clients in a good light: 
I suspect that the people who were working for the AWB felt that I 
had influence because of the timing in which I would present 
material. To me that was of small consequence, given that it would 
help the reporters get some context around various issues. (Rick 
Willis, interview, 2012) 
The antagonism between AWB’s media spokesman, Peter McBride, and Willis 
suggests that may indeed have been how the company saw Willis, although it must 
be said that Willis was representing an inquiry that barristers claimed was treating 
AWB witnesses and employees unfairly (see Cole, 2005, p. 1236, p. 1556). 
In either case, Willis was part of the logistics that impact on when and how often a 
media story is produced. His job was to ensure the good standing of the 
“constitutional processes of scrutiny” that McConnell et al. (2008) argued “can bring 
strong authority to debates” (p. 611). Given that journalists were highly aware of the 
political contest over the inquiry’s legitimacy, and experienced enough to know that 
such inquiries often exposed “inconvenient evidence” (Prasser, 2006) it is 
understandable that some suspected Willis may have, at times, been acting as a 
frame sponsor.  
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Opposition reframers 
Other media communications professionals attending the inquiry worked hard trying 
to influence the coverage, in particular James Bond, a trade adviser who took over 
from Kevin Rudd’s media boss Alister Jordan at the Cole Inquiry, tried to direct 
journalists’ attention towards the Howard government and to bolster criticism of the 
inquiry. He stayed with the inquiry for its duration talking to reporters, specifically to 
influence reporting: 
We were trying to frame it so the terms of reference would be 
interpreted as broadly as possible ... We were never going after 
AWB itself, and Kevin always said this, we were not going after 
AWB, we were not going after the public servants, we were going 
after the politicians. (James Bond, interview, 2012) 
He felt many journalists had already taken a similar approach. With a rapid supply 
of direct information from Jordan or Bond in the hearings, Kevin Rudd was able to 
make frequent political comments in parliament and in media conferences. When it 
was in parliament, political correspondents reported it: 
So if something dropped in the inquiry at 11 o’clock, I’d get the 
document to Canberra, then Kevin would have the opportunity to ask 
a question in question time ... so we were undertaking a forensic 
analysis of what was going on and trying to break down the 
government by continually asking questions based on what had 
happened that day – forensically chipping away. (James Bond, 
interview, 2012) 
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Political reaction outside the inquiry may not change a story filed during the day – in 
a radio news bulletin it might be run before or after whatever the reporter in the 
hearing filed; but sometimes editorial pressure was exerted on reporters at the 
hearings to raise the profile of a piece of evidence that they may not have deemed 
to be overly significant, because there was commentary available on it. Journalists 
at the hearing could, and frequently did, dispute such interpretation of the evidence 
with their editors. The opposition hoped that such pressure would lead to reporters 
at the inquiry accepting its perspective: 
There was a constant feedback loop between the journalists in 
Canberra and the journalists at the inquiry, and also between our 
office and me. Sometime Al [Alister] Jordan would say “this is what 
the story is down here, can you see if you can reinforce it up there?” 
(James Bond, interview, 2102) 
Bond felt he was very successful in his role, and this can be traced partially to the 
needs of certain media. Commercial television generally required pictures, as John 
Hill said above (p. 83) and the opposition was providing that in parliament and in 
commentary from “talking heads”. Hill was assigned to cover more than half the 
hearing days, but it was deemed to be a political, not a legal, story. He made the call 
as to whether evidence made a stand-alone story for him to do; more often than not 
he fed material to the Parliament House bureau for a national political story:  
Most of the time, I was keeping an eye on it for Canberra, looking for 
the political elements, because it was little known the detail that 
would emerge. Obviously they wanted to cover anything that would 
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implicate Alexander Downer, the then Foreign Minister. (John Hill, 
interview, 2012)  
Bond said that that at times he was surprised at his ability to influence media 
reports. He added that success came more often with journalists who were not 
attending on a regular basis and came more often with television reporters: “I did, 
sort of end up ... you know suggesting to journalists that certain stories were big 
stories and should probably run that day” (James Bond, interview, 2012). 
Government reframers 
The federal government’s strategic communications approach was usually to defer to 
the authority of its independent Inquiry, and to avoid commenting other than when 
reporting was politically damaging to its interests. According to McConnell et al., the 
federal government’s “symbolic portrayal of Cole as impartial, apolitical and rigorous 
continued throughout the inquiry” (2008 p. 612). 
Ministerial press secretaries were not often sent to hearings, but that did not stop 
them making approaches to journalists in private. 
Equally on the other side, well not equally – I don’t think anyone was 
quite as obsessive as Kevin Rudd’s office and Kevin Rudd himself – 
but on the other side, if there was a sharp political angle out of the 
story of the previous day, I would get a phone call from Chris Kenny 
from Downer’s office, or Tony O’Leary from the Prime Minister’s 
office, usually highly abusive. So that really kept you on your toes. 
(Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
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Anecdotally amongst the inquiry’s regular reporters, Chris Kenny, the media adviser 
to Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, was most notorious for his heavy-
handed approach to journalists. His minister was often mentioned in reports, as 
ultimately he was responsible for approving OFFP contracts. Kenny did once publicly 
call Overington’s reporting “tendentious and inaccurate” and she retaliated by 
reporting about him. Later, in a radio interview, she described his modus operandi: 
“Chris Kenny has been sending text messages ... And they’re almost always very 
rude. He would send you emails saying, you know, you’re ridiculous, you’re an idiot, 
you’re laughable, this is farcical” (Adams, 2007). Kenny was reported as boasting 
that he talked to reporters by the “truckload” (Koutsoukis, 2006) but in interviews for 
this thesis, only the newspaper reporters mentioned him.  
Media communications specialists or public relations people can be seen as the 
facilitators of the interaction between journalists and “elites” (Gans, 1979) and their 
presence is becoming increasingly common at public inquiries where the reputations 
of organisations or individuals are at stake.   
Their influence is difficult to assess, but they insinuated themselves into journalists’ 
professional routines. The logistics and complexity of the hearings and the news 
values and needs of certain media, as described above (pp. 75-78), gave them 
opportunities to influence coverage. Several journalists said some of the 
communications professionals were helpful with terminology and complex matters, 
others saw them as annoyances they tried to ignore. Rural reporter Lucy Knight 
spoke of more subtle attempts to influence, through suggestions, support and post-
coverage “corrections” or complaints. Most senior journalists have internalised their 
response to approaches by political staffers into their professional world view:  
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I’m pretty sure I did tell Alister [Kevin Rudd’s adviser] there in the 
second or third week ... what I thought of public relations people like 
him … we’ve been doing this game for a while, as you know, people 
are always trying, getting in your ear about something … we’re pretty 
good at dodging that. (“Journalist A”, interview, 2012) 
Television reporter John Hill saw it was part of his job to liaise with the political 
minder, James Bond, before applying his professional filters:  
What do you see as the issues that Kevin might want to comment 
on?  What does he think is important out of this and what is he going 
to say about it or will he say something about it? That was only a 
factor in terms of what was available from Kevin Rudd today … you 
would hardly take James Bond’s perspective as being the way you 
should shape your story. (John Hill, interview, 2012) 
“Journalist A”, on the other hand, says he found it “extraordinary” that Caroline 
Overington, at the launch of her book Kickback (2007) jokingly introduced the 
opposition’s Kevin Rudd – saying that in covering the AWB story, she “went to bed at 
night with him and got up with him the next morning”:  
I found that extraordinary: that she would talk to a senior player of a 
political party about how she was reporting it – what he thought were 
the key points and what she thought were the key points. [At the 
hearings] you are comparing notes, you are discussing people’s 
thoughts about what was going on. I thought, I suppose naively, we 
were on the same team, then you find out people [journalists] are 
actually not. (“Journalist A”, interview, 2012). 
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The reaction of “Journalist A” to Overington again illustrates the journalists’ 
professional world view of political communication professionals: a mix between 
getting useful information and maintaining some wariness of the frames they push, 
or “being mindful of the spin” (Reese, 2007, p. 152). 
Corporate reframers 
The agribusiness sector was also well represented in the hearing room: AWB’s 
media man, Peter McBride, lobbyists from the National Farmers Federation, and the 
Wheat Export Marketers Association (its board was made up of Louis Dreyfus 
Commodities, and grain exporter Cargill, which stood to benefit when AWB lost its 
wheat export monopoly). “There were always public relations people sitting amongst 
the reporters, AWB had their own spinners, BHP had a SWAT team of spinners – 
immaculately presented, beautifully dressed – and they handed out huge reams of 
material” (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012). 
My own experience of the same spinners was different, as I did short-form rapid 
reporting, and did not have time to speak with them. On one occasion, after they had 
failed to get my attention during the hearing day, they complained directly to my 
superior when they did not like the angle of my radio report.12 
Overington compared BHP’s tactics to those of Peter McBride of AWB, who sat in on 
most days of hearings, but “wouldn’t provide you with so much as a memo” (Caroline 
Overington, interview, 2012). However, other reporters found McBride a helpful 
resource for understanding agribusiness or trade terms, and he was sought out. 
Knight suggests why he might not wish to cooperate with newspaper reporters such 
as Overington, who often saw evidence as a jumping-off point for her stories:  
                                                
12 Anecdotally, many vigorous complaints were made by BHP public relations staff when media reports 
deviated from the company line in reporting about the Tigris deal.  
  
 108 
I did notice him setting the record straight with a few journalists from 
time to time. I guess they [AWB] were making sure that they weren’t 
portrayed in a manner that was outside of what was happening in 
the hearing (Lucy Knight, interview, 2012).  
Knight says the competitor agribusiness lobbyists took a more subtle approach:  
They obviously wanted the Single Desk annihilated and ... they 
would ring and say ‘good story, good story’; or the next, ‘why didn’t 
you write this, why didn’t you write that?’ (Lucy Knight, interview, 
2012). 
Dealing with media communications professionals is a constant part of day-to-day 
journalism, particularly since the 1990s, but in journalism studies it has rarely been 
factored into understanding the reporting of evidence from a legal Inquiry. The bulk 
of journalists at the inquiry were senior reporters who saw themselves as expert at 
judging competing interests, and interviews reflected that professional world view:  
they said they made up their own minds on what to report by weighing up competing 
interpretations of evidence.  
However, it may be argued that professional spinners did have an influence on 
media reporting by filling in gaps in understanding and providing suggestions for 
angles or material to “flesh out” stories. Equally, those who represented elected 
political officials could be very influential through the use of political commentary, 
and making material available to content-starved television outlets. A case study in 
Chapter 6 will analyse how this politicised sponsoring of information and preferred 
frames was effective in shaping inquiry news. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates how inquiry logistics and journalists’ production constraints 
led to them filtering the evidence presented and outlines professional strategies that 
were applied to frame that legal event. News values and the imperative to represent 
the inquiry as part of the political debate over the scandal shaped the reported truth 
of the legal process, and the legal constraints on reporting did not necessarily 
impede that mediation of the law. Nonetheless, the imperative to report the hearings 
accurately and fairly ensured the institutional power of the inquiry was not 
undermined and the dominant political frames were most often conveyed in news 
reports. However, it could mean the legal import of evidence did not always 
determine story choices. 
This chapter also shows that Inquiry logistics, journalists’ professional values and 
their interactions with political and media communications players affected the 
framing of news reports. The most powerful of these communications professionals 
was the one hired by the Cole Inquiry to supply inquiry documentation and 
information, Rick Willis. Some journalist interviewees even regarded Willis as a 
frame sponsor because of his control over the timing of the release of documents 
which might have fallen outside the dominant frame package of the fair and open 
inquiry exposing AWB culpability. This unexpected finding puts the academic 
spotlight on the gate-keeping role and influence of legal communications officers. 
Other frame sponsors outside the legal process did directly attempt to influence 
media reporting of evidence, but this work suggests that journalists were more wary 
of their spin. 
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Political communication is one of the factors outside what was said in evidence that 
contributed to the co-production of Inquiry meaning and helped determine which 
framing of the inquiry was presented in news reports: the Howard government’s 
preferred “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry” frame package, the opposition’s 
“Wheat for Weapons” or the less pejorative “unfair and restricted inquiry/government 
culpable” package or, less commonly, a hybrid of those specific functional frames.  
Significantly, this chapter also shows that presentations of evidence by Cole Inquiry 
lawyers, or their questions or statements, formed the basis of most inquiry news 
stories. This media focus saw journalists reinforcing the dominant framing of the 
inquiry’s purpose, supporting its institutional power and legitimacy to seek corporate 
culpability rather than political responsibility. Stories on evidence that did not fall into 
the dominant frame package, and where the government’s culpability was being 
pursued by an open Inquiry, were not sourced from lawyers’ presentations to 
anything like the same extent. 
This analysis of journalism practice and Cole Inquiry news mediation provides clear 
evidence of the influence of legal actors and shows that political or corporate 
stakeholders sought in various ways to intervene in inquiry news coverage and 
adopted communications strategies to influence or direct media representations. 
This outline of Inquiry mediatisation will be developed in the next chapter where I 
investigate the notion of mediatised “performance” by the legal profession, and its 
impact on news mediation. 
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CHAPTER	  5:	  MY	  LEARNED	  FRIEND,	  THE	  
MEDIA	  DOES	  NOT	  AFFECT	  US	  	  
	  
John Agius paused and kind of touched the edge of his silver 
glasses and said “Are you a complete fool Mr Lindberg?” and it 
seemed to me that was absolutely directed at the media because 
that is not a lawyerly kind of question, it is not a question that’s 
probative, it’s not aimed at trying to extract information from him. It’s 
done with flair, for impact. (Caroline Overington, Interview, 2012) 
In Chapter 4 I identified the professional and logistical factors that influence how and 
what the news media reported from the Cole Inquiry. I also identified how strategic 
communications specialists and politicians attempted to influence journalistic 
mediation and framing of events, arguing that news reports were discursive co-
productions involving journalists and other Inquiry players. This chapter examines 
the role of lawyers in those co-productions.  
Historically, lawyers claim not to be influenced in their court work by the presence or 
operation of professionals from government, church or the media. The title of this 
chapter alludes to the legal profession’s disavowal of the performative aspect of its 
work. Yet in this chapter I aim to identify how legal practitioners, in the way they 
carried out their roles, or in their “performance” of the law, responded to journalists’ 
professional and logistical imperatives to impact on media reporting. One example, 
quoted above, is found in the “fool question” to the Managing Director of AWB, 
Andrew Lindberg. It was one of a number of provocations from Counsel Assisting the 
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Inquiry, John Agius, SC, which became focal points for the day’s news coverage of 
the inquiry and Lindberg’s evidence. Reported by most news outlets, that question 
became a metaphor for AWB’s culpability and for the inquiry’s determination to 
expose it.  
This chapter draws on interviews with lawyers and journalists, the content of which is 
checked against Inquiry transcripts, and returns to my framing analysis. In the 
section Lawyers impact on news I argue lawyers can be seen as an influential news 
source if their activities were reported upon, or their lines of questioning were used to 
summarise or frame evidence. This resulted in a type of media report that I call 
“lawyer-directed”. This chapter goes on to examine why lawyers might develop that 
degree of influence, and how their work is mediated. In Setting the stage and 
performing I examine how and why barristers might perform in public, and how 
lawyers and journalists understand and interpret that. Follow the leader establishes 
why the Commissioner and Counsel Assisting the Inquiry are the dominant media 
sources, thereby reinforcing the power inherent in public inquiries. Then in Talking to 
the back of the room I look at the way lawyers’ public presentations can be delivered 
to address the journalists as audience (back of the room) and to suit media 
production needs, while still performing their main function of addressing the 
Commissioner (front of the room). Backstage examines the impact of direct 
interactions between lawyers and journalists who are positioned as their audience. 
Legitimate forensic purpose and Mediatising the inquiry 1 assess whether lawyers’ 
media awareness and their professional “performance” can be interpreted as a 
mediatisation of the inquiry hearings. Finally, in What’s in an argument? I note a 
qualification to the “publicness” of the inquiry that gave further power to the legal 
“performance” of the inquiry lawyers. 
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LAWYERS’ IMPACT ON NEWS  
In an attempt to quantify when the lawyers might be deemed to be the dominant 
source for inquiry news, and thus a source of influence on the mediation of the 
inquiry, my framing analysis of 252 ABC Radio news stories identified the main 
sources for each report. I divided these into three categories: 
1. Evidence from a witness or document 
2. A lawyer’s or the Commissioner’s statement or words 
3. Witness response to legal questioning (admit/deny/not recall). 
Of the 138 stories in the “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry frame package – the 
majority of reports, 78, were based on the words of the Commissioner or Inquiry 
lawyers. Of these stories, 46 involved reports about lawyer (including the 
Commissioner) statements and 32 used a lawyer’s question rather than direct 
witness evidence to frame the story. I call these ‘lawyer-directed’ stories. 
 
Less than half of the media reports in this frame (60) were from verbal evidence or 
documents. The 13 stories that raised questions about both AWB and government 
culpability, but remained within the fair Inquiry frame, were similarly dominated by 
lawyers’ speech. Only four reports came predominantly from the evidence.  
 
In contrast, of those stories in the government culpable/unfair and restricted inquiry 
frame package – which might be seen as adverse to the government – the majority 
of reports were based on verbal or documentary evidence. In that “Wheat for 
Weapons” frame, 83 of the 101 stories were drawn from evidence. Only nine stories 
originated from lawyers, and they were predominantly complaints about unfair 
process. Only four were “lawyer-directed” such as reports of witness responses to 
  
 114 
questions, or denying a lawyer’s proposition. That the inquiry evidence is the source 
for the majority of reports in the “government culpable/unfair and restricted inquiry” 
frame is perhaps indicative, as Chapter 4 suggests, of journalists extracting and 
highlighting evidence they thought the inquiry should be pursuing.  
 
As more than one-third of the 252 stories originated from Inquiry lawyers, it is clear 
that they had a significant substantial share of media attention. Before I expand on 
that finding about lawyer-directed stories, I will first examine what performative 
devices might be used to direct journalists towards the “good yarn” they’re seeking.  
SETTING THE STAGE AND PERFORMING 
This work builds on Leader’s (2008) thesis that lawyers “perform” the law in ritual 
ways and these “performances” are highly mediatised. She argues that the 
“performance of tradition” in the criminal trial law is the enactment of power or social 
significance, and she takes what she calls a “Foucauldian/Bourdieuian sociological 
bent” to understanding performance as a constitutive part of the legal event (p. 15). 
In her work, lawyer “performance” is mediatised in two senses: in trying to meet 
public (and jury) expectations created by “television lawyers”; and in being presented 
in media-friendly ways. Aggressive questioning and colourful language can certainly 
be a neat fit with media needs for conflict and human interest. However, the 
barristers interviewed for this study suggest such “performance” (rather than their 
theatricality, which they professionally eschew) is usually designed for a jury.  
Leader argues that a lawyer’s “performance” in courts is mediatised because diverse 
forms of communications knowledge and skills are now commonly a part of legal 
training:  
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Advocacy training material in the last 30 years has drawn on 
psychology, linguistics, and literature as well as acting theory. In 
addition to this multidisciplinary take on advocacy training, there has 
also been growth in generalised communication skills that are 
presented as applicable to multiple careers, most frequently lawyers 
and salespersons. (Leader, 2008, p. 109) 
This brings into question the long-held argument against televising courts and 
inquiries in Australia, which has been based on the notion that mediatisation of legal 
process, or legal “performance” for the media, would be to the detriment of the 
justice system (Stepniak, 2006). In interview, Barrister “Barry” suggested that a large 
media contingent could have the same mediatising impact as television cameras: “15 
to 20 journalists is equivalent to one camera” (Barrister Barry, interview, 2012). At 
the Cole Inquiry there were at least that many journalists present, sometimes more. 
The Inquiry was not televised; only the opening address and some of Commissioner 
Cole’s special statements were recorded. Thus inquiry journalists acted as audience, 
witnesses and reporters, mediating the legal “performance” of this event to the 
public.  
Like Leader, then, I use the term “performance” as a broad concept encompassing 
the “performed legal event” (Hibbits in Leader, 2008, p. 15), the presentations of legal 
practitioners and the techniques they use to persuade others of their case. As Leader 
observes, this term distinguishes effective courtroom communications from the 
overtly theatrical style that barristers denigrate: 
Although many legal agents consciously associate acting with 
artificiality, and construct a dichotomy between acting and his or her 
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own practice of not performing (being natural), this is a form of 
misrecognition, resulting from advocates’ failure to recognise their 
own embodied courtroom behaviour as a performance style. Legal 
naturalism is, in the courtroom context, simply a case of good acting 
rather than over-acting. (Leader, 2008, p114) 
When a lawyer’s presentation is deemed to be a “performance” in the pejorative 
theatrical sense described above, two of the barristers interviewed regarded it as 
likely to be diverting from proper legal process – not doing the job. One thought that 
the media was identifying something that was distracting them from the legal reality 
of what was happening. Yet barristers described their own professional conduct with 
reference to performative devices.13 Barrister “Darry” spoke of a legal tactic that aims 
to “position” a client or a key witness as a narrator for an audience, which could be 
the Commissioner (front of the room) or the media (back of the room): 
When you have an inquiry you need someone to tell the story, to put 
it all together and often you get someone who is a whistleblower or 
who you can position to put all the pieces together and you might 
need more than one person to do it. This was a really strange inquiry 
because they just didn’t have that. (Barrister “Darry”, interview, 
2012) 
Timing was also raised as a factor in securing audience reception. Barrister “Barry” 
explained that in courts, lawyers try to time events, such as particular questions to a 
witness, to direct maximum attention to certain evidence: 
                                                
13 Leader (2008) says a “common rubric” has developed to avoid the negative connotations of acting: with 
leading Sydney barristers Chester Porter and Mark Tedeschi, articulating the need for “storytelling” to advocate 
an argument to the jury audience (pp. 115 – 6). 
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Barristers do it with juries. They will time a devastating witness just 
before the end of the day so that the jury goes home with the 
witness’s evidence ringing in their ears; but of course that’s a jury, 
they’re the decision-maker. (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012)  
He argued that there was no good reason to use this technique when an Inquiry 
Commissioner, rather than a jury, was the decision-maker; yet he and Barrister 
“Carrie” both felt that lawyers for the Cole Inquiry did seem to time certain evidence 
for maximum media impact: 
So you would position a witness to give evidence if you knew it was 
going to be controversial or that you could demonstrate was false, 
right at the point where you knew that the media would take it, and 
run in the next the news cycle. So it was evident in the timing. 
(Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012) 
The media was really being driven, at least as I saw it, by the staff 
employed by the inquiry, in the way that they were lining up 
witnesses, even in the timing of questions, you know, just before 
lunch breaks. (Barrister “Carrie”, interview, 2012) 
Barrister “Darry” also described how legal practitioners would position themselves 
physically, to minimise any adverse impression about their client’s role. He argued 
for example, that being in the hearing room all the time was “a bad look”:  
I had to be a bit concerned about the media but I was concerned 
really that Terence Cole or Counsel Assisting, but more importantly 
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Terence Cole, would think we were there, worried (Barrister “Darry”, 
interview, 2012). 
Leader’s (2008) study indicated the use of rhetoric “to breathe life into the evidence” 
is central to legal “performance” (p. 112). Several barristers interviewed saw Counsel 
Assisting the Inquiry John Agius’s clever and humorous use of language as a 
demonstration of his acute media awareness and keenness to gain coverage. It is 
also, as Leader notes, a disputed technique of influencing opinion. In the hearings, 
AWB’s counsel, James Judd, complained that Agius’s attention-seeking style of 
questioning was legally inappropriate:  
MR JUDD: In our submission, although entertaining to the media, 
ridicule of a witness in any circumstances is unfair, and we have 
observed on numerous occasions since this Inquiry commenced the 
tool of ridicule being used, the most profound being the comment to 
Mr Lindberg, “Are you a complete fool?” Sir, that kind of 
examination, we say, is not just inappropriate, it is highly damaging.  
It attracts media attention and it ought to be known and understood 
to be damaging ... there are instances where it's been said, “Are you 
the only person in this room that doesn’t understand” a particular 
interpretation, or “If I were to ask a 12-year-old”, or “What were you 
doing in your job?” That sort of thing, we say, is ridiculing a witness, 
demeaning the witness, it's not becoming of counsel (Cole, 2005, 
p.1553). 
However, as Commissioner Cole noted, Judd himself was not averse to using 
language to attract media attention (see media report, Vincent, 2006a). 
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MR JUDD: it can only be concluded that what we are at risk of 
seeing is an ambush, an ambush of our clients [AWB and AWBI 
Limited] through their employees ... Sir, this is an Inquiry to establish 
facts.  
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.               
MR JUDD: In no circumstance is an ambush an appropriate tactic.   
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, “ambush” is a very colourful term ... 
(Cole, 2005, p. 1551-2) 
These barristers, with years of experience in courts and inquiries, indicate here that 
they were well aware of the performative and storytelling devices that could get an 
argument across to an audience. As personalities, lawyers can also attract extra 
attention if they use colourful yet simple language and aggressive legal tactics. They 
are also familiar with the constraints of media deadlines and say that lawyers can 
and do deliberately time the delivery of information for best public impact. As outlined 
in Chapter 4, the delivery of such well-timed evidence or comments is indeed crucial 
in the logistics that determine what the media reports.  
However, not all well-timed evidence or pronouncements will appeal to journalists’ 
interests, or influence their frame-building. A lawyer’s authority, as conveyed by their 
role in the inquiry, is an important factor in the degree of media attention they attract. 
FOLLOW THE LEADER  
An important factor in news framing is that the media follows those in power 
(Carragee & Roefs, 2004). In this case the key performers were the Commissioner, 
Terence Cole, who would make the final findings of the inquiry, and Counsel 
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Assisting, John Agius, who controlled and conducted the examination, along with his 
senior and junior colleagues. The event’s “political symbolism of Inquiry, rigour and 
learning” (McConnell et al., 2008 p. 614) was reinforced by journalists concentrating 
on those two players, particularly Commissioner Cole. 
The Honourable Terence Cole AO RFD QC 
The media looks to the Commissioner or judge in any legal inquiry, as she or he is 
the final arbiter of the evidence and is in control of the broad direction and scope of 
the inquiry (Prasser, 2006; Tiffen, 1999). The “framing war” surrounding the inquiry 
meant that Commissioner Terence Cole’s rulings and statements on his terms of 
reference addressed that contested frame, and his criticisms of the behaviour of 
legal parties (particularly AWB) were closely reported (see media report, Edwards, 
2006). Cole’s occasional questions to witnesses were also closely followed by 
journalists. Much of what Cole said could be seen as supporting the contested 
political frame of the “fair and open inquiry”. In that sense Cole was party to the 
public debate because he was widely reported; but it is not uncommon for a judge or 
commissioner on high-profile inquiries to defend publicly the integrity of her or his 
jurisdiction (see media report, Madigan, 2012). 
Three of the four barrister interviewees saw Commissioner Cole as highly media 
aware, and there is some supporting evidence for this judgement. He opened his 
Inquiry in December 2005 with remarks about media coverage, which were repeated 
the following January at the commencement of public hearings. Cole noted that 
statements had been made in the parliament and in the media “purportedly asserting 
knowledge of matters relevant to this inquiry” and made an open-ended call for 
anyone with further evidence to come forward. At the commencement of public 
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hearings, he said that he had received only one piece of information since the 
opening and two submissions, despite continued reporting of claims. He also raised 
the media and political debate over the Single Desk wheat export monopoly, then 
held by AWB, pointing out that the inquiry was not addressing that issue (Cole, 2005, 
p.491–2). As Chapter 4 noted, this was an issue that rural journalists, in particular, 
considered central.  
A month later, Commissioner Cole again allowed audio recording “in light of the 
extensive public commentary” on “supposed” knowledge about the kickbacks by the 
government. He invited anyone with information to get in contact: “I am extending a 
specific invitation to any Member of Parliament, any member of the media, any 
public servant, or any member of the public” (Cole, 2005, p. 3052). Across the 
hearings he often referred to comments in the media and in parliament and 
repeatedly explained the framework of the inquiry investigations, although this could 
only have been for the benefit of journalists and those outside the inquiry. 
Most interviewees felt that Cole’s awareness of media reporting was very high. His 
own remarks, made late in the hearings, support the legal interviewees’ view that he 
paid as close attention to reporting as journalists did to him: 
In the media I have received advice from editorial writers, journalists, 
commentators, and from the public as well as from a large number of 
academics. I have been advised on where the public interest lies, 
what the outcome and conclusions of this Inquiry will be, how I 
should interpret the Terms of Reference, where my duty lies, and 
how I can fulfil or fail in that duty. There have been statements and 
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articles that might be seen as endeavours to draw this Inquiry into 
the political debate. (Cole, 2005, p, 6702–3) 
Barrister “Garry” didn’t see any significance in Cole remarking on issues about the 
media, which were also “raised by Counsel Assisting the Inquiry, from time to time” 
(Barrister “Garry”, interview, 2012). Cole himself said he made an early decision not 
to respond to complaints about media coverage because it would be a burden (Cole, 
2006, p. 176). Publicly defending his Inquiry, in this case after media reports of 
criticism by US Senators, was a different matter. “Statements regarding the 
independence or integrity of the Commission are of an entirely different character 
from that that the press may publish” (Cole, 2005, p. 1938).  
Barrister “Barry” said Cole made remarks for the media. For example, he noted that 
Cole, in defending the independence of his Inquiry, often unnecessarily outlined his 
considerable legal qualifications – as can be seen here in the inquiry transcript: “As a 
former judicial officer I am accustomed to confining myself to a consideration of the 
material properly before me, and disregarding irrelevant matters” (Cole, 2005, p. 
6702-3). Barrister “Barry” said such statements had no relevance to the legal 
practitioners or the legal process that was underway: 
He kept saying things like “I’ve been a judge in the second highest 
court in Australia and therefore I ought to know something about 
these processes”. He said that a few times, that is a very odd thing 
to say, and he’s not talking to us. (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012) 
Given the adversarial nature of Australian law, the Commissioner, who is the king of 
the court, may well have been trying to tame unruly lawyers with these statements. 
However, he had many ways in which to demonstrate his judicial authority – for 
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example, by making on-the-spot-rulings. He also had the final judgment in the 
findings of his report. And this power meant the media was bound to follow him 
closely. 
On a day-to-day basis, though, the person who could best be described as his chief 
adviser, Counsel Assisting the Inquiry, John Agius, SC, was the focus of attention as 
he “conducted the investigation and selected the matters that were presented in the 
hearing rooms” (Cole, 2006, Vol. 5, Appendix 10). 
Counsel Assisting, John Agius, SC  
Barristers agreed it was inevitable that the media watched John Agius closely 
because he set the legal agenda, had read the documentation and had already 
taken evidence in private. As journalist Marian Wilkinson said: “So any rational 
reporter would think [Counsel] Assisting knows ten times more than I do” (interview, 
2012). Agius played an important part in the media’s piecing together of inquiry 
evidence and its direction: 
... so it is sort of the dance of the veils and everyone is trying to 
figure out if he’s really going to get his kit off or not, what other tricks 
does he have up his sleeve, does he have an email does he have 
this, do they really have a smoking gun? (“Journalist A”, interview, 
2012) 
Agius had the power to reveal evidence selectively, for example, when witnesses 
were questioned about sections of confidential material, which only the lawyers and 
the witness could see in full. Such “practical obscurity”, or keeping of important 
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information from the media, meant that only what was revealed by the lawyer could 
be reported.  
This study also suggests Agius’s daily briefings with the inquiry’s media liaison 
officer, Rick Willis, determined initial media access to documentary evidence. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, Willis said he would identify what the media might select as a 
headline to whittle down the number of multiple copies of documents he would 
provide most quickly to journalists. Caroline Overington from The Australian felt that 
Willis sometimes selected documents that suited the inquiry’s marketing strategy, 
which showed the process was uncovering information (p. 99). At times, when Rick 
Willis selected one document to hand out, journalists requested other documents. 
Interviewees said they “eventually” got the other material they requested, but until 
Willis provided that extra material, journalists could only report what had been 
revealed through John Agius’s questioning.  
Journalists examined Agius’s “performance” as a whole, listened for evidence 
summaries, and tried to read his reaction to witnesses, all of which affected the 
attention they gave to certain evidence: 
… when the Counsel Assisting asks a particular question, doesn’t 
like the answer or disputes the answer he gets and then proceeds to 
go after the witness on top of that, you cannot help but think that the 
witness is covering up, is attempting to avoid answering a question 
and that there is a very important issue there; and your attention is 
naturally focused on that witness and what you perceive to be his 
lack of candour. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
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From a media point of view, John Agius was also seen as a seasoned performer 
who generated news. When it was announced that the New South Wales barrister 
had been appointed as the lead legal interrogator, two journalists told me it was very 
good news for us. They had covered the Wood Royal Commission, which 
successfully utilised publicity to expose state police corruption (Tiffen, 1999) and 
where Agius had also been Counsel Assisting. The journalists described him as a 
lawyer who provided “great lines” (Personal communication, 2006, Michelle Brown, 
ABC Radio News) and “plenty of drama” (Personal communication, 2006, Kate 
McClymont, The Sydney Morning Herald). 
In the Wood Inquiry, one of Agius’s forensic tactics was to allow witnesses to deny 
allegations and claim innocence, before “demolishing” them by presenting contrary 
evidence such as surveillance recordings. In the Cole Inquiry he used documentary 
evidence. Several barristers called that tactic a “slam dunk” approach, connected 
with a desire for media attention: “In our profession, the temptations of a rush of 
blood to the head, in doing something that makes you look good in the media, is 
always present” (Barrister ‘Darry’, interview, 2012). 
Barristers “Darry” and “Garry” both said that there were good legal reasons to not 
use such tactics which draw media attention:  
I’m doing prominent cases all the time and it’s often what you don’t 
say that matters: it’s often being quiet that matters, it’s often avoiding 
the temptation to do a slam dunk when you could just quietly lob it 
over the net, or whatever sporting analogy you want to use. 
(Barrister “Darry”, interview, 2012) 
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However, a quieter approach could also ensure that there were fewer media reports 
about clients under investigation and as Johnston and Breit (2009) note, some 
lawyers might prefer that (p.147). 
Barrister “Barry” said he wondered why lawyers such as Agius appeared to want 
media attention, as if the media had some sort of role in the inquiry. He speculated it 
may have been that Agius was a common law barrister used to performing before 
juries: “Perhaps he just saw the media as his jury.” Caroline Overington dismissed 
such a nuanced view of Counsel Assisting’s style and argued Agius was purposely 
courting media coverage: 
In fact, it was giant theatre and he presented himself and the 
evidence that he had, in a way that was designed for maximum 
benefit of the media. If the suggestion is that he was in there simply 
putting the facts of the matter to witnesses and recording the 
answers, to come to his own conclusions ... it would have been a 
much flatter affair. (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012) 
Several barristers interviewed also saw John Agius’s use of what the media saw as 
“good lines” – clever and humorous hyperbole or metaphor or colourful language – 
as a demonstration of his acute awareness of the media and keenness to receive 
coverage. Lawyers’ questions can easily provide a way for reporters to make sense 
of evidence: they may structure an evidence summary, provide a lead or neatly 
encapsulate a problem. Agius’s persistent questioning of AWB managers, including 
former managing director Andrew Lindberg, trading manager Malcolm Long and 
former chairman Trevor Flugge, led the media to focus on their denials or inability to 
recall events or documents, and thus their framing of the inquiry as investigating and 
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uncovering corporate culpability. The Sydney Morning Herald’s Marian Wilkinson 
indicated that in those circumstances “the question [did] become the story.” For her it 
was also possible that Agius’s “intense examinations” led journalists to be “tougher 
on some officials, especially AWB officials” (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
Wilkinson believes the Commissioner allowed some of what she saw as 
“showboating” by Agius, because it was designed to communicate to witnesses, via 
the media, the investigative power of the inquiry:  
... consciously or unconsciously, I think Agius and the Commissioner 
wanted to send a message to senior levels of the company that they 
would not be protected and that they needed to reveal with all 
candour what they knew ... and [they were] using the media to send 
that message. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
Yet Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, too, was subject to what The Sydney 
Morning Herald reported was less aggressive, “patient questioning” (Marr, 2006a), 
which resulted in “can’t recall” headlines in The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age 
and the ABC. This reporting fed into the contested frame of government culpability, 
although arguably gave credence to the fair and open Inquiry frame because, as 
McConnell et al. (2008) note, the government had publicly “allowed itself to be 
subject to rigorous scrutiny” (p. 614). Thus the powerful roles of Commissioner and 
the lead lawyer command media attention and those legal players can influence 
what is reported and how it is framed. Whether Terence Cole and John Agius 
deliberately used their media awareness to enhance that attention is not a question 
that this study can hope to answer. It is certain though, that other lawyers were 
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aware of the news media’s presence and output and the potential influence of that 
on legal practitioners’ actions.  
LAWYERS’ MEDIA AWARENESS 
All barristers were asked to what extent they followed the media coverage of the 
inquiry as well as three Likert-type questions about their own awareness of the 
media, and the media’s potential impact on the Commission lawyers’ behaviour 
during the inquiry (see Appendix 2).  
 Only Barrister “Garry” rated his general awareness of the media as low, at 1 out of 
10. He said he was aware of journalists at the Cole Inquiry because he saw and was 
approached by them; but he said it was not professionally useful to follow much 
more coverage than his normal newspapers: “I did not follow the media coverage 
closely as, if I had, it would have been difficult to distinguish between what was in 
evidence as opposed to what I had read about in a newspaper” (Barrister Garry, 
interview, 2012). 
Yet “Garry” demonstrated a good awareness of media needs. However, he was of 
the view that the elements important to a news story “interesting, nice drama, out of 
the ordinary, a neat stretch of a point” were “distractions” from legal process. He 
argued journalists did not “discern the main issues with any great insight.” He noted 
that journalists and lawyers had “different interests, tacks, jobs.” Journalists, he said, 
“expected a different outcome than what was in court [referring to the inquiry]” 
(Barrister “Garry”, interview, 2012). 
Barristers “Carrie” and “Darry” rated their media awareness as high. The two lawyers 
had engaged directly with journalists and followed media coverage. Barrister “Darry” 
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said he was “Totally aware, the back right-hand corner of the room was full of 
journalists who were noisy.” Barrister “Carrie” rated his awareness of journalists and 
media coverage as 8–9 out of 10. Like Barrister “Darry”, “Carrie’s” professional take 
was that he had to take an interest in media reporting on behalf of his client – “the 
counterbalance to that was that we would keep assuring them and assuring each 
other that we couldn’t be distracted” (Barrister Carrie, interview, 2012). Barrister 
“Barry” says the size of the media presence was astonishing, and rated his media 
awareness as off the scale: “If you scale the Commissions of Inquiry I’ve been 
involved in, that would be 20 on a scale of 10.” 
 It was difficult to distinguish lawyers’ awareness of media presence from awareness 
of news coverage. The interviewees often conflated answers to the questions about 
their awareness of journalists with that of their awareness of media reports. Some 
also took these questions as asking whether they played to the media in the 
hearings. Barrister “Barry”, like the other barristers who said they had worked on 
royal commissions with equally high media coverage, argued he had quarantined his 
awareness from any impact on his professional ‘performance’: 
  I think you’ve got one eye on what’s going on in the media, but 
generally speaking when you are making decisions about what you 
are going to do and what you are not going to do, you are oblivious 
to the media. (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012) 
Barrister “Carrie” admitted that “subconsciously there must [have been] some 
impact” on his actions from the media presence. Later in the interview he admitted 
that he had at least once reacted to media coverage by complaining to 
Commissioner Cole about a piece of reporting (Barrister “Carrie” interview, 2012). 
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Generally the barristers rated the media awareness of Commissioner Cole and John 
Agius as higher than their own. Barrister “Carrie” was the only barrister to give a 
number rating for Agius, and that was 10 out of 10. “Barry” said the media 
awareness of both men was “very high.” “Darry” said that the Commissioner was 
“following the media coverage very closely” and was “much more influenced by the 
media than he should have been.” John Agius, he said, “was looking for headlines.” 
“Garry” ranked both players at the lowest level, at 2 – 3, but that was still higher than 
his rating of himself. He doubted, however, that media awareness triggered 
“performative” behaviour. 
The disparity in the legal interviewees’ assessments may be attributable to differing 
levels of professional disdain for theatricality, or to what sociologist Ann Daniel 
describes as, their varying “allegiance to the Court, a sort of secular church” (Daniel, 
1998, p. 36). 
The journalist Caroline Overington rated John Agius’s awareness of the media at 9 –
10, as did all the journalists, except John Hill, who described Agius as “highly familiar 
with the media.” However, when journalist interviewees were asked if that awareness 
affected the lawyers’ “performance”, two said no, “Journalist A” ranked that 
possibility as 2–3 out of 10, and Wilkinson and Overington did not give numerical 
rankings. 
The responses to this study show that the Cole Inquiry lawyers had a clear 
awareness of the presence of journalists and the potential use of the media in 
generating public interest in inquiry proceedings. As I outline in the next two 
sections, there is evidence that media-aware Inquiry lawyers used performative 
techniques to attract reporters’ attention and direct their frame-building.  
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TALKING TO THE BACK OF THE ROOM 
All of the barristers immediately understood the expression “play to the back of the 
room”, which I first heard from journalist Caroline Overington. She said it means “to 
try to win the media war.” She believed that both witnesses and lawyers did this in 
the Cole Inquiry because AWB was battling to retain its market share and reputation 
and the government was trying to avoid blame for the scandal: 
So I felt that a lot of the witness statements, a lot of the material that 
was presented in the inquiry was directed at the media, and not at 
the Commissioner, with the idea being to try to spin positive stories 
for the next day. (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012) 
The barristers I interviewed generally felt that they did not play to the media, but said 
that others may have done so. “Darry” said he never “performed” for the media in the 
hearings. “Carrie” did not deny “performing”, but said any “performative” action was 
not intentional. “Garry” conceded that some lawyers liked “seeing their names in the 
papers or on TV … there is some truth to that” (interview, Barrister “Garry”, 2102).  
There was debate over the extent to which Terence Cole spoke to the back of the 
room. As noted on page 122, “Barry” certainly felt that was the case when Cole 
described his legal qualifications or experience. Barrister “Carrie” thought that some 
of John Agius’s “performance” was designed to generate news but, over time, 
revised his position about Commissioner Cole. “Then I probably thought 
Commissioner Cole, like Counsel Assisting John Agius, was himself playing to the 
media, but [it was] because I was coloured by the tensions and anxieties of the time” 
(Barrister “Carrie”, interview, 2012). 
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The Inquiry’s media liaison officer, Rick Willis, thought legal “performance” in pursuit 
of a headline was driven by ambition – except for Commissioner Cole:   
A commission like this can make or break careers, there’s no doubt 
about that, legal careers. Presumably if you put on an exceptional 
performance, you get elevated in the minds of your peers. I think 
there were egos at work, as there always are. The Commissioner 
himself had no such problem. He was at the top of his profession. 
(Rick Willis, interview, 2012) 
Yet, as Barrister “Darry” wryly observed of Commissioner Cole: “He’s not a man 
short of an ego, unlike all the rest of us in the legal profession.” 
While Barrister “Garry” said he would be surprised if John Agius played to the back 
of the room, the other three barristers said Agius deliberately sought headlines with 
his questions and timing of witnesses. Barrister “Darry” cited a question Agius posed 
about starving Iraqis to AWB’s international sales and marketing general manager 
for the Middle East, Europe and Africa, Michael Long. This, said Barrister “Darry”, 
was designed to “make a media point and not a forensic point” (interview, 2012). 
AGIUS: … that money in the escrow account was used to pay Tigris, 
who had taken over the debt from BHP; isn’t that right? 
MICHAEL LONG: I viewed it as paying for humanitarian goods. 
AGIUS: What about the starving Iraqis that might have had that 
$8.8m available to them if it had not gone to pay the Tigris debt? Did 
you think about them? (Cole, 2005, p. 1658) 
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Barrister “Darry” says it was one of many such questions, “to say that is just a cheap 
shot, went nowhere, and that got coverage” (see media reports, Grimm, 2006b, 
Vincent, 2006b).   
Across the interviews the most commonly raised example of Agius’s appeal to the 
media was the Andrew Lindberg “fool question”: 
AGIUS: You only have to pick up your phone to have these contracts 
on your desk, and you know, don’t you, that those contracts say 
nothing about the inflation of the price to recoup money owed by the 
IGB for wheat delivered in 1995; you know that, don't you? 
LINDBERG: Well, I haven’t seen those contracts. I haven’t seen 
those contracts. 
AGIUS: Are you a complete fool, Mr Lindberg? You know that, don’t 
you? (Cole, 2005, p. 848) 
Barrister “Carrie” cited it as an example of grandstanding, “where a lawyer 
deliberately says certain things ... with a view to grabbing headlines.” He said his 
clients felt that such questions were deliberately asked, and timed for media 
deadlines (interview, 2012). 
Yet Barrister “Garry” was not sure the question was planned: “more frustration, I 
imagine” (interview, 2012). The PM program on ABC Radio reported as much: “Mr 
Agius became so frustrated at one stage, he lashed out at the AWB head” (Vincent, 
2006c). The Sydney Morning Herald also referred to “flashes of exasperation” before 
“yesterday's stream of ignorance [from Lindberg] finally led to Agius whacking him a 
little harder” (Moore, 2006). Caroline Overington had a similar take in The Australian 
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report headlined “Board boss's wages are no fool's gold.” This part of her story is a 
good example of what I call a lawyer-directed report, in the “AWB culpable/fair and 
open inquiry” frame package: “In testimony to the Cole Inquiry, he [Lindberg] used 
the terms “I don't know” and ”I can't recall” more than 250 times. An exasperated 
counsel John Agius QC [sic] finally asked: “Are you a fool Mr Lindberg? (Overington, 
2006).  
Both Overington and Wilkinson were in no doubt that the Lindberg question was 
designed to get the huge and ongoing media attention that it received:  
He knew absolutely that it was going to form either the headline or 
the main quote of the day the next day, because everybody knows 
what a beautiful quote looks like, and that was one. (Caroline 
Overington, interview, 2012) 
I think that a counsel that was as experienced as Agius, especially 
experienced in these sort of inquiries, must have known the impact 
and the headlines that would be produced. (Marian Wilkinson, 
interview, 2012) 
“Journalist A” said Agius’s “humiliation” of Mr Lindberg was an example of both the 
barrister doing his job well, and his complete control of when his inquiry made 
headlines: 
He is looking for a jolt, and if he is trying to prick someone’s pride to 
get the reaction. Yes, it may be more entertaining for us as 
journalists and the general public to see someone like that 
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humiliated, but also it serves a purpose for him to be able to get a 
desired response. (“Journalist A”, interview, 2012) 
The Lindberg question is just one instance in which John Agius’s cross-examination 
of witnesses, rather than their evidence, became the angle of the media story. Again, 
the chief interrogator’s actions fell into the frame of the tough Inquiry pursuing 
wrongdoing in AWB.  
At the end of the inquiry, in another instance where Andrew Lindberg was being 
questioned, Agius’s timely revelation of a new possible charge against AWB, and the 
use of evidence with colourful language, led one newspaper to report that there was 
“an extraordinary” and “sensational” end to the Cole Inquiry (Silkstone & Baker, 
2006). However, in Cole’s final report, the sensation of the day turned out to have 
had little legal importance, because he found no evidence that AWB breached 
Australia’s criminal code to finance an act of terrorism. 
The headlines were generated by John Agius pursuing that issue by suggesting 
AWB staff were well aware of the political situation in Iraq in 2002. The lawyer 
tendered a folder of media reports, entitled Articles Supporting Iraqi Terror Claims, 
about human rights abuses and reports that Saddam Hussein’s government was 
developing weapons of mass destruction (Cole, 2005–6, exhibit 1366). The lawyer 
representing Lindberg, Duncan Allen, objected, saying the media reports were both 
contested and legally irrelevant. Commissioner Cole quietly dropped a bombshell. 
He said he was required to consider section 103 of the Criminal Code, (later 
revealed to be about financing terrorism). Allen replied that the use of media reports 
from 2002 reflected badly on the legal process and the Commissioner himself. His 
trenchant criticism went unreported, possibly because reporters were distracted, 
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trying to work out what section 103 was; in any case, Allen’s argument was for the 
front of the room, and was non-headline-grabbing.  
MR ALLEN: If you think this is helpful, it says something about the 
procedure, in my submission. 
THE COMMISSIONER: What does it say about the procedure? 
MR ALLEN: It says that your perception of what is relevant must be 
extremely wide, well beyond the ordinary bounds of the concept of 
relevance in my experience, sir. I don't mean to be disrespectful. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you are being disrespectful, but I'll 
disregard it. 
MR ALLEN: Thank you, sir.  (Cole, 2005 p. 7618) 
Yet another lawyer complaint, even a strong one, was not as interesting as Agius 
promptly following up by quoting some extremely bad-taste jokes made in AWB 
internal emails, about Iraqi plans to build wheat bunkers with fumigation capacity. 
The bunkers will have cement walls and floor so they are actually 
designed for burying the Kurds – under the cement?? They intend to 
build them with fumigation capability so the mind boggles as to 
whether they are fumigating insects or any other pest that pisses 
them off.  (Cole, 2005 p. 7617; Cole 2005–6, exhibit 1367) 
Agius suggested that the email demonstrated that employees, supervised by Andrew 
Lindberg, were aware of what the Iraqi regime was capable of, and the knowledge 
was relevant to the terrorism offences (Cole, 2005, p. 7618). The suggestion that 
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financing terrorism could be a potential criminal charge, along with the appalling 
humour about gassing Kurdish people, saw John Agius, with the Commissioner, 
deliver Barrister’s “Garry”s “colour and movement, Saddam Hussein, war …” on the 
last day of an Inquiry that had stretched across 10 months. 
The questioning around some morally offensive humour is another example of how 
what the lawyer says and does, rather than the legal import or the witness response 
(there was no suggestion that Lindberg had read the email), can become the 
framework for a media report. It must be said that Lindberg himself created the final 
human sensation of that day by crying after the Commissioner gently asked why it 
[AWB’s long-term payment of kickbacks] had all happened. 
So far this thesis has analysed “front of stage” communications, and their impact on 
media framing – aspects of legal “performance”, the techniques of key performers, 
and the hearing-room interactions between journalists and lawyers (including 
watching and listening). However, there are private interactions between journalists 
and lawyers too, and the next section examines what impact these backstage 
communications may have had on reporting.   
BACKSTAGE 
Australian court protocol is generally in line with the privilege rule of legal reporting: 
only what is said in proceedings is reportable. As was the case in most Australian 
legal proceedings, Cole Inquiry barristers generally did not speak on the record to 
the media inside or outside the hearings.14 However, there were was some direct 
contact between lawyers and journalists. These were mostly brief, snatched in coffee 
                                                
14  One barrister, Paul Lacava made on-the-record criticism of the Inquiry, calling it “an arrogant circus” only after 
the hearings had ended. The same article also quotes criticism from another unnamed barrister (Silkstone & 
Snow, 2006)  
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or lunch breaks in hearing rooms and corridors, in lifts and on the phone. Some 
lawyers spoke to journalists who wanted to clarify evidence, or to canvass upcoming 
witnesses. Lawyers would argue that a particular perspective should be taken, in 
conversations on a background basis, not to be quoted or directly reported upon.  
Degrees of interaction varied. Some journalists never spoke to lawyers at all, others 
very rarely, given that their availability would be early morning or in the afternoon, 
which clashed with media deadlines. Nonetheless, Barrister “Carrie” observed a lot 
of conversations with journalists over coffee and via phone calls, although he 
personally never said “anything without the instruction of clients” (interview, 2012). 
Barrister “Darry” described some “limited’ work with the media.” (interview, 2012) 
Barrister “Garry” minimised his interactions with journalists during adjournments: 
“They asked who I was acting for. I made no comment on the substance of the 
evidence. I might clarify who a witness was, what was their role, just objective 
material” (Barrister “Garry”, interview, 2012). 
He and Barrister “Darry” felt the media had a preconceived position about the 
Howard government’s responsibility, the contested government culpable frame. 
“Darry” said his attempts at backgrounding a reporter to give a different perspective 
were completely unsuccessful: 
I spoke to a journalist, without success, at some length about the 
inquiry, just wanting to background her about a whole lot of stuff that 
I thought was wrong; but what I was saying was so contrary to the, I 
guess, prevailing, the conventional, wisdom about it. That never got 
anywhere. (Barrister “Darry”, interview, 2012) 
Barrister “Barry” saw little advantage in speaking to the media: 
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If you are going to say as little as possible in a Commission of 
Inquiry, only what you absolutely have to, you are not going to give 
additional facts to a journalist. Apart from anything else it will only 
come back to bite you in the inquiry, because they’ll read something 
in the paper and you’ll be called on to answer questions as to why 
you didn’t tell them that. (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012) 
However, “Barry” did see other barristers spending time speaking to journalists in an 
attempt to “soften” reporting about their clients: 
The object was to make them more client friendly, make them better 
understand the human side of their client and the like ... I know that 
[one barrister] did in particular, with the object I think of having them 
go easy on his client. (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012) 
On the Commission lawyers’ side, my experience, and that of other journalists, was 
that John Agius and his colleague, Miles Condon, were helpful in clarifying evidence, 
if approached after hearings ended or when they took a break and were still in the 
hearing room. In one such conversation, Agius pointed a journalist towards a piece 
of evidence that strongly suggested a government cover-up of crucial documents 
(government-culpable frame).   
Journalists also had professional reasons to avoid observable contact with the 
lawyers – including the need to maintain balance and fairness, and to observe codes 
of ethics and their organisation’s code of conduct. Reporters such as Marian 
Wilkinson were conscious of legal and public scrutiny of their conduct. Wilkinson 
said lawyers pushed stories at her and made complaints about her work, but she felt 
that it wise to minimise contact around the hearings: 
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... because there was a small room and they were stuck together 
there was never going to be secrets between barristers. So my 
feeling was you didn’t particularly want to be much more friendly with 
one than another because that would have been acutely observed at 
that bar table. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
As I indicated in Chapter 4, journalists commonly approached the inquiry media 
liaison officer, Rick Willis, to act as a legal intermediary. He would take questions to 
lawyers to clarify technical evidence, as did AWB’s media manager, Peter McBride. 
No journalist said that such interactions had much impact on their daily job of 
selecting and interpreting the evidence. 
Thus the rules of legal privilege and the two professions’ general preference to avoid 
direct interaction ensured front-of-stage “performances” were the primary influence 
on news reports. Backstage interactions did occur, though, around the legal parties’ 
interest in clarifying information and lawyers’ attempts to influence media coverage 
of their clients. 
The next section examines the extent to which lawyers’ “performances” or actions 
responded to media coverage, and whether this affected the course of the inquiry, 
particularly in the case of the then Prime Minister, John Howard, being called as a 
witness. 
LEGITIMATE FORENSIC PURPOSE  
Determining whether legal “performance” is intended to influence or respond to the 
media is a complex task given the different “regimes of truth” (Foucault, 1980) of law 
and journalism – each of which adopts different discursive approaches producing 
  
 141 
true statements. One barrister interviewed suggested that observers, even legally 
trained ones, might misunderstand what a lawyer is doing. At one point, he said 
other lawyers at the Cole Inquiry had privately accused him of “headline-grabbing 
grandstanding,” but he had argued he was using a tactic based on good legal 
reasoning: “there was a legitimate forensic point” (interview, 2012, identity withheld). 
During the hearings in 2006, Agius used similar language to defend himself against 
the complaint of “unbecoming behaviour” made by Counsel for AWB James Judd, 
(p. 119). Agius argued that there was a legal-process reason for his responses to 
witnesses, which also attracted media attention. 
Such ridicule, if there has been any that has flowed, has flowed not 
so much from any question that might have been directed to any 
witness but to perhaps the incredulity with which any response that 
they made to questions might have provoked. If it is a ridiculous 
proposition that's being put by the witness, and if later counsel 
Assisting proposes to make a submission, contrary to the interests of 
that witness, that their response was ridiculous or unsustainable, 
then counsel assisting has an opportunity, and indeed an obligation, 
to put that submission to the witness and to give the witness an 
opportunity to deal with it. (Cole, 2005, p.1566) 
Agius here confirms journalists’ views that such questioning is pointing to what 
conclusion he will draw from that evidence. Barristers owe allegiance to their 
“secular church” and will defend their actions based on professional adherence to 
“integrity, probity and procedural fairness” (Daniel, 1998, p. 36). Agius defended one 
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colourful question in such terms and, as with his colleagues, stressed his separation 
from the media coverage: 
If it be the fact that a 12-year-old reading a document would come to 
only one conclusion, and if it be the fact that the witness is 
obstinately refusing to make that concession, then counsel assisting, 
if that counsel wishes to make such submission in that regard later, 
has an obligation to put that fact to the witness.  Indeed, that is put 
as a matter of fairness.  The fact that the answer itself might be 
incredulous or that it might promote some reaction in the press is not 
the responsibility of counsel assisting this Commission. (Cole, 2005, 
p. 1566) 
Most of the other barristers interviewed for this project acknowledge that the 
“performance” of Cole and Agius influenced media reporting and vice versa but were 
reluctant to extend that observation to their “performance” having any impact on the 
overall legal investigation that was underway. Journalists, who have no such loyalty 
to the court, were much more likely to suggest that media reporting had an impact on 
what took place in hearings. For example, what journalists saw as the inquiry being 
forced to respond, or to take new paths, Barrister “Garry” called “a process reason.”  
One example is when ABC Television’s 7.30 Report broadcast an interview with a 
potential witness, Offman Al Absi, the manager of Alia Trucking, which was a conduit 
for the fees attached to AWB’s Iraq wheat exports. In the next day’s hearings, 
Lachlan Carter, the junior counsel for several AWB managers, criticised the inquiry 
for failing to produce similar evidence about Australian government officials attending 
meetings with Al Absi. John Agius then tendered the relevant documents and 
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outlined the [third party] evidence that the inquiry had collected some months before. 
Barrister “Barry” said the ABC broadcast had had an effect on the inquiry’s “psyche” 
and “they” [sic] had had to react: “I think they felt they’d been made to look like idiots” 
(Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012). 
Barrister “Garry” did not interpret that incident as the media influencing the 
proceedings, but rather, the inquiry correctly defending its integrity. “They wanted to 
show they had attempted to get Offman Al Absi to give evidence. I suppose the 
Commission was defending itself against the suggestion that it had not attempted to 
get hold of him” (Barrister “Garry”, interview, 2102) 
Marian Wilkinson did believe that news coverage changed what happened publicly in 
hearings, but probably not the end result: 
… partly I think because of the media reporting, the inquiry was 
forced to go down a lot more of the political path than perhaps they 
had intended ... if they felt it was wrong or otherwise, to address the 
story so that the Commission itself didn’t appear like  it was covering 
up or cutting corners. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
The key example here is John Howard’s appearance on 13 April 2006. The then 
Prime Minister took the witness stand for 40–45 minutes, depending on which media 
outlet we rely upon, triggering more national and international media coverage than 
any other witness at the inquiry. A second hearing room with video facilities was 
opened for the overflow of journalists, as the Canberra press gallery queued to join 
regular inquiry reporters. While regular reporters saw Howard’s appearance as 
having limited legal significance, no one gave up the priority seating that the inquiry 
staff arranged for them. Howard’s “prominence” news-value was bound to require 
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coverage, and his presence personified the frame of the “open and rigorous Inquiry” 
(McConnell et al., 2008). No cross-examination was allowed, but from less than one 
hour’s evidence I filed six radio news stories, and an ABC colleague in the spill-over 
room filed a number of colour reports describing the big audience and events around 
the inquiry rooms. 
Most journalists saw the calling of Howard to the witness stand as a product of 
media coverage of the scandal. Wilkinson said the political context drove Cole’s 
decision – “I don’t think politically he [Cole] could have got away without it” – 
although she thought it was justified from his [legal] point of view, “because meetings 
with government had been raised even if it was, in part, indirectly in evidence” 
(Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012). 
Two of the four barristers did connect the calling of the Prime Minister to the media 
coverage and three said they could not see the legal reason for subpoenaing him. 
Barrister “Barry” said the Prime Minister’s presence was a “show: Cole was going to 
demonstrate ... that he has covered all bases to ascertain knowledge of the payment 
of trucking fees” (Barrister “Barry”, interview, 2012). “Barry” argued that many 
government officials below the Prime Minister had given evidence that they didn’t 
know about AWB’s payments, so there was no legal reason to call Howard. Barrister 
“Darry” also could not “fathom why that was required … there was nothing that 
pointed to the government.” He argued that Commissioner Cole’s agreement to call 
John Howard to the stand “was playing into it [the media]: I mean what was the point 
of requiring John Howard to give evidence at all? Question, Walsh: You tell me? 
Barrister “Darry”: Well I never got it. I thought that was entirely media-directed” 
(interview, 2012). 
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Barrister “Garry” argued, however, that pronouncements or actions that fell into the 
frame of a “fair and open inquiry” were a legitimate part of the legal process:  
  I assume not only were there legal reasons to call him [Howard], as 
demonstrated by the questions that he was asked, but also there 
would have been a process reason, so as to show that a diligent 
inquiry was being seen to be done. (Barrister “Garry”, interview, 
2012) 
No reporter interviewed could remember hearing any evidence that referred directly 
to the Prime Minister. They all viewed the media coverage as the primary driver of 
Commissioner Cole’s decision to call ministers and, ultimately, the Prime Minister: 
I think that it was the constant and continual pressure from the 
media and the public to have the government answer questions 
about the government’s involvement that prompted Commissioner 
Cole to call them [ministers and the Prime Minister]. (Caroline 
Overington, interview, 2012) 
Channel 10’s John Hill couldn’t remember what Howard was accused of, “but I do 
remember he got off scot-free” (John Hill, interview, 2102). Nor could “Journalist A” 
remember: “It was just being hyped up. For ages it didn’t seem that there was a case 
for him to be there and then all of a sudden he’s on the stand” (“Journalist A”, 
interview, 2012). Rural reporter Lucy Knight also connected the move with media 
coverage: “I actually don’t think it was necessary for the Prime Minister to have been 
on the stand, and it was kind of pushed along and pushed along by the reporting, I 
think.” (Lucy Knight, interview, 2012). 
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The reporters all felt that John Howard’s presence became a political necessity that 
was driven by media reporting of the overarching political debate, including public 
and opposition calls for the appearance of ministers and criticism of the narrowness 
of the inquiry. However, not all see such mediatisation as problematic. 
I think that’s fantastic and shows the flexibility of the system under 
which we all live; because there are certainly countries in which you 
couldn’t persuade the courts to put Silvio Berlusconi on the stand, 
you couldn’t persuade them to get Putin on the stand; and I think 
that’s a good thing. (Caroline Overington, interview, 2012) 
 While there is some agreement between journalists and barristers, that the calling of 
the Prime Minister to give evidence was connected to media coverage, and therefore 
had an impact on the performed legal event, it is difficult to conclude that it had any 
impact on the legal process, and no one believed it affected the outcome of the Cole 
Inquiry.   
 As Barrister “Garry” indicated, defending the integrity of the inquiry, showing it has 
covered all angles, is a “process reason” for legal action. It can involve being seen to 
be calling a witness, no matter how important or unimportant. This rationale does, 
however, position the inquiry as a “performance” of the law (justice being seen to be 
done) and it does imply legal practitioners reacted to how the public, largely through 
the media, regarded the role of the process.  
Even with the critical media reporting on the Prime Minister’s appearance, as I 
argued above, it still spoke strongly to the frame of the “open and fair inquiry,” 
diligently conducting its investigation. That largely left the political frame sponsors of 
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the “unfair and restricted inquiry” and “government culpable” frames with nowhere 
else to go but to the public – via the media.  
My own observations suggest that the John Howard contempt “incident”, which took 
place after the Prime Minister’s inquiry appearance, provides a good example of the 
way the inquiry and lawyers were mediatised. It also speaks directly to the contest 
between the “government culpable/open and fair inquiry and the AWB 
culpable/unfair and restricted inquiry frame packages. 
MEDIATISING THE INQUIRY 1 
Wilkinson made the observation that lawyers generally speak to both the front and 
back of the room, acting in the interests of their clients. “They speak only to the back 
of the room if you [sic] think you’re losing, if you haven’t got the chance of winning” 
(Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) and this may explain the actions of lawyers in the 
days following the Prime Minister’s appearance. My own observations lead me to 
argue that the lawyers’ “performance” in the Cole Inquiry hearings a few days later 
was entirely for the “back of the room” and it spoke directly to the contest between 
the “AWB culpable/open and fair inquiry” and the “government culpable/unfair and 
restricted inquiry” frames. 
After Howard stepped down as a witness, he held a media conference that led to a 
scandal within a scandal. At the conference he reportedly stated that AWB 
executives had “misled” the UN and the federal government in paying kickbacks to 
the Iraqi regime (Silkstone & Wood, 2006). It was not long before newspaper reports 
quoting unnamed legal sources turned this on its head. Fairfax papers led with “PM 
may face court on AWB comment” (Silkstone & Wood, 2006). The Australian’s 
headline was “PM faces contempt threat on AWB.” It led with: “John Howard is likely 
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to be accused of holding the Iraqi kickbacks Inquiry in contempt for pre-judging its 
outcome when he said AWB misled the government and implied the wheat exporter 
could be guilty of corruption” (Gluyas & Robinson, 2006). 
These newspaper stories led to widespread media speculation on radio and 
television that the Prime Minister had crossed a legal line by pre-empting the inquiry 
findings and trying to influence its outcome. The damaging implication was enough 
for Howard to again break his practice of deferring to the inquiry’s independent 
process. In the days before hearings resumed, he appeared in the media to deny 
these suggestions (see media report, "PM Denies Contempt Claim," 2006). 
Three days after the first headlines, in a statement read out in the hearing room, 
Commissioner Terence Cole said he was in no doubt that one source of the articles 
was the legal team representing some AWB executives. The two barristers in that 
team, Terry Forrest, SC, and his junior, Lachlan Carter, SC, had made numerous 
unsuccessful objections during the course of hearings, arguing that the inquiry was 
treating their clients harshly compared with government (public servants and 
ministers) witnesses. Commissioner Cole had also previously ruled against Forrest’s 
request to cross-examine John Howard in the witness stand. At the resumption of 
hearings, journalists were primed to hear the unnamed lawyers put the argument for 
the contempt case.  
What followed was, I argue, mostly lawyers speaking to the back of the room. 
Forrest rose to ask if he could “say something about some remarks made by the 
Prime Minister in a press conference after he was examined here.” They were 
remarks, he said, on behalf of his clients, “that go to the integrity of this 
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Commission.” Commissioner Cole replied that he did not have to hear remarks and 
any legal submissions were required in writing: 
 MR FORREST: Are you saying, Commissioner, that it is 
inappropriate for me now to publicly vent our displeasure at the 
remarks the Prime Minister made?  
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it is.  
(Cole, 2005. p. 664)  
Mr Forrest handed a paper up to the bench and then, in an unprecedented move, his 
junior turned to journalists behind them in the hearing room and distributed 
numerous printed copies of the submission. It turned out not to be an application for 
a contempt ruling, just a paper “drawing the Commissioner’s attention to the Prime 
Minister’s statements that only AWB was involved in the payment of kickbacks to 
Iraq.” It did not require any legal reaction, but the Commissioner left the bench to 
consider the “remarks” and craft a response. 
Hearings were adjourned, and Cole returned after lunch with a statement affirming 
his and his Inquiry’s integrity, which he read out (copies were immediately distributed 
by the media liaison officer Rick Willis). Cole called the lawyer’s paper “legal 
nonsense” and suggested one particular  legal team was the source of the contempt 
headlines (Cole, 2005, p, 6702–3). As noted above on page 122, Cole showed his 
extensive knowledge of media reporting and emphasised his inquiry’s independence 
from government, his independence from the political debate, and his legal 
qualifications.15  
                                                
15 Counsel for AWB James Judd waited until late in the day to support Forrest and Carter by saying that his legal 
team was also thinking about raising what was said by the Prime Minister, but in writing.   
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It is difficult to see how those events were a necessary part of the legal process, or 
how they had a “legitimate forensic purpose.” As Cole said in his long and 
considered response, there was no legal purpose in the lawyers making such 
remarks in a hearing, and the “legal nonsense” had no effect on the legal process. 
 It is possible the lawyers designed the attack so that their complaints of lack of due 
process would be on the inquiry record, for future defences against using inquiry 
evidence, if the inquiry (as it did) find against their clients; alternately, as Wilkinson 
suggested, Forrest and Carter spoke to the back of the room because they thought 
they were losing the case for their clients. 
My own observation suggests that the lawyers’ “performance” was entirely for the 
back of the room and spoke directly to the contest between the “unfair and restricted 
inquiry/government culpable” and the “fair and open inquiry /AWB culpable” frames. 
The priming of the media with leaks to Fairfax and News Limited newspapers, 
followed by Terry Forrest’s “performance”, astutely played to the contested political 
frames in the media about the independence of the inquiry and the lack of scrutiny of 
the government. It certainly gained more media coverage for the lawyer’s arguments 
about the unfairness of the inquiry than they had ever received before. As an expert 
observer, I conclude that I had witnessed a stand-off between mediatised lawyers 
and the Commissioner, who exercised his power to shut them down and make his 
own public statement about the legal process. 
In this Chapter I have focused on the media’s reporting of “performed” legal process, 
and the impact of media presence and its coverage on it. Before I conclude, I will 
briefly mention the final submissions, an important part of the inquiry process, which 
was not presented to the media, and yet illustrates the inquiry’s mediatisation. 
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WHAT’S IN AN ARGUMENT?  
The penultimate act in an Inquiry is the final written submissions, summarising the 
legal position of the parties. These submissions were critical in terms of outcome, 
but, as is often the case with inquiries, they weren’t made public. It was a decision 
that angered journalists. 
Such decisions are often made by public quasi-judicial inquiries; Commissioner Cole 
accepted the arguments of the legal teams and agreed that final arguments on 
possible criminal charges would not be made public because of the possible 
prejudicial effect of media reporting (Cole, 2006, vol. 1, p. 196). This is generally 
argued by lawyers for those under investigation as reporters tend to give the greatest 
weight to the argument presented by Counsel Assisting the Inquiry because of the 
power of her/his position as noted above (pp. 124–9). However, the media does 
report on the submissions, if given access. 
John Agius’s final submission gained even greater power because it was leaked to a 
newspaper, which ran the headline: “16 may face charges in wheat scandal” (Snow 
& Wilkinson, 2006). The other submissions, which presumably had a contrary view, 
were not revealed, and the media and the public never had the chance to see the 
legal arguments against Agius’s propositions.  
In his final report, Commissioner Cole recommended a smaller number of charges, 
declaring that the leak to the media had been unfair on those he “exonerated of 
possible criminal conduct.” He recommended the Australian Federal Police 
investigate the breach of the suppression order, and the subsequent media 
publication which was a breach of the Royal Commissions Act (Cole, 2006, vol. 1, p. 
  
 152 
196). These recommendations acknowledged the impact of the inquiry’s 
mediatisation, and tried in vain, and too late, to constrain it. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that in the Cole Inquiry, there was a distinction 
between the “performed” legal process, which is observable by journalists, the full 
conduct of the legal investigation, and the political contest around that process. 
However, in a mediatised environment such as this, each discursive field informs the 
other.  
The “performances” of media-savvy lawyers, their language, aggressive questions 
and their timing of the presentation of evidence, whether deliberately attuned to the 
media or not, influenced media analysis and coverage. The analysis presented here 
indicates that lawyers who spoke plainly, forcefully and colourfully, and who used 
well-timed revelations, drove media reporting by appealing to well-accepted frames 
for the AWB scandal. 
I have outlined three ways that legal direction impacted on news reporting: 
journalists directly quoted lawyers; a lawyer’s question rather than a witness’s 
answer became the lead or was used to summarise a witness’s evidence; or a 
lawyer was the direct source of a report. More than half of the ABC Radio news 
stories from the inquiry fell into the first two categories.  
I have shown that the Commissioner and Counsel Assisting were the most powerful 
voices for the media and they were responsible for more than 90 per cent of those 
stories that fell into the “AWB culpable” or “fair and open inquiry” frames. 
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Finally, I have demonstrated the mediatisation of the inquiry, whereby lawyers 
performed for the news media, whose reports, in turn, influenced some aspects of 
inquiry conduct, including the production of a minor procedural ruling. Given that 
level of mutual communicative reinforcement, the reframing of the Cole Inquiry by 
reporters can now be seen as a co-production by lawyers and journalists including, 
as outlined in Chapter 4, the input of strategic communications specialists. 
In the next chapter I will examine one specific day of Cole Inquiry hearings – the 
evidence, the transcript and the reporting that came from them – to see how the 
day’s hearings were mediated, and to demonstrate the mediatisation of the first day 
in which former AWB Chairman Trevor Flugge gave evidence. A picture becomes a 
frame is a case study of the reframing of day 29 of the hearings into news stories, 
and it will address the key aspects of my co-production hypothesis.
  
 154 
CHAPTER	  6.	  A	  PICTURE	  BECOMES	  A	  FRAME	  
 
Figure 1. The Age front page, March 3 2006 (Baker, 2006). 
 
 
Everything that we were getting out of the AWB was that this was a 
company of basically grey-cardiganed ex-farmers … with a few 
political contacts … just a good stolid, solid Aussie company trying to 
sell a bit of wheat to Iraq and around the world.  [But] I think … a 
picture tells 1000 stories, in one image that smashed that image of 
the top leaders … hell there are cowboys in this company and they 
have been close to the top. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 2012) 
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This chapter presents a case study of how the Cole Inquiry was mediated and 
mediatised, focusing on day 29 of the hearings, Monday 27 February 2006, when 
AWB’s former chairman, Trevor Flugge, first gave evidence. As Marian Wilkinson 
suggests, the photograph of Flugge was a significant driver of public opinion about 
the AWB scandal, and the need for the Cole Inquiry. It was identified as such by 
most interviewees and had more impact on the interpretation of the day’s evidence 
than the bulk of significant legal evidence that was publicly presented. Yet the 
photograph was never tendered in evidence or even released by the Cole Inquiry. It 
was taken after AWB had negotiated the Iraq contracts being investigated, and when 
Flugge no longer worked for AWB. 
This image, which was published three weeks before Flugge first gave evidence, 
framed AWB as cavalier or dishonest, and contemptuous of the serious 
responsibilities of their work. Wilkinson says it was used to suggest that a powerful 
legal inquiry was exposing the company’s bad behaviour. However, in this chapter I 
will show that some journalists saw it as a powerful illustration of the government’s 
knowledge about the kickbacks and failure to act on warnings about the AWB deals, 
positioning it as a picture of the “Wheat for Weapons” frame. Its meaning was then 
contested by the various frame sponsors. 
In this chapter, a case study of the news reports arising from day 29 of the Cole 
Inquiry illustrates how the journalistic framing of the hearings can be seen as a co-
production involving journalists, lawyers, media communications professionals and 
politicians. It demonstrates, in action, four key influences on media reporting from the 
Cole Inquiry: news values and production constraints; lawyers’ “performances”; 
strategic communications; and the overarching political “framing war”. 
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This chapter examines how the frames chosen by the media were built and 
contested, and why. In particular, it examines the way journalists presented the 
hearings in light of the ongoing political debate about the legitimacy of Australia's 
involvement in the Iraq wheat market. It argues the inquiry evidence from Flugge 
was complex, with no compelling media narratives, which allowed the chief lawyer, 
but also strategic communications people and politicians, to lead frame choice and 
impact on the mediation of his evidence. The chapter comes to the conclusion that 
the Flugge picture was a powerful visual frame for reporting on the day’s hearings 
The chapter is set out in three sections. The first looks at the conduct and mediation 
of the hearings on day 29 in Hearings vs coverage; Mediating the hearings – 
Watson; and Mediating the hearings – Flugge, discussing what evidence was 
available from the Cole Inquiry hearings. It examines media reports, outlining the 
news values and editorial imperatives that guided reporting and suggests where 
lawyers’ “performance” may have had an impact on news frames. In section two, 
The cowboy factor examines the impact of the Flugge picture on the reporting of his 
evidence and in Mediatising the inquiry 2, its impact on the conduct, and perceptions 
of, the inquiry. In the final sections, Framing the hearings – Flugge, The cowboy in 
the frame and Elite influences – the framing war, I outline how that powerful and 
damaging representation of AWB was exploited to further one side of the “framing 
war”.  
HEARINGS VS COVERAGE 
Proceedings of the Cole Inquiry on Monday 27 February 2006 were focused on the 
appearance of former AWB chartering manager, Michael Watson, who gave 
evidence for just under four hours about his knowledge of company payments to Iraq 
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(10.04 am to approximately 3 pm, including a lunch break). Later in the day, the 
company’s former chairman, Trevor Flugge, then gave evidence for just under two 
hours (3.07 pm to 4.58 pm). Yet in the media reports on the day’s events, Trevor 
Flugge dominated. 
Earlier in the day the initial news was about former AWB executive Michael Watson. 
He had recanted earlier private evidence16 and admitted that he and others at AWB 
had worked to conceal the details of Iraqi OFFP wheat contracts likely to be in 
breach of UN sanctions. These media reports were largely based on short summary 
documents and the first 10 “proposition” questions from a Junior Counsel Assisting 
the Inquiry, Miles Condon. However, from late afternoon, reports emerged about 
Flugge saying, in contrast, that he could not offer much information about those 
dealings, and did not remember being involved in negotiating details about extra 
fees. Those reports relied on his largely negative responses to questions and detail 
from his written statements tendered into evidence. 
Despite the lack of new evidence from Flugge, the media focus on him is 
undisputable. I filed five radio news reports on Trevor Flugge’s short appearance 
(two for the next morning). AAP also filed two on Watson, then several longer stories 
on Flugge. While Watson was the focus in ABC current affairs radio on The World 
Today at midday, by evening, Flugge was the lead and central focus of the PM 
program, which tended to run long-form news reports summarising the day’s 
evidence from the Cole Inquiry. Watson’s evidence was reported only to set a 
context for Flugge’s appearance. On a line count of the report, it was 15 per cent 
based on Watson’s evidence, 75 per cent on Flugge’s. If I take out the parts of 
                                                
16 Commissions of Inquiry have discretion to take private evidence, and often do in the initial stage of 
investigation. The Cole Inquiry did this from 19 December 2005. Transcripts were later made public. 
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Watson’s evidence that were about Flugge, it leaves Watson approximately 9 per 
cent of the story. The PM coverage set the pattern of coverage by evening television 
bulletins, and across most electronic media, where scant attention was paid to 
Watson. In the next morning’s newspapers, Watson did not make the front page. 
However, Flugge made every front page examined. 
This concentration on Flugge runs counter to the relative legal significance of the two 
testimonies on that day. The Inquiry’s starting point had been the release of the 
Volcker Inquiry report, which could not find sufficient evidence to say AWB knew its 
trucking fees went to the government of Iraq (Cole, 2005, p. 525). Thus Watson’s 
change of testimony, his admission that he was part of a core group of managers 
who worked to conceal payments to Iraqi government entities (Cole, 2005, pp. 3398–
3471) and his claim that this was known to his AWB superiors (Cole, 2005, p. 3464; 
Cole, 2005–6, exhibit 14) were major advances for the inquiry. 
As the Chairman of the AWB board from 1995 to 2002, and a paid adviser after that, 
Flugge’s testimony was legally important in determining AWB’s culpability, because 
of his seniority and corporate knowledge of the Iraqi wheat business. His tenure as 
board leader covered almost all of the period of the OFFP wheat exports. However, 
in evidence on 27 February, he did not volunteer any new information about AWB’s 
corporate knowledge, nor did he provide any detail about the process of negotiating 
payments. Thus the fact that Flugge was the main media story out of day 29 was not 
reflective of the duration of his spoken testimony, nor, arguably, the legal 
significance of his evidence.   
Now I will explain why the media devoted more attention to Flugge than Watson. The 
next sections will outline why Watson was less newsworthy than Flugge and how the 
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mediatisation of the inquiry resulted in outside source material driving reporting from 
hearings. 
MEDIATING THE HEARINGS – WATSON 
Journalists reported on Watson because his evidence was timely and current, had 
impact and relevance and showed significant conflict, because it flatly contradicted 
AWB’s corporate defence that it did not have knowledge that its payments went to 
the Iraqi government and breached UN sanctions. However, its newsworthiness was 
lessened by similar evidence, given earlier by three other senior employees, which 
had already contested AWB’s claim that it unknowingly made payments to Iraqi 
entities. One of these was former AWB trading manager, Mark Emons, who had 
been widely described by the media as a whistleblower. So Watson’s evidence was 
not novel or unusual testimony. 
It was also a complex topic to report on; first, because it was the Cole Inquiry’s 
practice to release a large amount of documentation for a witness’s first appearance, 
and this was difficult to read and analyse while listening to evidence during the 
hearing.  As soon as Watson took the stand, a 119-page document and a seven-
page document containing his previous confidential evidence and statement to the 
Cole Inquiry were made public. These were followed by the tender of a seven-page 
supplementary declaration, a 10-page summary document, and a new two-page 
written statement. In total, 22 other new documents, consisting of emails, letters and 
telexes relating to wheat-trading arrangements with Iraq, were tendered during the 
four hours Michael Watson was in the stand. 
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Second, there were many documents that contained crucial material about payments 
to Iraq, using acronyms such as “FOB” and “FIT” or talked about “silo to governates” 
trucking costs and “demurrage” clauses in relation to numerous separately 
numbered wheat contracts. Reading and interpreting this level of specialist evidence 
can make the journalists’ task of distilling a story from the material before them a 
difficult and time-consuming task. However, two frame sponsors assisted the 
journalists’ filtering process. 
My experience of covering the Cole Inquiry hearings suggests that the inquiry’s 
media liaison officer, Rick Willis, would have distributed many of those documents 
promptly. It was his practice to use his knowledge of media needs to be helpful, and 
he would have pointed to the shorter documents and said “this is the one you need” 
or “this will be the most useful/helpful.” That guided journalists towards the inquiry’s 
summary assessment of what it considered to be the significant elements of 
Watson’s evidence. This summary paper immediately attracted journalists’ attention 
because it listed topics where Watson would confirm evidence previously given by 
the “whistleblower”, Mark Emons.  
Watson then faced a straightforward linear examination by junior counsel assisting, 
Miles Condon, which summarised the turnabout in evidence. Condon presented the 
evidence in a way that shaped the media framing. His leading questions, because of 
their simple, summary nature, formed the basis of “lawyer-directed” reports, 
especially for the rapid-form media (AAP newswire, and radio):   
CONDON: Mr Watson, I want to understand at the outset what the 
thrust of your evidence is. Is it your position that you knew that the 
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trucking fee was going to be received in some form or another by an 
Iraqi organisation?  
WATSON: Yes. 
CONDON:  Is it your position that means of payment were discussed 
so that the payments would not be obvious to the United Nations? 
WATSON: Yes. 
CONDON: Is it your position that one of the mechanisms used to 
disguise the payments from the United Nations was the use of 
vessel owners, including Ronly? 
WATSON: Yes. 
CONDON: Is it your position that these matters - that is, the use of 
shipping owners and disguising the payments from the United 
Nations - were discussed in the second half of 1999? 
WATSON: I believe about June 1999 onwards. 
CONDON: Is it your position that you were included in what you 
have termed, I believe, a core strategy team to work out a way to 
make payments for inland trucking to the IGB? 
WATSON: Yes.  (Cole, 2005 p. 3400-1) 
News reporters who understood the jargon in Condon’s questions quickly used the 
five propositions to which Watson had agreed to compile their stories.17 I identified 
three stories that were based on this summary evidence and they were framed as 
the inquiry uncovering more evidence exposing the culpability of AWB. 
                                                
17 Ronly was a shipping company used by AWB, the IGB was the Iraqi Grains Board and trucking fees were 
ultimately the method used to get the so-called kickbacks paid. 
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The lead to the AAP newswire report pointed to what journalists considered salient  
about that evidence, by incorporating background details garnered from previous 
media reports and evidence – that Watson was the fourth “whistleblower” to give 
such evidence and the standard background detail, that the total size of payments 
under investigation was about $A300 million. AWB’s corporate defence – that it 
unknowingly breached UN sanctions – is indicated in the use of the term 
“whistleblower”:  
AWB’s former chartering manager Michael Watson on Monday 
became the fourth whistleblower at the Cole Inquiry when his 
lawyers submitted a last-minute statement about his involvement in 
the $AU300 million kickbacks AWB paid to Iraq. (Tasker, 2006a) 
The radio news lead for the ABC also framed the evidence as a development that 
implicated higher-up AWB management. “A fourth AWB manager who was involved 
in arranging payments to the former Iraqi regime through wheat contracts says they 
were always done with the consent of senior AWB management ” (Walsh, 2006a). 
Colourful language also figured in the legal presentation and journalistic 
representation of Watson’s evidence. The radio voice report above concluded with a 
paraphrasing of Watson’s remark that he was not “involved in a frolic of its [sic] own,” 
which came from documentary evidence (Cole, 2005-6, exhibit 428). Miles Condon 
later drew attention to this phrase in the hearings in prefacing a question by reading 
it out:  
In paragraph 8 you say: “At all times I believed that the payment of 
trucking fees was made with the knowledge and consent of AWB’s 
senior management ... My direct superiors ... were both aware of the 
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true nature of the trucking fee payments. I was not, nor was the core 
strategy group, involved in a frolic of its own.” (Cole, 2005, p. 3464) 
It was a “good line” for the media, summarising a significant piece of evidence, with a 
somewhat old-world expression, but still a well-understood term. The phrase was 
later used in afternoon AAP copy, and on the ABC Radio current affairs program, 
The World Today. TWT gave the story some “new” news value by emphasising 
Watson’s seniority in AWB: “In the first confession at this level from AWB ...” 
(Trembath, 2006). 
Armed with the knowledge that AWB as a company had denied knowing that such 
payments breached UN sanctions, journalists were able to report that evidence, 
either from the verbal or written sources, and point to what they saw as the 
significance of its exposure. That put it squarely in the dominant fame package – 
“AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry”. 
Thus both the inquiry’s media liaison officer and the lawyer questioning the witness 
were frame sponsors who assisted journalists’ filtering of evidence for reporting 
about the inquiry uncovering “new” information. The Inquiry’s evidence summary, the 
lawyer’s leading questions and the mutual media and legal interest in colourful 
language shaped the news coverage of Watson’s testimony. It became a solid, if not 
novel, story that could be delivered with minimal complexity. 
Watson’s allegation against his managers directed media attention to the next AWB 
witness who had been higher up in the company; but even before Watson gave his 
evidence, an expectation about Trevor Flugge’s appearance had been created in the 
media. There was a large journalist contingent on day 29, and many were only there 
for the man some media called the “star witness” (see media report, Edwards & 
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Jones, 2006). News values and the circulation of a damning image determined that 
Trevor Flugge was always going to be the lead of the day.  
MEDIATING THE HEARINGS: FLUGGE 
Flugge was the main media story, even though his physical appearance had taken 
up only one-third of the hearing day. News choices for reporting the inquiry were not 
driven by the amount of time devoted to spoken evidence; they were driven by 
Flugge’s potential significance and news value, legal “performance” and by an image 
of Flugge that did not come from hearings and was not directly connected to the 
OFFP contracts under scrutiny by the Cole Inquiry. 
Flugge had greater news value than Watson, in terms of prominence, because he 
had led wheat sales delegations to Iraq, and several AWB managers said that he 
was directly involved in negotiating payments with Iraqi government officials to keep 
Australia’s Iraq wheat market.  
He was of interest to rural reporters because, as Lucy Knight noted in interview, he 
was part of the “elite leadership structure in rural Australia” (interview, 2012). For the 
metropolitan media his prominence was more political. The opposition, including the 
Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesman Kevin Rudd, emphasised that Flugge had 
close political ties to the Coalition government because he had been a candidate for 
the National Party. During 2005 and 2006, Rudd constantly referred to Flugge as 
having been hired by the Australian government to work in post-invasion Iraq. He 
called it a personal selection by the Prime Minister, both in parliament and in 
comments to the media about evidence before the Cole Inquiry. The opposition 
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placed Flugge in its “government culpable/Wheat for Weapons” frame as often as 
possible. It was his first time in the witness stand, so he was certainly “novel” news. 
Flugge’s appearance, like Watson’s, was accompanied by many documents. There 
were two statements of 47 pages and a folio of about 100 appendices and diary 
entries tendered. In expectation of a big story, some newspapers had assigned extra 
journalists to share the task of ploughing through the material. Unlike Watson, 
Flugge was not presented as a witness cooperating with the inquiry. He was not 
making any admissions and therefore the inquiry could not provide journalists with 
any neat summary of his evidence. Nor could Counsel Assisting, John Agius, ask a 
simple list of questions to summarise the former chairman’s position. The lawyer 
instead began the process of going through the documentation of five years of 
meetings and grains trading with Iraq, trying to establish Flugge’s level of 
involvement and knowledge of those documents detailing contract arrangements. 
Flugge’s written statements were easier to follow than his verbal evidence. This 
consisted of often confusing and roundabout answers to sometimes equally 
confusing questions about meetings or briefings that Flugge said he mostly could not 
remember. Despite the close attention I was paying to the witness, my 
contemporaneous notes show that I wrote half a page on Flugge’s evidence and 
sentences just trail off because his answers made little sense to me. This was 
unusual for such an important witness on his first appearance. 
It was complex questioning to follow – for example, in one question Agius took 
Flugge through sections of seven different internal AWB reports, reading out parts of 
two confidential reports, all of which referred to an AWB delegation to Iraq. The 
lawyer described them lightly as “flavour and background” before asking Flugge to 
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agree that one meeting in Iraq was specifically to resolve issues around the illicit 
fees (Cole, 2005, p. 3842 – 3845). 
The questioning was often based on documents such as emails, which were not 
necessarily sent to Flugge, and Flugge said he did not recall seeing them, and he did 
not accept Agius’s presentation of them as supporting the evidence of the four 
“whistleblowers” who suggested the Chairman was closely involved in the Iraq 
market. Flugge said that as a non-executive chairman he was not concerned with the 
detail of the management of that market (Cole, 2005, p. 3477–8). 
As a new, prominent witness, Flugge was always going to attract media coverage, 
regardless of the evidence he gave. However, when he started giving evidence I filed 
a couple of sentences on that, then wrote a third version based on Michael Watson’s 
evidence. That shift away from reporting exactly what was happening in the inquiry 
at the time of the news bulletin was the result of an editorial decision to incorporate a 
new element into the story – the release of information about Flugge by the 
opposition in Canberra, and my lines about Flugge in the witness stand were merged 
into that parliamentary report. This refocused reporting on the infamous Flugge 
image and its cowboy factor. 
The following section discusses the mediatising impact of that image, which not only 
ticked every news-value box but added connotations of reckless behaviour that 
fuelled the political “framing war” over the scandal. 
THE COWBOY FACTOR 
Trevor Flugge was particularly newsworthy because of the photograph depicted at 
the beginning of this chapter, published three weeks earlier by Fairfax Media on 3 
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February 2006. The news values of conflict and human drama suggested by such a 
prominent and respected figure behaving in a cavalier fashion in a war-torn country 
as well as the values of proximity and currency, and his central role in the narrative 
of Australia’s wheat scandal, ensured the rural leader was represented as a national 
news figure. 
The image made him extremely newsworthy even for television stations finding it 
difficult to get concise stories with vision from the Cole Inquiry because it projected 
“a real whiff of scandal” something to “sit people up” according to John Hill. “It was 
the photograph with the guns I think that kicked the thing along, and our newsrooms 
started to focus on ...” (John Hill, interview, 2012). It had particular newsworthiness 
because it suggested one of the major frames for the scandal, that of government 
culpability. 
Under the headline “The odd stray shot: photos reveal our men at work” in The Age 
newspaper, Richard Baker (2006) had reported on a series of “remarkable photos” 
showing Trevor Flugge and AWB executive Michael Long with guns and money in 
post-invasion Iraq. The pictures were published the day after the former Middle East 
desk sales and marketing manager had “spent 3½ gruelling days in the witness box,” 
according to Baker, being questioned by Counsel Assisting, John Agius. Half the 
article concerned evidence from the Cole Inquiry about Long and Flugge’s alleged 
involvement in payments to Iraq through wheat contracts (“AWB-culpable frame”). 
The connection to the “government culpable” frame was made clear at the 
beginning: “They were two AWB top guns who became the Howard government’s 
hired guns in Iraq” and at the end of the article, “He [Flugge] was appointed by 
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Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Trade Minister Mark Vaile in April 2003.” 
(Baker, 2006) 
The Age’s sister Fairfax paper, The Sydney Morning Herald, positioned the Flugge 
photograph directly within the “government culpable” frame. Under the headline 
“Smoking gun? Downer’s department was told about kickbacks two years ago,” it 
reported on Michael Long’s evidence about an email, sent while the two men were in 
Iraq in 2003, alerting the government to questions being raised about possible 
kickbacks in AWB’s Iraq contracts (Wilkinson & Marr, 2006). The Long photo was 
used separately with a comment piece from the Cole Inquiry by David Marr, 
headlined “Scam fundamentals set out in one riveting hour” (“AWB culpable” frame). 
Marr wrote that “the final stages of Long's humiliation yesterday were horrible to 
watch,” before Mark Emons (the “whistleblower”) took the stand “and set out the 
fundamentals of the scam” (Marr, 2006b). 
News Limited’s Caroline Overington agreed with Fairfax Media’s framing of the 
image, that it spoke about both AWB’s and Flugge’s relations with government: “It 
showed very strong links between AWB and the government, and it presented AWB 
in a kind of cowboy mentality” (Caroline Overington, Interview, 2012). 
Another, more local, culturally oriented frame applied by Richard Baker’s article was 
the rough and uncultured Australian bogan (see Gibson, 2013), “Other photos ... 
show Mr Flugge covered in what appears to be shaving cream. A bottle of vodka 
rests on a table nearby” (Baker, 2006). However, in Gibson’s work and elsewhere, 
guns (as opposed to petty crime) are not a central part of the bogan iconography. 
Either way, Lucy Knight argues the inappropriate behaviour led to an angry reaction 
among the rural readership, affronted by similar photos published in The Land. 
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It sort of was just this arrogance of “this is how we do business” … I 
guess they sort of thought, when they are out of Australia are they 
over there being cowboys? ... They were really provocative with our 
readership because they were, like, here’s this guy that we are 
paying a fortune to, over there fooling around with guns and tanks.  
(Lucy Knight, interview, 2012) 
The “government culpable” frame is not the only likely interpretation of this image. If 
we adopt the Oxford Dictionary’s informal meaning for cowboy as “a dishonest or 
careless person in business, especially an unqualified one,” it allows the framing of 
the picture to be seen either as narrowly personal or broadly political. All three 
journalists agreed that the notion of AWB managers (rather than the government) 
behaving like cowboys, was ultimately what came together “in the public’s mind,” 
according to Overington. 
The expression “cowboy” used by the journalist interviewees appears to have largely 
been influenced by statements from one political frame sponsor. A ProQuest search 
for the year 2006 using the terms “Flugge” and “cowboy” found 21 newspaper 
articles and two mentions on the ABC. The first mention was by The Sydney Morning 
Herald columnist Mike Carlton a week after the photos were first published, referring 
to ”AWB Cowboys” (Carlton, 2006). While the influence of editorial writers on framing 
should not be ignored, (Kee, Ibrahim, Ahmad, & Khiang, 2012, p.19) the search did 
not find the expression used again until the evening of February 27 when the 
Shadow Minister for Public Accountability and Human Services, Kelvin Thomson, 
was quoted from parliament as calling Flugge, amongst other things, a “gun-toting 
cowboy” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006c, p. 88). 
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Frames are dynamic and can become associated with new content or new events 
(Reese, 2007, p. 150) and the meaning of the framing of the Flugge photos changed 
over time. Initially The Age’s damning framing of the government contractors was 
reinforced by such political frame sponsors in the opposition, but the framing contest 
continued as the Cole Inquiry rolled on. Several months after the time of this case 
study, columnist Nicholas Stewart argued the image ultimately put AWB, rather than 
the government, at the centre of the kickbacks scandal: 
The dominant image to have emerged from the inquiry so far 
remains the photograph of Trevor Flugge, wreathed in a stupid grin 
while lolling half-naked in his comfy chair, pointing a pistol at the 
camera. Yet the release of this picture has, effectively, derailed any 
linkage of the scandal to the government. (Stuart, 2006) 
The picture was open to meaning contests because its significance to the scandal 
was ambiguous. The photograph(s) can be seen as a frame with in a frame package 
where a cultural phenomenon – in this case, the mythical outlaw cowboy – functions 
as a central theme (see Van Gorp, 2007). Van Gorp says reasoning devices and 
statements are central to the meaning of a frame package and, in this case, Flugge’s 
cowboy photo conveyed culturally understood meanings of arrogant and 
inappropriate behaviour, that were contextualised by another culturally understood 
notion, that of appropriate behaviour by public figures in a democratic polity. It was 
this meaning that Kelvin Thomson wished to operationalise. 
I have already argued that the media’s acceptance of an “altruistic democracy” 
macro-frame was a key element in reporting of the Cole Inquiry. This frame works to 
convey ideas about how democracy should perform, by “focusing on deviation from 
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an unstated ideal” (Gans, 1979, p. 43). Hence the media chose to give the damning 
Flugge/Long photos substantial exposure, because they had a deviant resonance 
within that macro-frame of “altruistic democracy”, regardless of which functional 
frame gained the upper hand. However, given these resources originated outside the 
inquiry, and were circulating during the hearings, it is important to consider whether 
they might have had influence on perceptions of the AWB scandal beyond the 
media.  
MEDIATISING THE INQUIRY 2 
It is one thing to argue the Flugge image influenced news coverage of the inquiry, 
and the media’s framing of scandal. The question central to a study of mediatisation 
is what impact it might have had on public perceptions of the handling of the scandal 
and the conduct of Inquiry proceedings.  
Four of the five journalists interviewed suggested that the photograph of Trevor 
Flugge was a powerful influence on perceptions of the company and its scrutiny by 
the Cole Inquiry. Three of the four barrister interviewees saw it as having some 
influence on perceptions of the inquiry.  
The Flugge photo was reused many times by newspapers and other media in 
connection with his Inquiry appearance. Half of the lawyers and four of the five 
journalists who were interviewed believed it bolstered the notion that Cole was 
publicly and fairly pursuing the “culpable AWB” in the government’s preferred frame 
package. 
Reporter Lucy Knight thought it changed the course of the reporting. She says even 
supporters of AWB’s monopoly trader’s status were provoked into questioning the 
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company: “Even for the supporters for the Single Desk, they were asking, what are 
these guys doing with our money?” (Lucy Knight, interview, 2012). 
Barrister “Carrie” also believed the power of the images lay in the frame of the Cole 
Inquiry pursuing the AWB witnesses. He said: “It was a bit of a boy’s own 
photograph, but it was put out there in a way that, at least in context, was quite 
inflammatory” (Barrister “Carrie”, interview 2012). 
The media, as Overington and Wilkinson said in Chapter 3, was also pursuing the 
government’s role, and Fairfax had highlighted the competing frame of government 
involvement (the “Wheat for Weapons” frame) when the Flugge/Long pictures were 
published. However, Marian Wilkinson said the cowboy image did bolster the Cole 
Inquiry’s line on its work, through the media. She said it was sending a message that 
the company was not protected and “had to reveal all”: 
That came off the back of some photographs being sent to Fairfax ... 
by someone who obviously thought that Flugge and other AWB 
officials weren’t being completely forthcoming, so that gave Counsel 
Assisting a complete jumping-off point. (Marian Wilkinson, interview, 
2012) 
Barrister “Barry” also felt the inquiry lawyers seemed to profit from the media 
coverage of the images. “He had no upside, Flugge. Their [Long’s and Flugge’s 
legal] representation was destabilised” (Barrister Barry, interview, 2012). He and 
Barrister “Carrie” both raised the photos, unsolicited, as an example of the way in 
which the Cole Inquiry worked with the media to present its view of AWB’s dominant 
role in the scandal.  
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Barrister “Garry” disagreed that there was any effect in the inquiry itself, saying the 
photograph of Flugge was “only an influence from a media point of view” because 
the media wanted “colourful characters to report on” (Barrister “Garry”, interview, 
2012). 
The interviewees who said the Cole Inquiry profited from the cowboy image, were 
describing it as speaking to the dominant frame – the “AWB culpable/open and fair 
inquiry” package. As a consequence of how highly they rated its impact, two 
barristers and one journalist were inclined to believe the photographs had been 
leaked directly from the Cole Inquiry. For the record, the inquiry’s media liaison 
officer, Rick Willis, and Fairfax Media’s Marian Wilkinson said that the Cole Inquiry 
was not the source. 
The pictures of Michael Long and Trevor Flugge were taken after Flugge had ceased 
being chairman of AWB, when the OFFP had ended. It was outside of the period 
under investigation (although as Fairfax noted, it was at the time when the extent of 
the rorting was being uncovered). Nonetheless, the image endured as an iconic one 
of the AWB scandal, Illustrating Rod Tiffen’s argument that: “Whatever the larger 
substance of a scandal, often it is some relatively trivial detail that captures the 
public and media imagination, that epitomises its absurd, sleazy or bizarre aspects” 
(1999, p. 80). 
The Flugge photo became a commonsense representation of the scandal, so much 
so that a year later, one theatre production based on the Cole Inquiry, called Deeply 
Offensive and Utterly Untrue (Version 1.0, 2007) used an actress to dramatically 
reveal the familiar image on stage. 
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Additionally, Tiffen’s (1999) proposition about the “fickle and fluid sense of 
newsworthiness” (p. 5) is demonstrated by the revelation from Lucy Knight that The 
Land did not choose to publish similar photos sent to her in 2004 by Flugge himself, 
after she had interviewed him about his work with the reconstruction effort in Iraq. 
The then junior reporter saw the inappropriate nature of the photos, and says she 
was taken aback: “[There were photos of] ... him standing in front of silos, with 
Saddam Hussein painted on the sides ... him and another guy on top of a tanker.” 
The images did not fit in with her story, “they actually were very poor quality for 
publication, by normal standards you wouldn’t use them,” so she forgot about them 
until the Cole Inquiry began. Knight remembered them during an editorial discussion 
about how her newspaper could “own the story” (adopt a unique angle); with Cole 
pursuing AWB wrong-doers the photos had developed great news value: “I said, oh 
my God, I’ve got these bloody photos from the Farm Writers’ Association lunch. We 
eventually found them, and we ran some of those photos and they were really 
provocative” (Lucy Knight, Interview, 2012). 
By the time Flugge appeared in the witness box, his co-worker Michael Long had 
been “humiliated” after gruelling days in the witness box, (according to Baker, 2006; 
Marr, 2006b), and three other AWB “whistleblowers” had implicated the former 
chairman. Now a photograph implying at least an arrogant and possibly a criminal 
attitude to the rule of law, on his part, was a more powerful frame than ever. 
But were the pictures prejudicial to Flugge, or to Michael Long? In Long’s case it was 
a damaging image of a man who had denied any wrongdoing, despite what 
appeared to be a lot of documentary evidence to the contrary. In Flugge’s case he 
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had not even begun to give evidence. So was it a breach of the contempt rules 
covering legal reporting to publish them? Commissioner Cole didn’t seem to think so. 
During hearings, lawyer Terry Forrest, representing Michael Long, objected to the 
publication of the photos on the basis that they implied guilt over something Long 
was never accused of, handling bags of cash in Iraq. Commissioner Cole said that 
he had no power or control over the press, which is not strictly accurate, and he 
reiterated his decision to not respond to complaints about media coverage (Cole, 
2005, p. 1937–8). In this case it proved to be a wise decision, as several days later 
Forrest had to correct the record, saying that the photograph did indeed depict his 
client with bags of money in Iraq. 
Despite the dubious legality of using the photos, the Flugge gun photo had 
committed the Australian media to following the inquiry story. Even though Flugge 
was an important witness, his initial evidence was not startling, and he was not 
giving evidence that progressed the investigation. This lack of compelling source 
material forced reporters to look elsewhere for a story.  
As Counsel Assisting, John Agius, unsuccessfully pressed Flugge for admissions, it 
was the lawyer’s efforts, and the journalistic reading of his “performance”, that 
initially framed reporting of Flugge’s evidence. This lawyer direction is evident from a 
close examination of day 29’s transcripts and the stories that result from Flugge’s 
appearance as a witness. 
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FRAMING THE HEARINGS – FLUGGE 
In examining day 29’s hearings transcripts and the news stories that resulted, what 
becomes apparent is the extent to which the lawyers can direct the framing of news 
reports via their presentation of the evidence. 
For example, the stories examined show journalists took note of Agius’s style, and 
the way in which he defended his persistent line of questioning about documents by 
telling Flugge it was “in the hope of jogging your recollection” (Cole, 2005, p. 3490).  
AAP called Agius’s effort that day an “intense cross-examination” (Tasker, 2006b). 
My recall is that reporters also noted how the chief lawyer reacted to Flugge’s 
disavowal of memories about his AWB work:  
FLUGGE: As I have said, Mr Agius, if a trip report can be shown that 
this is what we did, this is what we were briefed on, then so be it. My 
recollection doesn’t take me there. 
AGIUS: Mr Flugge, I appreciate that you will admit it if you see it in 
writing, but what I am putting to you is something slightly different. I 
am suggesting to you that Mr Hogan [AWB marketing executive] 
suggests that he cannot imagine that you were not briefed, that it 
was normal practice for you to be briefed ... (Cole, 2005, p. 3487) 
Such a reaction suggested the witness would not tell the truth unless there was 
written evidence. A more benign interpretation would be that Flugge merely wanted 
to see some six-year-old material to see if it jogged his memory. Journalists also 
watched whether the chief lawyer would give a pejorative summary of the evidence. 
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AGIUS: So your position is that you don’t recall being briefed but you 
are not prepared to say you weren’t briefed? 
FLUGGE. No, I certainly can’t say, because, I mean, if you travel 
from Amman through to, you know – certainly some briefings might 
have taken place. To what extent those briefings took place, I can’t 
recall, and I certainly can’t - well, I can’t remember them. (Cole, 
2005, p. 3488) 
Most media reports on Flugge’s evidence were largely based on his confusing and 
apparently evasive or negative responses to Agius’s questions. As I outlined in 
Chapters 4 and 5, a lack of clarity or brevity in evidence can lead journalists to focus 
more on how they see the lawyers’ framing of proceedings. Flugge’s poor recall of 
detail and complicated answers contributed to Agius’s questions appearing in the 
leads of the afternoon and evening news stories, such as the following AAP wire 
report. “Former AWB Chairman Trevor Flugge has denied ever being involved in the 
wheat exporter paying millions of dollars in kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's regime” 
(Tasker, 2006b). 
That is another “lawyer-directed” lead, in which Flugge’s “denials” framed reports of 
the fair and thorough inquiry pursuing a dubious AWB character. ABC Radio news 
leads followed that pattern too: “The former chairman of AWB has denied 
sanctioning the payment of kickbacks to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and 
denied being involved in negotiating the payments” (Walsh 2006b).  The ABC 
television news headline or banner followed suit: “Former AWB Chairman denies 
bribe knowledge.” A number of other media reports also highlighted the expressions 
“can’t recall” and “denied” in reporting Flugge’s evidence. In one radio news story I 
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incorporated the above exchange with Agius to summarise Flugge’s disavowal of 
knowledge after multiple questions: 
Trevor Flugge was at a meeting in Iraq when the fees were 
discussed but can’t recall such talks; and can’t recall being briefed 
before the Iraqi trips. But if AWB documents show he was told about 
the sanctionbusting fees, then he says, “so be it”. (see ABC News, 
2006)  
Only one early-afternoon radio news story I wrote presented Flugge’s evidence as a 
partial “admission”, and this came from Flugge’s written statement. It said that he 
knew freight fees were paid to the Jordanian trucking company Alia, but added that 
he did not know any detail. I gave this information salience by pointing to the conflict 
with previous witnesses. “The Cole Inquiry has heard from several AWB 
whistleblowers that payments to Alia Trucking went directly to Saddam Hussein’s 
regime” (Walsh, 2006b). 
This example from the Flugge hearing on day 29 illustrated a phenomenon I noted 
earlier – that when inquiry lawyers were the source for stories (in this case when 
their questions were used to scaffold the reporting of meagre evidence) the media 
reports usually fall into the “fair and open inquiry” frame (see p. 95). 
As the next section will discuss, those news stories that incorporated more detail 
from Flugge’s written evidence, along with the picture of Flugge with the gun in their 
narratives, placed his evidence in more damning frames. Indeed, the biggest story of 
the day did not come from Flugge’s verbal evidence, “lawyer direction” or the 
infamous picture, but from an elite influence – the opposition’s Kevin Rudd and 
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colleagues, who produced a compelling narrative about Flugge in federal parliament 
that became the dominant frame for media reporting of the day. 
THE COWBOY IN THE FRAME 
On the evening of day 29, a description of the Flugge photo made a colourful and 
damning “AWB culpable” frame in a lead on ABC Radio’s PM. “His image is now 
fixed in the public mind, shirtless and brandishing a gun, but the former chairman of 
AWB, Trevor Flugge, was unarmed and fully clothed when he appeared at the bribes 
to Saddam Inquiry today” (Colvin & Trembath, 2006). As outlined above (p.156–7), 
this report led with Flugge’s appearance, and used Watson’s evidence only to set it 
up in opposition to Flugge.  
Jennifer Sexton in The Australian the next day wrote one of many similarly critical 
reports; it combined previous “whistleblower” evidence with Flugge’s description of 
his hearing impairment from one of his written statements: 
After six weeks of evidence Trevor Flugge has been characterised 
as a hands-on wheat board chairman with a special interest in Iraq 
who personally designed a way to pay kickbacks. So there was great 
interest when he took the witness stand yesterday afternoon to 
explain that not only could he recall little of the days in question, he 
was virtually deaf in his left ear and might not have heard the 
incriminating discussions. (Sexton, 2006) 
Most newspaper reports and several commercial television reports also used the 
cowboy photograph; Fairfax printed it; and rival News Limited papers described it, as 
ABC radio had done.  
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The media interest in Flugge had been amplified on the afternoon of day 29 by a 
political frame sponsor – the Shadow Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
in information he released in parliament just before Flugge entered the witness stand. 
As ABC news reported: 
Newsreader: [The answer to a question on notice] ... revealed that 
the government had spent just under a million dollars for Flugge’s 
post-war work in Iraq. [audio of Kevin Rudd] We now no longer have 
the 700-thousand dollar man, we have the million-dollar man in Mr 
Flugge. That’s why the Prime Minister didn’t want to answer any 
question about his million-dollar man in Iraq. (see ABC news, 2006) 
This promotion of new information about the historic photo propelled the image back 
into the culpability frames of the day’s political debate.  
ABC Television’s current affairs program, the 7.30 Report, broadcast immediately 
after the evening news, focused on the AWB scandal through that statement from 
parliament, and did not run a separate story from the inquiry. Like ABC Radio news, 
it incorporated one piece of Flugge’s written statement into its report, to suggest that 
little useful evidence had emerged from a trusted and well-paid government man. 
“And today the million dollar man himself was the star attraction at 
the Cole Inquiry in Sydney. In his opening statement to the inquiry, 
he maintained that he was completely unaware that AWB was 
making any payments to Iraq in breach of the UN sanctions. He says 
he was kept in the dark. [Television subtitle] Trevor Flugge, former 
AWB chairman, speaking at the inquiry: As a chairman, I was trotted 
out to open doors or to be a figurehead, to take a political beating for 
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the sake of doing business or to perform other ceremonial roles. The 
question that I have asked myself is what I knew and when I knew it. 
After searching my memory, I can frankly say that I was entirely 
unaware of a number of things. (Brissenden, 2006) 
ABC television’s Lateline did a news story on Flugge at the inquiry, reversing the 
7.30 narrative format, incorporating the parliamentary story into an Inquiry report. But 
the lead (the framing) was the line from the federal opposition. “He’s the million-
dollar man, the Cole Inquiry's star witness, AWB's former chairman, Trevor Flugge. 
But the critical question Commissioner Terrence Cole wants answered is how much 
Mr Flugge knew …” (Edwards & Jones, 2006). 
Those story formats, which centrally incorporated the narratives of external frame 
sponsors from the opposition, Rudd and Kelvin Thomson (see below), were 
precursors to the way in which newspapers, such as The Sydney Morning Herald, 
The Australian (national), The Age in Melbourne and The Advertiser from Adelaide, 
all addressed the story the next day. Their front pages only reported on Trevor 
Flugge’s evidence, under headlines calling him “The million dollar man.” The next 
day’s headline on Sexton’s article in The Australian was “AWB’s $1m man hears no 
kickback evil,” The Sydney Morning Herald story below headlined “One million for 
knowing nothing” (Banham & Wilkinson, 2006). 
Some newspapers later added the iconic “cowboy” description, which was picked up 
in the later evening radio news bulletin after Kelvin Thomson raised Flugge’s 
evidence, during a debate on tax law in the parliament. This frame package now had 
Flugge as the cowboy, the disabled man, and the government man who was funded 
by taxpayers’ money: 
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NEWSREADER: The federal opposition has attacked AWB’s former 
chairman Trevor Flugge labelling him “the million dollar man” 
because of the amount he was paid for less than a year’s work for 
the Australian government in Iraq. Mr Flugge today told the Cole 
Inquiry he didn’t know of kickbacks being paid to the Iraqi regime of 
Saddam Hussein. A photograph taken in Iraq showing Mr Flugge 
with a handgun has been widely distributed since the Cole Inquiry 
began. Labor’s public accountability spokesman, Kelvin Thomson, 
has complained in parliament about the amount Mr Flugge received 
from the aid budget. [Kelvin Thomson, audio] 878 thousand dollars 
from our aid budget for 8 months’ work because he was such a great 
communicator and now he tells the Cole Commission he’s pretty 
much deaf; a virtually ineffective left ear and a right ear that was 
somewhat impaired. So Mr Speaker, we sent this deaf, gun toting 
cowboy to clean up Iraq. Good grief. (Yaxley, 2006) 
Thomson’s cowboy analysis in parliament was a late insertion into newspaper 
stories, and does not appear in the early edition (Figure 2) of The Sydney Morning 
Herald below. 
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Figure 2. Sydney Morning Herald front page, early edition, 29 February 2006 
(Banham & Wilkinson, 2006). Reproduced with permission, Fairfax Syndication 
 
  
 
It is high up in the later editions of the newspaper, and became central to the framing 
of later newspaper reports on Flugge’s appearance at the inquiry (Figure 3) below. 
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Figure 3. Sydney Morning Herald front page, late edition. Tuesday 29 February 2006 
(Banham & Wilkinson, 2006). Reproduced with permission, Fairfax Syndication 
 
  
 
Sydney Morning Herald [Sydney, N.S.W] 28 Feb 2006: 1. 
*   PM confirms AWB man's fee * Poll reveals damage to Government: 
$ 1m for knowing nothing 
 
Our man in Baghdad … Trevor Flugge at the Cole Inquiry yesterday, and how he appeared on duty in Iraq in 2003. 
 
Cynthia Banham and Marian Wilkinson. 
The Federal Government has admitted it paid the former AWB chairman Trevor Flugge 
almost $1 million to act as an adviser in Iraq, but this central figure in the wheat kickbacks 
scandal suffered repeated memory failure when he faced the Cole Inquiry yesterday. 
Mr Flugge told Commissioner Terence Cole he could not recall significant details about 
AWB's dealings with Iraq, that his impaired hearing meant discussions in vital meetings 
escaped him, and that his diary was missing for several critical months. 
The Prime Minister revealed Mr Flugge was paid $978,776.50 through AusAID to act 
as an adviser in post-war Iraq, prompting the Labor frontbencher Kelvin Thomson 
to tell Parliament last night: "We sent this deaf, gun-toting cowboy to clean up Iraq. 
Good grief” (emphasis added). 
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Three elements sourced from outside the inquiry, the gun photo and the political 
frame sponsor’s two expressions, “the million-dollar man” and the “gun-toting 
cowboy” were dominant in those newspapers’ framing of Flugge’s hours in the 
witness stand. They provided convenient framing devices for the media, as Watson’s 
evidence had already set the scene for a critical media reading of Flugge’s evidence. 
Like the earlier stories described above, The Sydney Morning Herald article gave 
salience to that critical framing by describing Watson as one of “a string of AWB 
managers” giving a great deal of detail about the kickbacks, in contrast to Flugge. 
Thus the three most influential framing devices from day 29 were a product of “elite 
influences” (opposition politicians) working to promote the government’s connection 
to the scandal via use of Trevor Flugge’s photo and his evidence. These political 
frame sponsors were armed with their knowledge of media routines, and were 
assisted by the work of their communication professionals attending the inquiry. 
ELITE INFLUENCES – THE FRAMING WAR 
When Kevin Rudd first called Trevor Flugge the “million-dollar man,” referring to the 
value of his government contract, his connection of the Howard government with the 
AWB scandal was clearly expressed. The “million-dollar man” catchphrase was 
quickly taken up by media, not always with attribution, and became a central part of 
media reports on Flugge, which used or described the gun photograph. 
Kevin Rudd set up his sponsorship of this framing device in Canberra by revealing 
the Prime Minister’s answer about Flugge’s salary (in the guise of a new question) 
during parliamentary question time, the most heavily reported part of the day, just 
half an hour before Trevor Flugge entered the witness stand in Sydney: 
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(2:25 PM) — My question is to the Prime Minister. I refer to the 
question I asked the Prime Minister when parliament last sat on the 
salary paid to the former National Party candidate and Australian 
government representative in Iraq, Mr Trevor Flugge. I also refer to 
the written answer the Prime Minister delivered to my office five 
minutes before question time began, in that he confirmed that Mr 
Flugge’s package was not the $700,000 as stated in Senate 
estimates but, in fact, a total of $978,776.50. Prime Minister, beyond 
this million-dollar package to Mr Flugge paid for from the Australian 
aid budget, did Mr Flugge have access to any other Australian 
government money to support his activities in Iraq? 
MR HOWARD (Prime Minister) – I am not aware of it, but will I check 
and, if there was something else, I will let the public know. 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2006b, p. 30) 
Rudd’s question was reported on the 7.30 Report as part of “another unrelenting 
round of questioning from the opposition on AWB” (Brissenden, 2006). Just to be 
sure no journalist missed his contribution, Rudd released a media statement and 
spoke to the Canberra press gallery, tactics that made his frame of the government 
connection even clearer, as this report indicates: “This is Mr Howard’s personally 
chosen former National Party Candidate, million-dollar man” (Bradford 2006). His 
intervention also provided television pictures and audio, that, as I have indicated, 
television journalists at the inquiry often found difficult to find. 
Rudd’s phrase indicates political knowledge of news-writing practice. It is standard 
practice for journalists to simplify large numbers. So the exact remuneration Flugge 
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received, $A978,776.50, was reported as “almost” or “just under $1 million in the first 
instance. That may have been a factor in the rapid media internalisation of the term; 
within hours, it went from what Reese & Lewis describe as “simple transmission ... to 
naturalization” (2009, p. 778). The other part of Kevin Rudd’s media release 
statement connecting the appointment and the salary directly to the Prime Minister, 
was not similarly naturalised, and was attributed to Rudd by the media gatekeepers. 
At the Cole Inquiry, Rudd’s trade and media adviser, James Bond, was staying 
abreast of what he called “a constant feedback loop between the journalists in 
Canberra and the journalists at the inquiry” and was working to reinforce the 
opposition’s message. He also monitored the evidence to “pass any useful 
information straight back to the office in Canberra … to make it more political to 
make it more, a bigger story in the media, so that it would discredit the government” 
(James Bond, interview, 2014). 
Of course, it is also standard practice for political media advisers (and politicians 
when they can) to monitor all media reporting; and the early evening parliamentary 
speech by the Shadow Minister for Public Accountability and Human Services, Kelvin 
Thomson, showed detailed, up-to-date knowledge about Trevor Flugge’s evidence at 
the Cole Inquiry:  
(6:36 PM) Today the Cole commission also heard from Mr Trevor 
Flugge, the former National Party candidate who chaired the AWB 
from 1999 and 2002. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government, 
the Howard government sent Mr Flugge to Baghdad and paid him, 
we heard today, $978,000 from our aid budget for eight months work 
because he was such a great communicator. Now he tells the Cole 
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commission he is pretty much deaf – a virtually ineffective left ear 
and a right ear that was somewhat impaired. We sent this deaf, gun-
toting cowboy to clean up Iraq. Good grief! (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2006c p. 88) 
Without the opposition’s timely intervention in the parliament, it is arguable the 
government’s “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry” frame package might have won 
the day in reporting terms on 27 February 2006, through media reports on another 
AWB whistleblower, followed by Counsel Assisting, John Agius, beginning his 
“intense cross-examination” of the former chairman’s role in the tainted OFFP 
contracts. However, the media, which was critical of the inquiry’s terms of reference, 
was always going to search for some sort of government connection given Flugge’s 
antecedents. For example, The Sydney Morning Herald reports above (Figures 2 & 
3), noted that the former deputy prime minister and trade minister, Tim Fischer “sat 
watching at the inquiry.” (Banham & Wilkinson, 2006)  
The two dual frames or frame packages that I have identified in radio news were the 
“Wheat for Weapons” or “government culpable/unfair and restricted inquiry” frame 
and the “AWB culpable/fair and open inquiry” frame, which appear to have 
recombined in this example case study. Most reports imply both an element of 
government involvement, and the inquiry pursuing the recalcitrant AWB witness. As I 
explained in Chapter 2, multiple frames are much more likely in longer-form news 
reporting. In ABC Radio news and radio current affairs, the parliamentary and inquiry 
reports were initially kept as separate stories, except once, as outlined on page 166, 
when a brief element from the inquiry was incorporated into the parliamentary report 
(Yaxley, 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrates that a study of professional news practices, or news 
mediation, will only reveal a fraction of the co-produced rationales for the framing of 
news stories from the Cole Inquiry. A study of journalists’ interactions with internal 
and external sources, professional communicators and frame sponsors reveals that 
both legal direction and political influence had a demonstrable effect on the stories 
that came out of the day 29 hearings. 
The news value of each witness’s appearance, which dictates reporting choices, 
ensured that Michael Watson, who had taken up most of the time in the day’s 
hearings, was relegated to a foil for Trevor Flugge’s evidence. This gave salience to 
the negative frame of a witness resisting the independent investigation into AWB’s 
culpability. 
The lack of structure in Flugge’s interrogation, and difficulty journalists would have 
had in making sense of his evidence, made the questions posed by the Cole Inquiry 
lawyer, and the tenor of Flugge’s responses, the chosen focus of much internally 
sponsored Inquiry reporting. These reports were “lawyer-directed,” although much of 
the detail came from Flugge’s two written statements. 
On the day in question, political frame sponsors became part of the news media 
reports, and so were instrumental in the “Wheat for Weapons” frame getting the 
upper hand in the “framing war” over the AWB scandal. The Flugge gun photograph 
was a particularly resonant framing device, first because, in terms of the macro-
social frame, it represented the inappropriate corporate or political behaviour that the 
inquiry was addressing or, many argued, should have been addressing. Second 
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because it was also open to becoming either part of the “AWB culpable” or the 
“government culpable” frame for reporting of the day’s evidence.  
It is notable that the “cowboy” cultural frame persisted in journalists’ minds to the 
point one could describe it as reified, given that three interviewees used the 
expression to describe the Flugge photograph more than five years after the inquiry 
ended.   
This chapter also indicates that journalists should not be seen as passive recipients 
of official sources. As Kee et al. (2012) argue, reporters use organisational skills (as 
outlined by Todd Gitlin, 1980) that “involve a process of selection, emphasis, 
interpretation, and exclusion” (p.19). The Cole Inquiry itself sponsored a critical 
context through lawyers and witnesses for interpreting Flugge’s evidence. The 
federal opposition then provided handy “organizing devices” (Reese & Lewis 2009) 
for journalists to frame the Flugge picture as a representation of the scandal that 
included the possibility of government culpability. This turning to external sources 
involved deliberate editorial decisions about using the Flugge photograph for its 
flexible framing qualities, as “journalists are professional symbol handlers with a high 
degree of self-reflexivity” (König, 2005, p. 3). 
Hence, the media coverage of the Cole Inquiry on 27 February 2006 was developed 
in a co-production involving journalists’ professional strategies, legal “performances”, 
the efforts of media professionals and the interventions of political frame sponsors. 
As argued in the previous chapters, competing issue-specific or functional frames 
were already in place across the inquiry investigation and coverage. This analysis 
finds that the meaning of the Flugge “cowboy” photograph was a central part of this 
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framing contest over the inquiry. It was open for various parties’ reasoning devices 
and statements to alter its meaning and this did take place over time. 
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CHAPTER	  7:	  CONCLUSION	  
 
The Australian government set up the Cole Inquiry to investigate a scandal that had 
ramifications for Australian domestic governance of international trade and political 
relations and for corporate governance. This study has explored how that important 
legal investigation was mediated and mediatised, so that inquiry players “performed” 
complex and active roles as frame sponsors in the ongoing public debate. This is an 
important issue for study because such investigative inquiries have considerable 
institutional prestige as independent bodies that drive policy and regulation. As such, 
this work contributes to contemporary journalism studies’ understanding of how 
inquiry reporting produces meaning and to political science research in assessing 
the role of such inquiries in the political resolution of controversial issues. 
This research set out to understand why there was a disjuncture between the stated 
purpose and the legal conduct of the inquiry and the news stories that emerged from 
the legal process – to the point that there was public expectation that the 
investigation could find government culpability in the scandal, and that the then 
Prime Minister, John Howard, be called to give evidence. 
I proposed that news of the inquiry, and its framing of the event’s meaning, did not 
only represent the fair and accurate reporting of legal process but was also shaped 
by internal and external perspectives on the political management of the scandal. In 
this thesis I have tested two interlinked hypotheses: first, that within the inquiry, news 
coverage was influenced by legal actors representing the conflicting interests of their 
clients and frame sponsors, and that lawyers’ “performance” was, in turn, influenced 
by the media coverage of this event. I also proposed that the news coverage was 
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shaped by external factors, as part of a national political debate, primarily 
represented by politicians and strategic media communications professionals, about 
the meaning of the inquiry. 
This study addressed these hypotheses in three ways. It investigated how the inquiry 
hearings were mediated by journalists, in their professional practices and 
interactions with strategic communicators and stakeholders in the political debate. It 
then explored how journalists and lawyers participated in the mediatisation of the 
inquiry’s hearings. Crucially, it analysed how that mediatisation contributed to the 
journalistic framing of the Cole Inquiry in ways that were not always congruent with 
the preferred legal and government frames for its conduct. 
I have concluded that the framing of news reporting was a co-production between 
journalists and lawyers, strategic communications people and politicians. They 
engaged in a contest over what would be covered and which frames were dominant, 
with the object of influencing how the truth of the inquiry was conveyed to the 
Australian public. This reveals the complexity of reporting such independent 
inquiries, where journalists must observe, understand and interpret legal process, 
and analyse its larger social context and implications. 
I have argued that the inquiry was a highly mediatised event that shaped news 
coverage in two respects. First, the Cole Inquiry reporting was influenced by, and, in 
turn, influenced, the legal “performance” of what many regarded as a politically 
expedient investigation. 
Second, the reporting framed news stories within the national political debate about 
the AWB scandal, and thus was influenced by political communicators with a stake in 
determining the outcome of that conflict. 
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In order to understand the factors that shape inquiry reporting I began by surveying 
the current body of work on court and inquiry reporting, which revealed that 
Australia’s judiciary has long debated the way the media represents legal process 
and how it can shape that mediation, for example, through the appointment of court 
media liaison officers. In Chapter 2, I conclude that that there is already a basis on 
which to argue the existence of some level of institutional and individual response 
within the legal profession to media within the courts. This includes the crafting of 
legal “performance” for the media as a factor in what communications scholars 
describe as “mediatisation” of the law.  
Royal commissions and public inquiries such as the Cole Inquiry are quasi-legal 
processes of investigation with a variety of administrative purposes – they are an 
institution of government rather than of the separate executive branch of the 
judiciary. Journalists have a professional obligation to report these as legal events, 
however, they tend to contextualise these with external sources and even to draw 
conclusions about their purpose and potential findings in a way that is not common in 
everyday court reporting. Their ability to do this is tempered by an inquiry’s statutory 
powers to control media reporting, and to direct representation through the 
presentation or “performance” of the legal process. In this sense this research finds 
that journalism mediates inquiries, rather than proving that it mediatises the legal 
process. However, the evidence that media practice and coverage has an influence 
on legal “performance” is suggestive and requires further research. This might 
examine whether mediatisation operates in a circular process involving the 
interaction of, and contests between, these two powerful institutions. 
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Media reporting is, according to political scientists, central to the work and public 
perceptions of such inquiries. In terms of the Cole Inquiry, news reporters played an 
educative role in documenting and interpreting the legal process, but also a symbolic 
role in analysing the blame management of the scandal and a realpolitik role in 
framing the debate as a political contest – in the case of ABC Radio news within 
largely dominant and preferred meanings of the inquiry’s purpose. My research could 
be extended by further systematic research into the way in which commercial media, 
particularly print news, framed the inquiry. This could also test the proposition that 
reporters such as those from commercial broadcasters who only attended on “big 
days” were at a disadvantage in understanding the complexity of the event, and 
more likely to rely on information and explanations provided by the inquiry 
gatekeeper and other interested parties. 
The news media’s tendency to reflect these dominant frames is not to discount 
journalists’ power to exercise independent critique or to frame the evidence they 
heard critically. This was done through the external lens of the public and political 
debate about the wheat trade scandal that included argument about the narrow 
focus of the inquiry. This was a watchdog role that journalists regarded as valuable 
for the construction of public debate about the scandal.  
The conflict between this realpolitik function of journalism and its symbolic function 
was powerfully confirmed by the journalist interviewees in Chapter 4, when they 
raised concerns about the power of the inquiry’s media liaison officer to control the 
timing of the release of critical documents. The Inquiry was obliged to release all 
tendered documents, however, in the daily news cycle, the timing of such information 
access is everything. 
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Chapter 4 has confirmed the active role of journalists in filtering, interpreting and re-
framing legal proceedings for public consumption and analysed the constraints on 
their representation of a complex, lengthy Inquiry. I outlined how the sheer scale and 
scope of the evidence required journalists to make a series of filtering decisions 
about which stories would be covered and what information could be represented, 
within the confines of their particular production and publication demands. This is 
what placed the inquiry media liaison officer into a powerful position as an 
information gatekeeper.  
For all but a few journalists, the unfamiliar subject matter of agribusiness required 
the rapid acquisition of knowledge about international trading and contracting, in 
order to be able to identify relevant, timely material for coverage. Journalists needed 
to decipher legal, government and corporate documents and to analyse their 
implications, even if their subsequent summary reports could not go into much of that 
fascinating detail. The professional imperative that journalists supply speedy, rolling 
reports of complex proceedings mitigated against nuanced critiques of the legal 
process, and ultimately saw news reinforcing the role (and thus the mediated power) 
of the independent legal Inquiry. This need for quick understanding exposed them to 
the influence of political and corporate communicators, who attempted to reframe the 
legal process in the interests of their clients. 
I found that the news media’s professional narrative imperatives, particularly its focus 
on the news value of conflict and its interactions with elite sources, meant it tended 
to contextualise the inquiry’s operation within a macro socio-political frame of 
altruistic democracy. This then shaped its functional framing of specific actors and 
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witness evidence in the political “framing war” being conducted in the parliament and 
the public sphere over the AWB scandal.  
Utilising framing theory, I identify four frames for reporting on the Cole Inquiry. These 
were drawn from journalist and lawyer interviews, confirmed in an analysis of short-
form and rapid radio reporting from the inquiry, and they matched the terms of the 
national political debate over who was to blame for the scandal. 
The Howard government, and the inquiry’s lawyers and staff, promoted the frame of 
a “fair and open inquiry”. This reflected the argument that the government was 
correctly acting to get to the bottom of how Australia profited from its wheat trade 
with Iraq, while supplying almost $A300 million in cash to a regime considered so 
dangerous it was under an Australia-supported United Nations trade embargo.   
The “AWB culpable” frame was a position the Howard government slowly moved 
towards, as the inquiry it set up gradually uncovered the deliberate nature of the 
company’s payment of fees to the Iraqi regime.  
Together, these two functional frames represented the government’s preferred 
position, and were the dominant frame package of the radio news stories from the 
Cole Inquiry. The other two frames I identified broadly represented the argument of 
inquiry critics about the federal government’s alleged failure of oversight of 
Australian trade. They presented the Cole Inquiry as an “unfair and restricted 
inquiry”, and usually came in combination with the “government culpable” frame. 
To an extent it is unsurprising that the bulk of the Cole Inquiry stories were reported 
in the dominant frames, given that these reported what the inquiry was tasked to 
investigate. The Commissioner and lawyers acting as Counsel Assisting, rather than 
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the direct evidence, were the source of more than half the stories in those dominant 
frames, and inquiry lawyers would tend to promote their investigation as having 
integrity, but this indicates the power of the most senior inquiry lawyers to direct 
news mediation.  
In contrast, I did not expect to find that evidence given or tendered would be the 
source of almost all (83 of 101 stories) stories in the “unfair and restricted 
inquiry/government culpable” frame package. This could be because the frames that 
inquiry lawyers promoted were not pursuing the alternative information about the 
unfolding scandal for which the fourth estate was looking. Journalists in their 
watchdog role see inquiries as a professional opportunity to gain access to 
documents about the machinations of the bureaucracy that are otherwise restricted, 
and thus test the proper function of democratic government.  
It is a significant indicative finding that lawyers so directly sponsored one side of 
what I called the “framing war.” However, this finding is limited because I do not 
know exactly how this source material attracted journalists’ attention, and how it 
relates to timing of the inquiry’s provision of legal documentation. On the other hand, 
it does support McConnell et al’s (2008) proposition that the Cole Inquiry was a 
cross-institutional part of the Howard government’s blame-management processes. 
Further, it suggests the importance of political science inquiring into the 
mediatisation of inquiry and royal commission reporting. 
The study has found lawyers were mediatised players in the co-production of stories 
from the inquiry, but this in-depth analysis of their role suggests that their 
“performance” of the law is not only a matter of legal style but also a result of their 
media awareness, their interest in gaining public attention for their work and their 
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knowledge of the imperatives of journalists. A legal “performance” that entertained, 
by giving “a good line” to summarise or respond to evidence, was thus attractive to 
reporters trying to make salient a particular piece of evidence. Counsel Assisting, 
John Agius, was such a mediatised “performer” and a big contributor to what I call 
“lawyer-directed” stories. Journalists recognised the power of Commissioner Terence 
Cole, and this allowed him to direct a considerable number of stories, particularly 
where he defended the integrity of his inquiry and its fair and open frame. 
Significantly, I have found the media’s editorial imperatives to represent the inquiry 
as part of the political debate over the AWB scandal attracted a wide breadth of 
interventions in news-making by strategic communications professionals who tried to 
shape, or reshape, what made the news, and in Chapter 6 I used a case study to 
examine the impact of outside interventions on reporting agendas. 
This study found that corporate communications and public relations staff, inside and 
outside the hearings, had some influence on the focus of inquiry reporting. I found 
that strategic communications professionals worked in the inquiry to draw attention 
to the narrative lines that they wanted the media to pursue, on behalf of the 
politicians they served. Politicians then played a role in influencing framing by using 
the agenda-setting influence of Canberra on news production. Opposition politicians 
queried the legitimacy of the Cole Inquiry and sponsored a “framing war” over its 
meaning and conduct, which the government had portrayed as legitimate and 
independent. However, senior journalists who covered the inquiry had a strong 
understanding of the political battle for meaning and worked to maintain independent 
editorial control over the interpretation of evidence, as well as the public presentation 
of the Cole Inquiry’s role and limitations.  
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The Flugge case study demonstrates how journalists used both internal and external 
sources to mediate one day’s hearings. It also demonstrates the co-production of 
meaning in action. In my analysis of the reporting of day 29, it is clear that material 
sourced from outside the inquiry, including the Flugge photo and political 
interventions, impacted on coverage; that is, the mediation of the legal process. 
It is still unclear who leaked the Flugge photo to Fairfax Media but, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, a range of frame sponsors then vied to control its interpretation. The 
federal opposition successfully used the photo to promote its “Wheat for Weapons” 
frame, which positioned Flugge as a “cowboy” with government connections, 
although over time the image began to represent the dominant package, the “AWB 
culpable/fair and open inquiry” frame. 
Future studies of mediatisation in legal reporting should look at how new, real-time 
sources of information about inquiries, such as social media streams, impact on 
reporting – particularly as inquiries are now commonly live-streamed to journalists 
and the public. Social media (such as Twitter and Facebook) now give journalists 
immediate access to a wider range of frame sponsors who are commenting on 
evidence, and this may further broaden the range of players in any reportorial co-
production.  
My conclusion is that media reporting from the Cole Inquiry can be seen as a co-
production of meaning about a contested administrative event, with important 
political, legal and corporate implications for those involved in the process. This 
analysis explains why inquiry news reports sometimes highlighted different, and 
differently contextualised, interpretations of the event’s purpose and key evidence 
than can be found by reading the hearing transcripts. 
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A study of journalism practice and representations of the available evidence is not 
enough to understand the narrative or source focus of Cole Inquiry reporting. Neither 
is the suggestion that reporters went in to the process to pursue one particular 
framing of the Cole Inquiry, that of government culpability.  
The interviewees in this study are certainly a small proportion of the total number of 
lawyers and journalists involved in the Cole Inquiry and their views cannot always 
stand in for all participants. The analysis would have been strengthened by the 
participation of the Commissioner and his senior lawyers in the research, which 
could have confirmed or challenged the way other participants interpreted their 
actions, and clarified the purpose of subpoenaing the Prime Minister. An audience 
reception study might also have provided valuable insight into whether John 
Howard’s appearance diminished or enhanced the symbolic power of the inquiry. 
However, I am confident that the breadth of analytical material presented here 
provides a highly informed, reliable and generalisable account of the inquiry’s 
mediation and mediatisation, which can enrich further research in journalism, law 
and political studies.  
This thesis challenges the notion that journalists merely observe and reproduce the 
substance of legal events, and that lawyers act independent of any media interest. 
Rather, it suggests further studies are needed to establish the extent of any 
interdependence between these professions in such ad hoc inquiries, and their 
interaction with strategic communications professionals. This is particularly important 
in establishing the independence of the media from such bodies, as the number of 
journalists sent to report full-time on such events declines and the number of media 
communications specialists continues to rise in Australia. 
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Appendix 2: Legal participants’ interview questions 
What was your role? How many royal commission or high-profile inquiries have you 
acted in?  
While in the courtroom generally, how aware are you of journalists?  Scale of 1 to 10 
During the Cole Inquiry, how aware were you of the journalists following 
proceedings?  Scale of 1 to 10 
To what extent did you follow media coverage of the AWB Inquiry? (Did you receive 
professional monitoring reports? If so, why?)  
What types of media did you most often follow and why? 
How well did journalists represent the main issues relevant to the legal proceedings? 
(Were there any significant inaccuracies? Any occasions when the media missed the 
significance of something? Defining moments? Any penetrating analyses?) 
I am interested in whether media coverage impacted on how the inquiry proceeded: 
• in the language used by legal participants 
• structure of argument etc   
• timing of information release. 
Did media coverage impact on the way you acted in the inquiry? 
Did it affect other legal practitioners? 
What is the primary reason the presence of media does/does not affect you? 
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What is your professional assessment of whether a large media presence affects 
witnesses? 
Do you think the presence of media in the court affects the behaviour of 
commissioners/judges? Scale of 1 to 10. 
Cole Inquiry – Scale of 1 to 10? 
How does the media attention affect the behaviour of legal counsel? 
Have you seen legal tactics or “play-acting” or “dramatics” partially or fully designed 
to attract media coverage? 
Have you engaged in legal tactics or “play-acting” or “dramatics” partially or fully 
designed to attract media coverage? 
Have you heard the expression “play to the back of the room”? (Know its meaning? 
Does it exist?) 
Was the then Prime Minister called as a witness for the front of the room or the back 
of the room? (What was the legal reason to call him?) 
It was often said that this Inquiry was politically framed. What do you understand by 
that phrase? (Do you think that it applies here? If so, how is it manifested, and is it a 
problem?)   
Do you think the presence of media in court has a positive effect/no effect/a negative 
effect on the administration of justice in inquiries? 
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Appendix 3: Journalists’ interview questions 
How did you decide on what the main issues or events were to be covered in the 
AWB hearings? 
What factors influenced your choice of what you would cover? Were any outside the 
evidence you heard and reported on?  
Does the need to produce narratives about the day’s hearings impact on what you 
cover? 
While in the courtroom do you believe that the media presence affected witnesses? 
Why? 
How aware do you believe legal practitioners are of you the journalist? If affirmative 
what evidence do you have for this? 
Does the presence of the media affect lawyers or their behaviour? Evidence? 
Have you heard the expression “play to the back of the room”? 
During the Cole Inquiry, how aware do you think legal practitioners were of 
journalists covering the event? Scale of 1 to 10? (What are your scales based on?) 
Might your relationship/lack of interaction with a lawyer affect your reporting? If so, 
how? 
Do you think the presence of media in the hearing room affects the behaviour of 
commissioners/judges? If so, can you put it on a scale of 1 to 10? What is your 
evidence for this? 
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Have you seen counsel affected by the media in the courtroom – using legal tactics 
“showboating” or “play-acting” or “dramatics” partially or fully designed to attract 
media coverage? 
I am interested in the degree to which media coverage impacted on the 
“performance” of legal people during the inquiry – that is, the language used, timing 
of information release, structure of arguments etc. Do you think that happened – any 
examples? 
How does the “performance” of legal practitioners impact on what you choose to 
cover? 
Do you think the presence of media in court has a positive effect/no effect/a negative 
effect on the administration of justice? 
Would you ever make an assessment that a legal Inquiry is “politicised” while 
hearings are on? 
What does that mean to you and is it a problem?   
Would that affect your reporting decisions? Or would you be constrained by rules of 
legal reporting? 
Do you think that it applies here?  If so, how is it manifested? (Why call John Howard 
to give evidence?) 
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Appendix 4. Communications professionals’ interview questions 
Name and describe your role in the hearings phase of the inquiry? What was your 
object/aim? 
Did your role evolve or change in any way? (If so, why?) 
Would you say you had a pretty good knowledge of how the media would approach 
covering the inquiry?  
Were you able to hear/read most of the evidence? To what extent did you follow 
media coverage of the AWB Inquiry?  
Did you receive professional monitoring reports? If so, why?  
How well did journalists represent the main issues relevant to the legal proceedings?   
Were there any significant inaccuracies? Any occasions when the media missed the 
significance of something? Any penetrating analyses? 
How did you decide on what the main issues or events were?  
Was inaccuracy your concern?  
Did the media coverage impact on the way you did your job at the inquiry? 
Do you think that you had influence on the media and how it might have 
received/reported on what they heard at the hearings? (Evidence?)  
Did you want to influence coverage in any way? (For what purpose?) 
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I am interested in whether media coverage impacts on the “performance” of legal 
people during the inquiry (On how the inquiry proceeded – for example, the language 
used, timing of information release, structure of argument, etc.)  
What was your view of media consultants/public relations people who were trying 
directly to influence journalists? (for example, James Bond/BHP Billiton/Cargill) 
In the courtroom, do you believe that the media presence affected witnesses? Why? 
(examples?) 
During the Cole Inquiry, how aware do you think legal practitioners were of 
journalists covering the event? Scale of 1 to 10? (Evidence for this?) 
How much do you think the presence of media in the court affects the behaviour of 
commissioners/judges? Scale of 1 to 10? Evidence for this? (examples ?)   
Have you seen counsel affected by media in the courtroom – using legal tactics 
“showboating” or “play-acting” or “dramatics” partially or fully designed to attract 
media coverage? 
Do you think the presence of media in court has a positive effect/no effect/a negative 
effect on the administration of justice? 
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